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Foreword 
5/> Max Bingham QC 
A series of royal commissions in Australia from the 1960s on, brought a public 
awareness of the extent and impact of organised crime in this country and led to 
the establishment of the National Crime Authority (NCA). In an interesting local 
parallel, the Fitzgerald Inquiry held up a mirror to certain sections of Queensland 
society. The efforts of Commissioner Fitzgerald and his crew produced an 
awareness in this community about organised crime and corruption. They also led 
to consideration of a number of wider issues of great social significance and to the 
establishment of the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) and the Electoral and 
Administrative Reform Commission (EARC). 
In many ways, the Fitzgerald Report has proved a watershed. It has also 
demonstrated that there is, in fact, nothing new under the sun. Mr Fitzgerald's 
report has served as a reminder that Queensland politics do have, and have had for 
many years, a certain simplicity; and that the corrupting influence of power, too 
long enjoyed, knows no boundaries, neither party-political nor geographical. If the 
Queensland body politic is to remain healthy, it is essential that public awareness 
continues. It is indeed true that for evil to prevail, it is necessary only that good 
men do nothing. It is therefore important that the process of debate continues to 
enliven the public conscience. Public debate requires informed participation. It is 
for this reason that occasions such as the Fitzgerald Vision for Reform Conference 
(held in Brisbane on 29-30 November 1989) are so important. Queensland has no 
Upper House. An Upper House in itself is, of course, no guarantee of purity in 
political matters, and there is plenty of experience around the country to 
demonstrate that. But an Upper House does at least provide a forum in which 
public debate can occur and in which varying points of view can be expressed. In 
the absence of such an institution, it seems to me that the media and the academic 
world have an enhanced responsibility to provide the possibilities of such debate. 
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Now that the Fitzgerald adventure is moving into its legislative reform 
phase, it will be continually important for the agents of reform to be subjected to 
public scrutiny, comment and accountability. The two reform commissions are not 
excluded from this category. As they embark upon the discharge of their functions 
prescribed by the report and the ensuing legislation, it will be essential that they 
retain public confidence. From the point of view of the CJC, this will be very 
difficult in some areas because, of necessity, some of its enquiries and 
investigations will need to be in private. However, every opportunity must be 
taken to engage and attract public attention to the underlying purposes of the 
reform process. 
There will probably be little difficulty in achieving this, at least in the early 
stages of the work of the CJC because it seems clear that following from the 
Report, priority must be given to consideration of such topics as the control of 
prostitution and SP bookmaking; not to mention the reform of the police force. It 
can probably be fairly observed that each of these areas of activity has the 
potential for attracting public attention. But even the less glamorous and 
controversial realms of activity will require the same level of supervision. 
From the CJC's point of view, the initial steps in the reform process will 
necessarily focus upon police restructuring. This is the area in which the 
Fitzgerald comments have the greatest impact and the re-establishment of morale 
and efficiency among the police must be regarded as a matter of great urgency. 
Fairly closely linked with this is the revision of the legal provisions which 
regulate voluntary sexual behaviour and SP bookmaking, because it is clear from 
the report that those activifies generated the greatest opportunities for corruption 
and abuse in the pre-Fitzgerald days. No less important will be the rearrangement 
of provisions for the vocational training of police and the broadening of the police 
educational process. Commissioner Newnham has already indicated a policy that 
will require commissioned police officers to hold university qualifications by the 
late 1990s. Consequently, there is here a new challenge for the academic world to 
collaborate with police educators in seeing that this goal is achieved in a practical 
and effective way. 
Later, attention will need to be turned to the functioning of the criminal 
justice system and the way in which the courts and the police, and the correctional 
agencies, interact. This picture must include the work of the public prosecutors' 
and defenders' offices; and it may well be that in the long term this will be the 
most important area of the Fitzgerald inheritance. In establishing a body which is 
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capable of overviewing the whole criminal jusfice process, Queensland will be seen 
to be blazing a trail for other states to follow. It is a process which contains many 
exciting challenges. 
The work of the EARC covers a much wider field of public administration. 
Naturally, its primary task will be the electoral reform which Fitzgerald saw as 
being at the centre of the State's political activity. However, the ramificafions of 
EARC interest in the public service and local government areas generally are 
likely to be far-reaching and important. The coincidence of a change of 
government after a very long period of conservative dominance means that the 
stage is set for an exciting era of reform in Queensland. It imposes awesome 
responsibilities on those involved. 
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Introduction 
The Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities and Associated Police 
Misconduct (commonly known as the Fitzgerald Inquiry) was appointed in May 
1987 by the Queensland National Party Government. The Commission had one 
member, Tony Fitzgerald QC. Its Terms of Reference were limited and the 
Government clearly thought that the Inquiry would be a short term affair, a view 
shared by the Opposition and most other observers. 
In July 1989, the Fitzgerald Inquiry released its report to a highly expectant 
public amidst unprecedented media coverage. The Fitzgerald Inquiry had not 
been a short term affair. Instead it had gained extra powers, staff and resources to 
become one of the most expensive public inquiries in Australian history. Even 
before it had completed its inquiries, its impact had been felt throughout the 
Queensland political system: a police commissioner had been compelled to stand 
down: a premier had been forced into premature retirement by his party; and two 
ministers had lost their jobs. More than this, the widely reported public hearings 
verified what many had long suspected, that much was indeed rotten in the State of 
Queensland. Ultimately, the corruption which the Fitzgerald Inquiry revealed at 
the heart of Queensland's political institutions brought about the downfall of the 
resilient and long-lived National Party Government. 
Not only did the Fitzgerald Inquiry identify the sources and causes of 
corruption in Queensland, but also it sought to provide a vision for reform. The 
Report stated that "the most pressing task for this Commission was to formulate 
recommendations to found the process of reform) [which would allow] permanent 
instituuons and systems to work properly".2 The Report stressed that its 
recommendations made up a "package of reform"3 which had to be accepted in its 
entirety if corruption was to be tackled seriously. 
What provoked this volume and the conference which preceded it in 
Brisbane in November 1989, was this "package of reform". The Fitzgerald vision 
for reform captured the imagination of many Queenslanders. There was, at least 
in the early stages, almost universal support for the Fitzgerald Report by the 
Government, the Opposition and the media. National Party Premier Mike Ahern's 
unprecedented acceptance of the Report "lock, stock and barrer't twelve months 
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before its release symbolises this. In the flood of early enthusiasm for the Report, 
and repugnance for the corruption which it had revealed, there was little detailed 
analysis of its recommendations. The need for such analysis became even more 
apparent when it was clear that the Fitzgerald Report and its recommendations 
were the key issues in the 1989 Queensland elecfion and would colour the political 
life of the State for many years to come. 
In order to meet the need for a careful analysis of the Report away from the 
arena of party politics, the School of Management of the University College of 
Southern Queensland decided to run its inaugural Public Sector Management 
Conference on The Fitzgerald Vision for Reform: Making it Happen. These papers 
are the result of that conference. They bring together a wide range of contributors 
from the media, the police, the legal profession, the public sector and the 
universities. They cover all aspects of the Inquiry, from the media reports which 
were the catalyst for its establishment, to the style of the Inquiry itself and the 
implications of its recommendations for the police, for government, for the 
bureaucracy, for the media and for electoral reform. 
The Fitzgerald vision involves not only the creation of new institutions and 
processes and the employment of new personnel, but also the development of a 
new spirit of openness and accountability in bureaucrats and politicians and a new 
spirit of vigilance on the part of the Queensland public. Is this is too much to ask? 
The contributors to this volume seek to provide an assessment. 
Scott Prasser 
Rae Wear 
J R Nethercote 
Notes 
1, G.E. Fitzgerald QC, chairman. Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal 
Activities and Associated Police Misconduct, Report (Brisbane: Queensland 
Government Printer, 1989), p. 14. 
2. Ibid., p. 5. 
3. Ibid., p. 7. 
4, Australian Financial Review, 5 July 1988. 
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Perspective 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Corruption — The Evolution of an Idea 
1788-1988 
Gary Sturgess 
Corruption is - to borrow a charming Americanism from the 1960s - one of those 
acts that is characteristically committed between consenting adults in private. It is 
a secret crime - so much so that we have made secrecy one of the statutory indices 
of corruption. And it follows that those of us who would seek to compile histories 
of corruption - authors, journalists, even, may I say, royal commissioners - need to 
approach the task with a large dose of humility. We find ourselves, if you like, 
standing in the front garden of a house, trying to guess at the intimate personal 
relationships of the family inside. Very occasionally, through telephone intercepts 
or the evidence of a "super-grass", we are privileged to peek through a window and 
glimpse one or two scenes. Sometimes, a family argument spills out onto the front 
porch. But, most of the time, even with the powers of a royal commission, we are 
left standing out on the footpath trying to reconstruct the scenes inside according 
to our respective theories of corruption and the vignettes we have been lucky 
enough to glimpse. 
Any history of corruption must, therefore, be primarily a history, not of 
corruption itself, but of scandal, especially political scandal. Walter Lippman 
observed sixty years ago "It would be impossible for an historian to write a history 
of political corruption in America. What he could write is the history of the 
exposure of corruption."! And so it is with us. What we are studying, when we 
look at graft in our society, is not corruption itself, but corruption exposed, 
corruption scandalised, corruption moralised. 
It is, at once, both more and less than corruption itself. It is less in the 
sense that we are guessing at the whole picture from nothing more than a few 
small pieces of the jigsaw. It is more, because through exposure and 
scandalisation, we add to reality by personal hypothesis, misunderstanding and 
(quite proper) moral outrage. 
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This process of simplification and exaggeration that takes place during a 
period of scandal and reform, creates special problems for the historian. For the 
social reformer, scandal is but one of the tools of trade. The moral entrepreneur 
uses it to awaken public outrage and to facilitate attitudinal change within society. 
But for the historian, it is yet another layer of distortion through which 
interpretation of the past must be sought. Of these distortions, the one to which 
we are all most vulnerable, in my experience, is the tendency to retrospectivity; the 
inclinafion to read yesterday's corruption in light of today's moral and legal 
"certainties". 
There is nothing especially novel about this. Indeed, judicial reformers are 
deliberate in the selective use of "precedent" when they seek to justify change to 
the law. By arguing that the new law or ethic is, in fact, not new at all, but has 
always been so - only ignored by wicked men - the reformer minimises resistance 
and manages to present himself or herself at the same time, as a conservative. 
But for those of us who wish to understand corruption as it is, or was, such 
retrospectivity is deceptive and unprofessional. The brute fact is that both the law 
and society's ethics on corruption are still evolving. The boundary line between 
public duty and private interest is still being drawn. And the ethos against which 
we measure our public officials today is very different from that against which (say) 
Lachlan Macquarie judged himself. It is simply unfair to judge the officers of the 
New South Wales Rum Corps against the standards now being enforced by Ian 
Temby QC and Doug Drummond QC. 
In this chapter I want to trace this line between public duty and private 
interest and the way in which it has shifted over the 200 year history of government 
in New South Wales. It is my firm belief that we cannot know where we are unless 
we know where we have been. 
Origins of the Concept of the Bribe 
As John Noonan argues so eloquently in his superb study. Bribes,^ the question 
which we need to ask about corruption is not why does it exist but, rather, why is it 
deserving of censure? 
In almost every other part of human endeavour, reciprocity is regarded as 
an unquestioned good. In our personal relationships and in business, exchange is 
the norm, and gift-giving a virtue. In most societies, it is not only acceptable to 
bring a gift when approaching a more powerful social figure, but positively 
offensive not to do so. 
So the puzzle is not why these attitudes exist, but why, when it came to 
public officials, did we in the West develop a different ethic which treats gift-giving 
as corruption. 
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The answer according to Noonan, can be found among the kings who 
governed Mesopotamia two or three thousand years before Christ. Somewhere 
during that period it occurred to Ur-Nammu or one of his contemporaries that if, 
on Judgment Day, God rewarded men according to the value of their gifts, and not 
according to the virtue of their acts, then the poor were not going to make it to the 
"Great Dwelling". And it followed, when these earthly kings set about trying to 
emulate Divine Justice in their courts, that they made a virtue of treafing rich and 
poor alike. So it is that, in the Old Testament, we find, for example, the prophet 
Isaiah condemning Israel's leaders for taking bribes when they sit in judgment: 
Your princes are rebels, accomplices of thieves 
All are greedy for gifts and itch for presents. 
They do no justice to the orphan. 
They never hear the cause of the widow. (Isaiah 1:23) 
As a result of this very deep biblical foundation, English law has regarded 
judicial bribery as unacceptable from the very earliest of times. By 1788, when 
Captain Arthur Phillip sailed into Port Jackson, there was no doubt in anyone's 
mind that corruption of the judicial process was beyond the law. 
English Law and Practice, 1788 
Regrettably, the same cannot be said of the law as it affected other public officials 
- politicians, military officers, civil servants and the like. 
Indeed, but for the development of a few rules on the sale of offices (the by-
product of the debate within the Church over the practice of simony) and an eariy 
and disastrously unsuccessful attempt at preventing election bribery, English law 
had developed little on the subject of corrupfion before the late eighteenth 
century. 
In fact, it is fair to say, that as Arthur Phillip set sail from Portsmouth in 
1787, British attitudes to corruption were in a state of flux. In the late eighteenth 
century, electorates, as we know them now, did not exist in Britain. Members were 
elected by boroughs or counties with a restrictive property-based franchise and, in 
the Ccise of the rotten boroughs, constituencies consisting of as few as a dozen 
hand-chosen councillors. 
Even in the open boroughs, electoral bribery was commonplace, and 
treating - plying would-be voters with food and drink prior to vofing - was a 
national outrage. By way of example: "At Shaftesbury in 1774, amidst a great deal 
of drunkenness, one of the aldermen disguised as Mr Punch passed sums of twenty 
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guineas through a hole in the door, for which each elector had to sign a bill to an 
imaginary character called Mr Glenbucket."3 
Such were the simple artifices by which corrupt politicians by-passed the 
laws on bribery in the late eighteenth century. In the 1750s, Hogarth had produced 
his famous series of prints. The Election, lampooning these practices. He created a 
metaphor that was to be overworked throughout the nineteenth century by fiction 
writers such as Charies Dickens, Benjamin Disraeli, and H.G. Wells.'t 
England waited until 1832 for the first of its electoral Reform Acts, and 
1867 before the Great Reform Act was passed by Disraeli's Government. Secret 
ballots did not arrive until 1872. 
Throughout the late 1770s, Lord North and George III apparently 
developed a sophisticated system for buying the votes of members of Parliament 
through direct payments of money. By about 1780, such blatant bribery appears to 
have stopped, partly because the King's war against the party system had failed and 
partly because of the unofficial commencement of parliamentary reporfing.5 
Another corrupt practice which thrived well into the nineteenth century was 
the awarding of military supply contracts to members of Parliament. The armed 
forces were a hothouse of corruption at this time, although the loss of the 
American War of Independence had shaken the military estabhshment and led to 
some reform, especially in the Navy, aimed at rooting out corruption and 
patronage. 
In 1780, too, Edmund Burke had made his now-famous attack on defunct 
offices of the Crown, which had been used by George III to buy the loyalty of 
selected members in the Parliament. Reform of these extravagant and now 
entirely-useless offices had been blocked, in Burke's marvellous metaphor, because 
"the turnspit of the King's kitchen was a member of Parliament." In 1782, Lord 
Rockingham abolished many of these offices by Act of Parliament, and Burke, 
newly-appointed Paymaster under Rockingham, abolished more by himself. 
And yet - and this is important to understanding the uncertain state of 
ethics on corruption at this time - Burke used his new position to appoint one of 
his backers as his Deputy Paymaster, his son as another, and his younger brother as 
Secretary to the Treasury.6 The distinction in Burke's mind, and in the mind of 
most of his contemporaries, seems to have been the payment of money. 
Reciprocal or partial behaviour was tolerable. Cash payments were not. 
As the First Fleet lay off Portsmouth in the early months of 1787, British 
newspapers were filled with reports of the impeachment proceedings against 
Warren Hastings, the greatest corruption trial of the century - brought by none 
other than Edmund Burke. In spite of clear evidence of having received payments 
while acting as the Governor of Bengal, in 1795 Warren Hastings would be 
formally judged by the House of Lords to be not guilty.7 
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Despite this setback, reform of the civil service had already begun in the 
early 1780s. In 1782, in something of an over-reaction, civil servants had been 
endrely disenfranchised, on the assumption that, in voting, they faced an 
impossible conflict of interest. 
Not undl the mid-nineteenth century were sinecures and pensions finally 
purged. And only in 1854, was the Northcote-Trevelyan report published, thereby 
laying the foundations of a modern, merit-based public service. 
Paradoxically - partly as a result of the impeachment proceedings against 
Warren Hastings - the origins of these reforms lay in the British Civil Service in 
India - from where, indeed, the term "civil service" derives. 
New South Wales, 1788 - 1856 
Arthur Phillip thus set sail for Botany Bay with an uncertain heritage as concerned 
the law on corruption. Robert Hughes, indeed, records that the contractor who 
victualed the First Fleet, Duncan Campbell, had corruptly shortchanged the 
convicts on their food supply, giving them half a pound of rice, instead of a pound 
of flours - an inauspicious beginning, evidence that New South Wales' corruption 
problems did not start with the Rum Corps. 
It can, however, be said with safety, that syndicated or organised corruption did 
begin with the senior officers of the New South Wales Corps, as it was formally 
known. 
Until 1823, when Sir Thomas Brisbane appointed a Legislative Council, 
New South Wales was governed by the military. So it is not surprising to find that 
the same principles of accounting, the same standards of propriety adopted by the 
British army elsewhere in the Empire, prevailed in New South Wales in the early 
years of the nineteenth century. The officers of the New South Wales Corps 
monopolised trade in the infant colony because they alone had access to large 
sums of sterling, which were acceptable to visiting captains as foreign exchange.' 
In addition, John Macarthur and his fellow-officers also attracted the 
condemnation of the small farmers because of their control of the Commissariat -
the store through which the convicts and many of the settlers were fed and clothed, 
and through which the produce of the infant settlement was traded. Many 
allegafions of profiteering were probably unfounded. There is no doubt, 
nevertheless, that Macarthur and his fellow-officers built their pastoral empires on 
the foreign exchange monopoly which they held during these early years. That 
monopoly was founded, not just on their personal incomes, but on the company 
funds which Macarthur, as Paymaster of the NSW Corps, controlled. To put it 
bluntly, Macarthur built his fortune, at least in those early years, by risking army 
funds and taking the profits for himself. 
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This same abuse of office characterised the early years of the Commissariat. 
A succession of early commissaries were dismissed or charged with fraud and like 
offences relating to use of govertunent funds for their personal enrichment. The 
New South Wales commissaries were not so much grafters who had knowingly set 
about to break the law, as poorly qualified Treasury men who had not caught up 
with a shift in that boundary line between public duty and private interest.lo 
As late as 1869, a volume on the military forces of the Crown could still 
report that "it has been the usage, as far back as our inquiry hcis gone, for the 
Officers in these departments to be themselves the Proprietors of, or to have 
shares or interests in, a great number of the vessels and small craft and in almost 
all the waggons and horses, employed in these services".ii 
As in the United Kingdom, government in New South Wales in the first half 
of the nineteenth century was marked by patronage and favouritism. Among the 
many criticisms of Lachlan Macquarie's administration made by Commissioner 
Bigge, was the Governor's patronage of a small number of public works 
contractors. In particular, Macquarie was criticised for granting tickets of leave to 
convicts in breach of his own published guidelines, in order to supplement the 
work gangs of this select group of contractors. Bigge was careful to clear 
Macquarie of any suggestion of corrupt conduct, but he did comment on the way in 
which the Governor's infringement of his own rules had fostered an environment 
in which corruption could flourish.12 
Macquarie's most notorious act of patronage was granting a monopoly on 
the importation of rum to a group - consortium would be the modern word - of 
private entrepreneurs, in return for an agreement to construct a hospital in what is 
now Macquarie Street. It was, to borrow the vernacular, a licence to print money. 
The consortium unfortunately had not tied up the terms of the monopoly, and they 
were forced by Francis Greenway to rebuild part of the hospital at their own 
expense. In spite of widespread rumours about the fortune they had made, the 
consortium, it appears from the available evidence, lost money on the deal. 
Macquarie, nonetheless, had to bear Lord Bathurst's criticism and the suspicion of 
some of Sydney's leading citizens. Some regard it as significant that the Parliament 
of New South Wales is today still housed in the northern wing of Lachlan 
Macquarie's rum hospital.13 
As for Macquarie's patronage, all that we can say is that the man was a 
product of his environment. After a life in the British army, Lachlan Macquarie 
cannot have regarded patronage as anything but the norm. After stagnating 
because of his refusal to buy commissions in the 77th Regiment, he had purchased 
the post of the Regiment's Deputy Paymaster-General in Bombay in 1797. If he 
did not use this position to recoup his investment - as most army paymasters were 
forced to do - then Macquarie certainly used it to befriend powerful allies who 
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were able to accelerate his later promotion. We also know that Macquarie was 
active in lobbying for the appointment of his relatives to ranks within the regiment 
- brothers, nephews, cousins, servants - some of whom were only five years old. 
Macquarie's patronage should not detract from our perception of the man's 
basic integrity. He was, above all, a man of his time.i" Patronage of private 
entrepreneurs, both by the Colonial Office and by officials in Sydney, continued 
throughout the nineteenth century, and it is often difficult for us to distinguish 
legitimate government support from corrupt or improper favourites. Even a rogue 
such as Ben Boyd could begin his Australian adventure by approaching the 
Colonial Office and obtaining special privileges in relation to land grants and 
government tenders. 
It was difficult enough for the citizens of Sydney in the 1840s to tell where 
Boyd's public and private interests stopped and started.is Looking back 150 years 
later, I fear we cannot hope to successfully make such a distinction now. 
Government by Factions 
Responsible government in 1856 brought a new set of challenges, among them the 
difficulties of conducting honest elections. 
New South Wales was in some ways a leader in electoral law reform, with 
the secret ballot in 1858, two years after Victoria, but fourteen years earlier than 
the United Kingdom. But in other ways, the law and practice governing elections 
in New South Wales remained positively eighteenth century until early in the 
twentieth century: Voting extended over several weeks; rolls were poorly 
maintained; poll supervision and scrutineering were rare; and, until the 1890s, 
treating was not illegal. Not surprisingly, in this penumbra between public duty 
and private interest, electoral malpractice thrived. Between 1858 and 1900, some 
seventy petitions alleging electoral impropriety were investigated by the NSW 
Parliamentary Committee of Elections and Qualifications.i6 This, for example, is 
an extract from a letter from James McClean, one of Henry Parkes' electoral 
agents, concerning the 1891 election for the seat of Tlie Hume: 
... as Mr Burley's hotel is almost opposite the Court House where the 
polling took place we had an excellent opportunity of seeing how faithfully 
he, Burley, and many other hirelings acted during the day in fulfilment of 
the bribery arrangement. From 8 to 4 there was one incessant stream of 
half-muddled creatures led like sheep to the slaughter between two or more 
agents over to the booth, and on entering which, a printed paper was placed 
in their hand ... 
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Burley's hotel was placarded off as Lyne and Hayes committee 
rooms and drink was freely administered minus payment by the drinkers. 
Cabs were also flying about having 'Vote for Lyne and Hayes' placards 
affbced on the sides, and as they arrived agents jostled them through the 
hotel to get primed with drink and then led over to the booth.i? 
The bribery arrangement referred to by McClean was an agreement by 
Hayes to deliver a government roadworks contract to Burley if he worked to get 
him and Lyne elected. 
The infant years of New South Wales democracy did not, as our "founding 
fathers" had hoped, produce a party system such as had developed in Britain. For 
almost forty years, until the advent of the Labor party in 1891, the State was 
governed by loose alliances of independent members, clustered about powerful 
figures such as Sir Henry Parkes and Sir John Robertson. 
Not surprisingly, this period of factional government was highly unstable, 
and the temptation to use patronage or even bribery to hold onto office must have 
been great. Allegations of bribery are notoriously difficult to prove, but if smoke is 
evidence of fire, then bribes were paid for members' votes during this period of 
rapidly shifting alliances. 
It is some measure of the times, that in the 1885-86 session of the NSW 
Parliament, the Speaker, Edmund Barton, found it necessary to rule the following 
terms as unparliamentary: "cooking a return", "gaol birds", "bribery and forgery", 
"bribery and corruption", "this corrupt government", among others of a similar 
kind.18 
More significantly, in 1881, a royal conunission investigated claims that 
members had been paid for their votes on the appropriation of money to the 
Millburn Creek Copper-mining Company, which was part-owned by the Minister 
for Mines, Ezekiel Baker. The Commissioner accepted evidence that at least one 
member, a former minister, Thomas Garrett, had been party to an agreement to 
sell his vote in return for shares. As a result. Baker was expelled from the 
Parliament and his faction leader. Jack Robertson, who was effectively the Deputy 
Premier, resigned out of personal loyalty to the two men. Robertson's resignation 
saved Garrett from expulsion, Robertson returned to the ministry and Baker 
successfully applied to the next Parliament for his expulsion to be rescinded.is 
In 1889, yet another inquiry was held into allegations of bribery to buy 
members' votes on a tramway tender.20 In retrospect, it is difficult to reconstruct 
just how serious this bribery problem was. But from the very highest public 
officials in the State, contemporaries of this period accepted the inevitability of 
nepotism and patronage. In 1868, for example, the Chief Justice, Sir Alfred 
Stephen, wrote to Henry Parkes: 
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Parliamentary (or as it is fancifully called responsible) government is 
necessarily to some extent - it at all events always has been - a government 
by corruption ... Pass a stringent Public House Act - or try to do so - such as 
shall really restrain public drunkenness, and you will not be Colonial 
Secretary six months. Appoint the sons and nephews of a sufficient number 
of members of Parliament to be clerks of Petty Sessions or Waiters in the 
Customs or something on the Roads or in a lighthouse, and you will 
command votes for the session, probably for two.21 
Prior to 1856, entrants to the New South Wales Public Service had been 
required to pass an examination in the basic skills, but this had been abandoned on 
the arrival of responsible government. It was not resumed until 1871, although this 
could only check the very worst abuses of the system. 
Until 1889, when they were paid for their services, the financial pressures 
on some members of Parliament were considerable. Henry Parkes was 
bankrupted early in his career, and spent his entire political life on the edge of 
insolvency. 
The immense burden on a young MP who became a Minister of the Crown 
is well illustrated by Bernhard Wise, elected for the seat of South Sydney in 1887 
and appointed two months later by Henry Parkes as Attorney-General. Recently 
returned with a law degree from Oxford, Wise was one of New South Wales' most 
promising political leaders. He was not a wealthy man and, in the absence of a 
political party to share the costs of election, the new member for South Sydney 
started political life in debt. 
Upon appointment as Attorney-General in May, Wise was obliged to resign 
from Parliament and contest the seat again. At that time, the 1707 Act of 
Settlement still prevailed in New South Wales, requiring a member of Parliament 
who accepted an office for profit under the Crown to resign from Parliament and 
stand again. Wise's debt was immediately doubled and, with a full-time job in the 
Executive Government, he was deprived of whatever opportunity he would have 
had at the Bar to slowly pay off his financial obligations. 
Wise undertook paid legal work for the Crown whilst Attorney-General. 
This, too, was attacked by the Opposition and nine months after his appointment, 
he was forced through financial pressures, to resign from the Ministry. At a time 
when most MPs were still "gentlemen", Bernhard Wise's financial misfortune was a 
matter of political gossip. And during his second Attorney-Generalship in 1902, it 
was rumoured, entirely without foundation as best we know, that the controversial 
early release from prison of a Jewish moneylender was related to Wise's financial 
indebtedness to someone of the same name.22 (I should add that, in the payment 
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of members, Australia once again led the United Kingdom, where MPs were not 
paidumil 1911.) 
Away from this frontier between public and private interest, in the 
heartland of the law on public duty, errant officials continued to be pursued for 
abuse of office. They included a senior officer in 1856, who misappropriated 
moneys from Treasury's iron box, a group of Customs officers in 1858, who 
conspired with smugglers to defraud the revenue, a corrupt licensing magistrate 
and a crooked Lands Department accountant.23 
By the 1890s, corruption was the bread and butter of New South Wales 
politics. In 1896, in his Life of Sir Henry Parkes, Charles Lyne could write of this 
distinctly New South Wales phenomenon: 
No Government in New South Wales is free from charges of this nature. At 
one period or other of the existence of all Ministries, acts savouring of 
corruption are alleged against them. The charges are not proved; except, 
perhaps, by those whose natures prevent them from thinking anything but 
evil of their fellows, they are not believed; but, nevertheless, they do a 
certain amount of harm. They give rise to a feeling of dissatisfaction and of 
unrest, and they assist all movements of a directly hostile character against 
the Government.^ 
Royal Commissions on Corruption 
The first minister of the Crown to be investigated for corrupfion in office was the 
colourful (former) Lands Minister, Paddy Crick, in 1905. By the turn of the 
century. New South Wales' land laws were a bewildering maze, and a class of land 
agents had grown up to guide the cifizenry of the State through this legal 
nightmare and through the lobbies of the Department of Lands. Among these 
land agents was William Nicholas Willis, a member of Pariiament, a dose friend of 
and, it was alleged, sometime bagman to the former Minister. 
The subsequent muddle of royal commissions and trials is too complex to 
outline more than briefly here.25 Very early in the Royal Commission, Willis fled 
the State, placing himself beyond the jurisdiction of the inquiry. He was arrested 
in Western Australia trying to leave the country, but successfully defeated 
extradition proceedings and left for South Africa on the next mail steamer. More 
than a year passed before he returned to stand trial - a source of no small political 
embarrassment to the Government. During the life of the inquiry, Crick was tried 
twice for corruption, and twice walked away free, once from a directed acquittal 
once from a hung jury. He reftised to answer questions put to him at the Ro al 
Commission. He prosecuted the Commissioner for illegally administerine 
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And, following suspension from the service of the House, Crick was in the end, 
physically removed from the Legislative Assembly by the sergeant-at-arms while 
threatening an acfion in assault. 
In spite of his best efforts, the Royal Commission finally brought down a 
finding of corrupfion. Crick was struck off the roll of solicitors, although he was 
successful in his assault case against the sergeant-at-arms. He died at home in 
August 1908 after a day at the Rosehill races. 
Crick raised for the first fime, many of the problems inherent in the 
corruption royal commission - the use of indemnified informants, witnesses 
excusing themselves from the jurisdiction, protection of the rights of persons who 
may later be charged criminally. 
And speaking as I am, at a time when the Independent Commission Against 
Corrupfion (ICAC) is accused of being an unprecedented threat to civil liberties, it 
is interesting to note that it was in the midst of this inquiry that the New South 
Wales Parliament amended its Royal Commissioners Evidence Act to empower the 
Commissioner to compel the production of self-incriminating evidence. 
During a subsequent Royal Commission in 1914, into corruption in the 
Lands Department - again involving members of Parliament acting as land agents -
the Government was once again to expand the powers of the Commissioner to 
compel the taking of evidence from witnesses and to punish for perjury.26 
The following two or three decades were to see royal commissions used 
extensively for investigafing corruption and, for the first time in New South Wales 
at least, the appointment of royal commissions with narrow terms of reference for 
the purpose of covering up. 
From the elecfion of the first Labor Government in 1910 until the fall of 
the Holman Nationalist Goverrmient nine years later, the New South Wales 
Government went into business to challenge the so-called "trusts" and "combines", 
and to fulfil Labor's philosophical commitment to nationalisation. 
During these years, the Government acquired a baking enterprise, several 
blue metal quarries, a brickworks, a joinery works, sawmills, a timberyard, a 
trawling fleet, and the State Monier Pipe and Reinforced Concrete Works. 
Investigafions were also made into the possible nationalisation of the steel and 
petroleum industries. Of these, the bakery, the timberyard, the trawling 
enterprise, the pipe works and the mooted monopoly of petrol involved successive 
premiers in no less than seven corrupfion royal commissions. 
Queenslanders are familiar with the corruption that surrounded these early 
nationalised industries. But fifteen years before Mungana Mines brought down 
Ted Theodore, the Labor party's first martyr to alleged corruption in the new 
state-owned enterprises was Arthur Hill Griffith, the New South Wales minister 
for Public Works.27 
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Corruption as Conflict of Interest 
In the midst of the political cut-and-thrust surrounding these inquiries, among the 
allegations of muck-raking and the cries of cover-up, we are able to trace new 
developments in the line between public duty and private interest. 
It is during one of these royal commissions that we see argued, for the first 
time in Australia I suspect, corruption as a breach of public trust: "The Minister 
has undertaken a public trust... and if he deliberately and intentionally commits a 
breach of his public duty, and wilfully and unlawfully exceeds the powers conferred 
upon him, without due regard to the public interest, then he is clearly guilty of 
maladministration as is the private trustee ..."28 
So radical was this proposition, so unknown to the law in Australia at that 
time, that the judge who was conducting the inquiry missed the point entirely and 
dismissed the commission after two days, on the basis that no criminal charge of 
corruption had been alleged. 
It was also during this turmoil surrounding Arthur Griffith that the concept 
of a ministerial code of conduct first emerged in Australian politics. 
While the New South Wales Parliament had been struggling with cormpt 
public works contracts, the House of Commons was grappling with the Marconi 
share scandal. Marconi was, as it turned out, a comparative peccadillo on the part 
of several senior ministers in Asquith's administration, but it became a cause 
celebre because the Government tried to cover up. As one newspaper put it at the 
time, even "the most harmless facts will hurt if they are drawn out like teeth". In 
the midst of the debate over Marconi shares, Asquith delivered his speech on 
ministerial "rules of obligation".29 
And in September 1913, barely four months later, the New South Wales 
Opposition was arguing their application to the Minister for Public Works, Arthur 
Griffith.3o While they were not formally adopted by the New South Wales 
Government at that time, Asquith's rules are significant in that they became the 
foundation of the ministerial codes of conduct that have been adopted in Australia 
in later years. 
Developments in the Law on Bribery 
In July 1914, there was another development in the law on bribery which, although 
it took place in the Court of Criminal Appeal in England, was of such moment that 
it cannot be overlooked here. The Court confirmed the conviction of Lieutenant-
Colonel Charles Whitaker for conspiracy to bribe.si 
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Whitaker was the officer commanding the Second Battalion of the King's 
Own Yorkshire Light Infantry and, in return for the payment of several hundred 
pounds a year, had awarded the regimental canteen contract, not once, but several 
times, to Lipton Limited, a London catering firm. 
His defence was that the common law did not recognise an offence of 
bribing a public official employed in a ministerial (as opposed to judicial) capacity. 
Bribing judicial officers was a crime. So was the sale of bribes. 
But here in England in 1914, was one of His Majesty's Counsel seriously 
arguing that it was not an offence at common law to bribe a public ministerial 
officer. As it emerged, the judge did not accept this line of argument, but there 
was not, as he claimed, "ample authority" to support his decision. Indeed of the 
three cases which he relied on, one was a case of election bribery and another the 
sale of offices. 
The case was not especially significant for the United Kingdom, which had, 
by now, long specific statutes to deal with bribery. In New South Wales, which to 
this day is still governed by the common law on bribery, the case was a crucial one. 
Bribery of Members of Parliament 
At about the same time in New South Wales, several landmark judgments on the 
bribery of members of Parliament were being handed down. The New South 
Wales Supreme Court had already in 1875 ruled in R. v. Edward White32 that 
payment of a member of the Legislative Assembly for his vote in the House was a 
bribe at common law. 
The decision is noteworthy for several reasons. It appears to be the first 
such case in English law; secondly, because two of the judges couched their 
decision in terms of "public trust"; finally, because of Sir James Martin's reply to 
the defence that bribing members of Parliament was customary: 
It has been suggested that in fimes gone by, members of Parliament have 
been notoriously corrupted by bribes of various kinds, and that the practice 
cannot be said even at the present day to be wholly discontinued. It is 
urged that the notoriety of such transacfions, and the absence of any 
prosecution in connection with them, is a strong reason for holding them to 
be cognisable by Parliament only. I cannot admit the force of such an 
argument. It may not be an uncommon thing for a member of the 
Legislature to have his conduct influenced by benefits given or promised, 
but the difficulty of proving that to be a bribe which the parties interested 
profess to regard as a just attenfion to the wishes and arguments of proved 
and steady supporters, may well account for the fact that there has been no 
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conviction for an attempt to bribe a member of Pariiament. That such an 
attempt is a Common Law misdemeanour cannot, in my opinion, admit of 
any doubt...33 
In 1914 the Boorabil Royal Commission considered yet another case 
involving members of the New South Wales Legislative Assembly acting as land 
agents. Commissioner Pring, who had become something of a full-fime royal 
commissioner under the McGowen and Holman Governments, issued a stern 
caution about this practice and the conflict in which it placed members when 
matters came before the House.34 The following year, a civil acfion was taken to 
the High Court by two of these members who were seeking payment from one of 
their customers for services rendered.3S The High Court held the contract to be 
contrary to public policy and therefore void: "The law cannot supervise the 
conduct of members of Parliament as to the pressure they may bring to bear on 
Ministers, but if they sell the pressure the bargain is, in my opinion, void as against 
public policy."36 
Eight years later, the High Court once again addressed this question in R. v. 
Boston, yet another case involving payments to a member of the New South Wales 
Legislative Assembly over Crown lands.37 This was a criminal case, an unusual 
charge of conspiracy to corrupt a public officer, based more on the common law 
offence of public mischief than that of bribery. 
The question before the High Court was whether a member of Parliament 
commits a criminal offence by taking payment to lobby ministers and the 
departments of State. The court's answer was that he did. As it was put by Mr 
Justice Higgins: "By agreeing to take the money, he puts himself in a position in 
which his interest and his duty conflict. It does not matter for this purpose whether 
the acquisition of the particular land by the Crown is in fact a good thing for the 
public or not; it is enough that the member by his agreement incapacitates himself 
from performing his duty to exercise his true judgement."38 
It is fair, 1 think, to say that the law on bribery, insofar as it affects the 
duties of members of Parliament, has not progressed much further since 1923. In 
1983, in keeping with the modern focus on conflict of duty and interest, the New 
South Wales Parliament did amend the Constitution Act to introduce a public 
register of members' interests. 
But as the gaoling of the former minister for Corrective Services Rex 
Jackson, showed, such a register is unlikely to be effective against members who 
are bent on abusing their positions of trust. 
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Election Bribery 
One of the reasons why corrupfion largely ceased to be a problem in the New 
South Wales Parliament, was the advent of a strong party system, where the 
individual votes of members are of less importance. Where allegafions of bribery 
did surface in later years, most notably in the 1930s, was in the Legislative Council 
where the major parties have had greater difficulty in maintaining control.39 
But the shift of power from the individual member to the party brought with 
it a corresponding shift in concern about corruption, and election funding took on 
even greater significance. Where, as in the case of Sir Robert Askin, a premier 
does not have a close working relationship with the party machine, and accepts 
polifical donafions personally, then the concern is even greater. 
In a recently-published defence of Askin, the former premier's press 
secretary, Geoff Reading, has acknowledged that: "The Premier maintained a 
record of donafions handed to him personally in a little exercise book he kept in 
the top drawer of his desk... He kept money so received in a separate bank 
account, and, insofar as it was possible, away from Liberal party headquarters."* It 
is hardly surprising that the people of the state should have misunderstood the 
status of accounts kept in a little exercise book in the top drawer. 
New South Wales introduced laws on the public funding of elections and 
the disclosure of polifical donations in 1981. It is, nevertheless, clear from the 
1988 prosecution of the NSW secretary of the Labor party, Stephen Loosley, and 
recent proceedings before the ICAC, that the boundary line between public duty 
and private interest in this most difficult area has not yet been clearly settled. 
Confirmation of the uncertainty which still exists at this political interface, 
is the decision late last year of the NSW Court of Disputed Returns, Scott v. 
Marfin.4i In the March 1988 general elecfion for the New South Wales 
Parliament, the ALP candidate. Bob Martin, had won the seat of Port Stephens by 
a margin of ninety votes. The Liberal Party candidate, Scott, claimed that in the 
weeks prior to the election, Martin, who was a candidate for, but not yet a member 
of Parliament, handed out $38,000 in unsolicited donations from various 
govenmient departments to local groups and organisations. Scott alleged that this 
amounted to bribery under the Parliamentary Electorates and Elections Act. 
Mr Jusfice Needham found that Martin's actions did amount to bribery 
within the meaning of the Act and declared the elecfion void: "(Martin's) actions 
were not, in my opinion, corrupt in the ordinarily accepted meaning of that word; 
unfortunately, in modern times, there seems to be an accepted view that public 
moneys are in the unrestricted gift of those in power. In some cases, the 
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temptation is to use such resources for purposes of party polifical advantage. That, 
in my opinion, is what had been done in the present case...-^ 
If the judge had known his legal history a little better, he would have known 
that this was not a modern but a very ancient practice. 
Recent Developments in the Law on Bribery 
Following developments in the United Kingdom and other Australian States, the 
NSW Parliament passed a Secret Commission Prohibition Act 1919, which made 
criminal, payments made to an agent without the approval of his or her principal. 
Although it also dealt with public officials, the Bill was debated entirely as a 
reform to the commercial law and was little used in subsequent years to prosecute 
corruption in government. 
Following an abortive police investigation into alleged corrupfion in the 
Transport Workers Union, the Unsworth Government repealed the Act and 
inserted a new secret commissions offence in the Crimes Act 1987. 
The new provision made this offence indictable rather than summary, 
extended the farcical six months limitation period indefinitely, and did away with 
the reverse onus of proof. It had the effect of both strengthening and weakening 
the law on secret commissions, making it easier to prosecute, but more difficult to 
prove. 
A more encouraging development was the Darling Harbour Casino Act 1986 
which borrowed from an American statement on the law of bribery, and overcame 
many of the deficiencies of common law bribery. It also extended bribery, which 
has traditionally been associated with public officers, to include private people 
exercising public functions under that Act. 
The Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 defines 
corruption in the very widest terms and picks up the concept of public trust for the 
first time in New South Wales statute law. 
Scrutiny of the Executive 
Another development in recent decades which has no doubt had an effect in 
suppressing corruption, has been the trend to place the Executive Government 
under closer public scrutiny. The Askin Government introduced the Ombudsman 
Act 1974 and although the office was not intended specifically to pursue corruption 
- in fact, successive Ombudsmen have chosen not to do so - there can be no doubt 
that the exposure of "wrong conduct" has had a positive effect. Likewise, although 
the Freedom of Information Act 1988 is expected to make dishonest and improper 
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decision-making by the Executive more difficult, it is not primarily an anti-
corruption measure. 
Commissions of Inquiry 
Finally, some comment should be made about the recent history of commissions of 
inquiry. 
One black moment in the development of the royal commission as a 
weapon against corruption, was the Sydney City Council (Disclosure of Allegations) 
Act 1953. As the title suggests, the Labor-dominated council had been under siege 
for several years over alleged corruption among aldermen and employees. 
No doubt sick and tired of the persistence of these stories, and the political 
harm which they were causing, the Cahill Government refused demands to set up a 
royal commission. Instead, in late November 1953, it hastily enacted legislation 
which had the effect of requiring any person who made corruption allegations 
against the Council, to justify them before a Supreme Court judge, with a penalty 
of twelve months imprisonment for the failure to produce the information on 
which the allegations were based. It was a blatant attempt to silence critics of the 
Council. Predictably, it had a hostile reception from the Opposition and the 
Sydney press. The Act was eventually repealed in 1976. 
In recent years, growing public concern about corruption and repeated 
Opposition and media demands for royal commissions, have led to quite different 
responses. The Wran Government introduced the Special Commissions of Inquiry 
Act 1983. It was directed not towards discovering and exposing the facts of a 
matter - as the Royal Commissions Act is - but to determining whether there is 
sufficient evidence warranting the prosecution of any person. The Legislation was 
used twice successfully, in the investigation of the prisoner early release racket and 
the police investigation into the murder of Donald Mackay, and twice in 
controversial circumstances, to inquire into allegations made by investigative 
journalist Bob Bottom and the then federal leader of the National party, Ian 
Sinclair. 
Then in 1984, implementing an election undertaking, the Wran 
Government appointed a Commissioner of Public Complaints, to act as a clearing 
house for allegations of corruption. The Commissioner was not empowered to 
investigate the agencies against whom corruption allegations had been made, but 
could use royal commission powers to examine the person making the complaint. 
Not surprisingly, no one rushed forward with complaints. 
The ICAC is the most sophisticated attempt by any Australian Government 
so far to come to terms with corruption among officials and, in spite of a great deal 
of rhetorical nonsense about the extent of its powers, is nothing more than a 
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standing royal commission. In this sense, the ICAC was a natural next step. Royal 
commissions, with their quite formidable powers, have been a basic part of the 
armoury in the fight against corrupfion since as long ago as 1905. 
This is neither the time nor the place to expound the virtues of the ICAC. 
It has been operational for less than twelve months, and with less than a full 
complement of staff, it has already produced remarkable results. No one doubts 
that it is scrupulously independent and that it will conduct itself enfirely without 
fear or favour. 
The Future 
In conclusion, I should perhaps briefly discuss where this line between public duty 
and private interest will be drawn in the future. 
Firstly, I believe that standing anti-corruption agencies will become an 
accepted part of public sector administration in Australia. Queensland and 
Western Australia have already moved down this road, although not as far as New 
South Wales. And it is not widely knovra that Mick Young, while he was the 
responsible minister, considered an ICAC federally. The Australian Democrats 
early in 1989 unsuccessfully moved for the introducfion of an ICAC in South 
Australia. 
Secondly, in the short-to-medium term we will see an updating of the law 
on bribery, for example, to cover non-pecuniary benefits more clearly, and to pick 
up what I refer to as "ambient corruption" - the situafion where the "bribee" is not 
paid for a particular act, but is kept on a retainer or given gifts every Christmas by 
the briber. I expect that our law will lean increasingly in an American direcfion, in 
particular, by introducing criminal offences for serious conflicts of duty and 
interest. And, given the growing awareness of the hitherto obscure law of official 
misconduct, I would expect some statutory definition in that area. 
I would add that the New South Wales Government is at present in the 
midst of just such a review of its bribery and official misconduct laws. 
I am also confident that there will be more of the concept of public trust in 
the law on corruption. There is a long history of judges imporfing the fiduciary 
obligations of private trustees into the law regarding public officials, and as some 
of the old common law notions about bribery fall away, equity is offering a robust 
and eminently adaptable model. 
Partly for this reason, and partly because the historical distinctions between 
public and private sector corruption are largely artificial in any case, I believe that 
these two threads of legal precedent will converge in the years ahead. England 
broke down that distinction in the latter part of last centuiy, and the Hong Kong 
ICAC is, quite deliberately, concerned with both government and commerce. 
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Indeed, in recent years, the major thrust of the Hong Kong body's work, has been 
in the corporate world and less and less in government. 
And, in spite of the review of the law of bribery being carried out in New 
South Wales, I anticipate that greater emphasis in the future will be placed on 
systemic and management solutions to corruption, rather than on traditional 
criminal remedies. Both the Hong Kong and the NSW ICACs place a high 
premium on corrupfion prevention work, and the Office of Public Management, 
located within the NSW Premier's Department, has shown particular interest in 
introducing anti-corruption measures into the mainstream management systems of 
government. The Australian National University has a research program on ethics 
in government - again, a cultural, rather than a criminal solution. 
Political donations will remain a vexed question in the short term at least, 
and there is already a renewed emphasis around Australia in registers of members' 
interests, public funding laws and the publication of the sources of political 
donations. As a result of the disclosures in the Fitzgerald Inquiry and before the 
ICAC, I believe that there will be renewed pressure for the registration of 
lobbyists, although this must always remain a partial solution. 
In closing, I would plead for a little objectivity on the subject of corruption. 
As I said at the beginning of this paper, I can understand the emotion which 
accompanies the discovery of corruption in high places; as I said, I believe that it 
serves a most useful social purpose. But, if we are to combat corruption 
successfully, especially syndicated and high level corruption, then it seems to me to 
be fundamental that we see the problem as it really is. 
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Who Sets the News Agenda: The 
Turkeys or the Chooks? 
Bruce Grundy 
What follows should not be seen as an apology. It is an attempt at explanation. 
Conventional wisdom suggests that everything wrong with Queensland can be 
sheeted home to one enduring and essential failing in the Sunshine State - its 
gutless media. If only, the argument goes, Queensland media had performed their 
Fourth Estate role, none of the nasty things that have happened here in the past 
twenty to thirty years would have happened. But, compliant, cringing and 
uncritical, the Queensland media have allowed the excesses of the last quarter 
century and beyond to flourish. They let the turkeys run the show. The question 
is: true or false? The answer is: a bit of both. 
The turkeys ran most of it, but not all, and the chooks have been having 
more of the say lately - none of which is to deny, for example, that Tony Koch and 
Matthew Fynes-Clinton brought about the Sturgess Report,i that the media stuck 
to their guns in the matter of "the wife of a senior public servant" and some people 
like Des McWilliam2 named names (when others were not prepared to do so), that 
Paul Bongiorno3 won all his four Waikley Awards for stories about funny things in 
the Sunshine State and Phil Dickici his award for stories about even funnier things 
in the Sunshine State. But despite these examples, (and there are others) the 
turkeys made the running. 
It is interesting that part of the problem of how the media in Queensland 
handled itself during the Bjelke-Petersen days, is the similarity they exhibited to 
some of the less endearing characteristics of the Bjelke-Petersen style of 
government. They saw no need for introspection, no need really to examine what 
it was that they were on about, and how they operated. They rejected criticism as 
stupidity and then they denigrated their critics and went right on in the know-all 
fashion in which they had always operated, for the most part, arrogantly confident 
in their performance. And, for the most part, not a lot of that has changed. 
Back in 1986 when criticism of the media anywhere in Australia was 
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regarded by the media as "quaint", to say the least, I said a few things about the 
state of journalism in Queensland on Quentin Dempster's documentary on "The 
Sunshine System". That program turned out to be, as was suspected, quite 
prophetic. What I said then went something like this: "Queensland journalism is 
very good at reporting what goes on day by day. But simply reporting other 
people's lies is not enough. There has to be more to journalism than that". And, of 
course, there was, even then. But not much. There has been more since, but not 
enough. 
So, if you want to talk about who is setting the agenda, let us start by talking 
about attitudes toward what the media should be on about and attitudes toward 
journalism.5 
The Role of Journalism 
There is a view among some journalists that the function of the reporter is just that 
- to report. End of story. If people in power tell lies, it is up to the Opposition (for 
instance) and not the reporter, to say so. And anyway, politics is all about lies so 
what is new about people who indulge in telling them. If Bjelke-Petersen, or 
anyone else in the newsmaker category, says that black is white, report it. He is 
the premier. You can chase the Opposition for a contrary view if you like. But, 
that done, you can rest easy knowing that you have done your job because that is 
all the job involves. 
Such a view of journalism has little in common with the Fourth Estate 
proposition that some people see as the role of journalism in a democracy such as 
ours. 
The second point is, what happens if you go beyond the above mentioned 
role of the journalist? What do you get then? Well, first of all you get writs. And 
if you want to talk about who is drawing up the agenda, you had better talk about 
that. 
The Law 
The fear of writs has been a problem in Queensland. There has been a view, at 
some management levels at least, that to get a writ (or even a threatening letter 
from a firm of solicitors) is a sign of incompetence. And the serving of a writ all 
too often has been regarded as a finding of guilt - when it is no such thing. I know 
some radio newsrooms where a solicitor's letter would bring the station managers 
out in boils. 
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In many cases the reason for taking out a writ for damages is its "stopper" 
value - Assistant Commissioner Graeme Parker's writs against the Courier-Mail for 
instcmce.6 A pious claim for respectability when no such respectability existed. 
But, he must have figured his writs would prevent the issue revealed by the paper 
from being ventilated further. 
There are also defences against writs. Not very good ones perhaps, given 
the lack of uniform defamation law that we have in this country (what is 
defamatory in one state may not be in another). But, in general, Queensland 
defamation law is not as bad as we may have been led to believe. 
Peter Applegarth, Brisbane barrister, and one who took part in proceedings 
before Commissioner Fitzgerald, pointed out that, "at a superficial level 
Queensland defamation law would appear to inhibit the media less than the 
defamation laws of other states".7 Commissioner Fitzgerald also took up the point 
made by Lawrence (1983) that, "few actions ever are tried. The damages awards 
and legal costs paid by media organisations are a fraction of their southern 
counterparts" 8 Applegarth (and Lawrence) were writing prior to the $400,000 
deal.' Applegarth then talks about what the real problem of the media has been, 
as I shall oufiine later. 
I should say that the issue of legal action and the threat of legal action are 
causing the local media some concern, as they get more into the murky areas of 
Queensland life and have a look at what the turkeys have really been up to. For 
instance, in a paper on our defamafion laws recently, Gareth Evans, Editorial 
Manager of Queensland Newspapers, made the point that in 1986, Queensland 
Newspapers received 8 writs; in 1987, 19; in 1988, 28; and so far in 1989, 35.io So 
the pace has picked up by 400% in three years. Since 1979, Queensland 
Newspapers has received a total of 140 writs; 100 in the last four years, 40 in the 
previous six years.n By comparison, Adrian Deamer, Legal Manager for John 
Fairfax and Sons, told me a couple of weeks ago that he was overseeing progress 
on 160 current active actions for Fairfax. 
While not excusing the media's performance, Applegarth acknowledges that 
the cost involved in the defamation area is significant. He said in 1986, "Even 
large (Queensland) organisations, such as Queensland Newspapers Pty Ltd, lack 
the finance which the publishers of the Sydney Morning Herald and the Age commit 
to investigative journalism and defending defamation actions."i2 
Ironically, hand in hand with this fear of writs, has been an attitude of 
timidity on the part of the media in having anything done about the defamation 
laws, or any other laws that impose restrictions on freedom of speech and the right 
to know. This is a curious situation. But I find it less than comforting to hear the 
media blame the "stacked deck" that the defamafion laws present the crusading 
journalist when the media have never really conducted a campaign to have the 
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wretched things changed. With the possible exception of John Dowd, Attorney-
General in New South Wales, to rely on politicians to do so is to believe in the 
tooth fairy. Journalists cannot have it both ways. If they were scared of the 
defamation laws, they at least had the means to campaign for change. But they did 
not. 
And they still do not. No one in Queensland that I know reported Dowd's 
recent statements at a conference in Queensland, at which the media was 
significantly represented, that he intended to reform the defamation laws in New 
South Wales. He even spelled out what reforms were proposed. Nor have I seen 
Wayne Goss asked what he plans in the area of freedom of information (FOI) 
after the election, least of all Russell Cooper or Angus Innes. I checked with the 
Labor camp and they said FOI was on the agenda but they did not know anything 
about defamation law reform. I acknowledge that Peter Charlton, Associate 
Editor of the Courier-Mail, called on the Ahern Government to initiate reform so 
that the media could "report on the public activities of public officials".i3 Clearly, 
the lack of such legislation and reform has impeded the media in Queensland. But 
really, where is the demand for change. It does not exist. Some of our founding 
editors must be spinning in their graves. So on one or other of those counts, 
intimidation or failure to seek reform, the charge of gutlessness sticks. The media 
cannot have it both ways. 
Resources 
Applegarth mentioned the cost involved in legal action. That surely is a problem. 
But it is not the only one. When you are talking about resources there just is not 
time, and there just is not money for all this Woodward/Bernstein stuff. That 
limits the media's ability to set the agenda. On the other hand, there is an outfit in 
town with no shortage of money - it is called the government. 
What is more, the pressures we create to have more and more news rather 
than better news leaves us totally vulnerable to the well-oiled PR machine. They 
are members of our own union and they are only trying to help. So we crank up 
the treadmill and away we go, news on the hour every hour, no story is a story 
unless it has got an actuality grab and so on. 
Enter a government PR juggernaut. According to Juanita Phillips "the 
State Government is second only to Queensland Newspapers as the State's biggest 
employer of journalists"." I tried to check the claim and contacted the 
government's media and information office. After being shunted around I ended 
up in the public service area. I was told that my request was not a problem -
twenty minutes to write a program to interrogate the computer, an overnight run 
and I would have the answer tomorrow. But there was one thing, did I have $100-
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$150 to pay for it all? I told him I was from Bond University. It did not help. 
The govenunent has a formidable media machine - press secretaries for the 
ministers, public relafions officers of all sorts in the various departments and 
quangos, the Public Relations and Media Office within the Premier's Department -
churning out PR material, advertising, promotions and the like. 
Fitzgerald recommended an all-party parliamentary committee to monitor 
the cost and working of ministerial and departmental media activities, including 
press secretaries, media units and paid advertising, LS Perhaps one check on the 
possible excesses of such operations might be to even up the balance a bit. After 
all, a healthy parliamentary democracy relies a great deal on the strength of the 
opposition. If we spend millions of dollars to keep the public informed about what 
the government is doing, perhaps we should spend a bit more on what the 
opposition thinks the government is doing and what the opposition thinks it might 
do. I did discover that the Queensland Opposition and the Liberals have one 
pubhcly-funded press secretary each. 
And you ask who ends up setting the news agenda? 
One of the really sad things about a public relafions job (and I had a PR 
funcfion among others, with the Reconstruction Commission in Darwin) is the 
ease with which you can get a story run. You need contacts, of course, and you 
also need to be well regarded. But it is true and I am not talking just about 1974. I 
am talking about the 1990s. 
There are cosy relationships that exist between ministers and others and 
journalists. We have all heard the story of the minister who could phone in with a 
story and after a brief word with the journalist, get put straight through to the copy 
taker. What is so bad about that, when actuality grabs are recorded by PR staff 
and phoned through to eager, perhaps lazy, but probably understaffed radio station 
newsrooms? Where is the journalism in that? It happens - at least it has 
happened. Not everyone is like that. Some certainly are not. But the pressures 
are there for a story, a better story than yesterday, and a better story than that of 
the person at the next desk. These pressures totally subsume any concern on the 
part of journalists to sit down and analyse what their relafionships are with their 
sources and what they should be. These pressures of daily journalism are partly 
responsible for the arrogant lack of interest in self analysis and navel gazing. 
Culture of Journalism 
Commissioner Fitzgerald spent some fime discussing the police culture that has 
operated in Queensland for as long as anyone can remember and how it is 
perpetuated. 16 A not dissimilar culture operates in journalism. Both groups 
operate the "cadet" system which sees young people inducted in their late teens 
and trained in the tried and true methods of how to do the job and how to get on. 
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journalism does take some outsiders and even some graduates. But that is a 
recent development. For the most part, intakes over the past twenty years have 
been heavily weighted in favour of cadets. 
The culture has been, and still is, passed on through the shop floor 
socialisation process. News values and attitudes toward sources, among other 
things, are handed on to newcomers by more senior staff. There is no 
encouragement to self criticism or reflection. The ways of the past are the ways of 
the future. Clearly it is time for a change. Too many people are tired of beat-ups 
and second best. And the old arguments about deadlines, subbing stuff-ups, 
ratings and circulation battles are worn out. They are not good enough any more, 
it is time for a change. But as I keep saying, you cannot go on blaming the media. 
Our other institutions let us down too. 
The Queensland Backdrop 
The political system, so keenly developed by Labor in government, was turned 
against it with devastating consequences. The Opposition became irrelevant, 
devoid (at least until now) of leadership and wracked by constant attempts at 
harikiri. The courts and commissions of inquiry even served to work against us. 
Why, if the National Hotel Royal Commission and the Southport bookie case 
failed to get at what was really going on, why is it so obvious that the Courier-Mail 
should have done so? It had no power to compel or subpoena. No FOI. No 
indemnities to offer. And this is where the charge falls down. The Courier-Mail 
deserves no more blame than any number of other players in the game. Sure, it 
deserves some blame, but not all of it by any means. 
In weighing up the media's performance during the Bjelke-Petersen years 
one has, at least, to consider the environment in which the media has operated. To 
start with, the attitude was spread (and the media was instrumental in that process) 
that to criticise anything about Queensland (apart from the Labor Party) was un-
Queensland, unpatriotic, and treacherous. Anyone who criticised Queensland was 
a ratbag. Any media outlet who did, could expect reaction and retribution, both 
official and unofficial. Such retribution embraced certain ridicule, possible loss of 
audience or circulation, loss of access to information, and loss of revenue from 
government sources. 
All the issues just mentioned occurred, and they were always in the 
background (if not very much in the foreground) for any journalist wanting to get 
in and have a go. In explaining the realities of life for a media organisation in 
Queensland, Applegarth noted back in 1986: 'The Queensland media has some 
aspirations to act as a Fourth Estate ... but is incapable of fulfilling that role 
because in Queensland there is no liberal consensus to legitimate such a critical 
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and instrumental function."n 
The Queensland syndrome was not just a state of mind that directed the 
people running the show in George Street, Brisbane. The Queensland syndrome 
permeated the State. Tliis Queensland culture produced a most unhealthy 
situation where the Opposition was treated very badly by the media. If the 
Opposition put out a press statement, reporters would seek a reaction to it from 
the Premier even before giving it a run as newsworthy in its own right. This kind of 
journalism was common in the early to mid-1980s - and probably earlier. 
Wallace certainly thought so back in the late 1970s. He said: 'The real 
story could well be that the Queensland news media has failed to play a politically 
responsible role; that it has failed to take responsibility for the quality control of 
the news it publishes; that it has left itself open to manipulation by well-positioned 
sources and public relations personnel, and, most importantly of all, that 
Queensland journalists have minimal awareness of this.'is 
Hea\y stuff. But would John Wallace know? He was a teacher of 
journalism. 
Interestingly what he was talking about is the kind of journalism about 
which the Nafional Party Government complained during the 1989 election 
campaign. They could not get a run with any good news, they said, because the 
media were only interested in what Wayne Goss had to say. 
It is as well to remember that the Courier-Mail was not the only media 
outlet in Queensland during the Bjelke-Petersen era. There was not a lot else, but 
there was Nationwide, for instance, on the ABC; Today Tonight on Channel 9; and 
A Current Affair on Channel 7. And as a former member of that team has said, 
"We tried but we failed." No one was really interested, least of all the people of 
Queensland. Warm in the everlasfing sunshine, full bellies, big mortgages, content 
and apathetic Queenslanders. She'll be right mate. Who gives a damn? 
You have to do better than blame the Courier-Mail. None of the others did 
a lot better. Even when they tried. Nationwide produced the Kingsley Fancourt 
story, for instance.i' All we got in the end was the Police Complaints Tribunal and 
what did that produce? And what did Fancourt and Campbell get for doing their 
civic duty? Simply put, they got a message - get out of town. And they did and 
Queensland got on with the good life. So you cannot just blame the media. But 
why did this story not take off? Is it the media who sets the agenda? Again, the 
turkeys had a victory because of some of the media attitudes toward competition. 
Competition 
The competition that has existed between the various outlets has not worked 
necessarily to everyone's advantage. There has not been enough support from 
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some media for someone else who got onto a good story - a story like the Fancourt 
revelations. Indeed, it often seemed to be the case that a story would not be 
touched by one organisation purely on the grounds that it had been broken by 
another organisation. The stories that were followed up were not always the ones 
that mattered - or might have produced results. That form of competition is stupid 
and serves journalism very badly. Again the National Party Government in earlier 
days was a past master at denigrating anyone who got onto a good story. That did 
not help the cause of journalism either because it became fashionable to snort at 
programs like Nationwide and Jane Singleton. Many stories died for these reasons. 
The reverse is true, but, oh so infrequently, and no better example exists 
than the media's performance during the ten days between Russell Cooper's 
ascendancy to the throne and his eventual decision to implement Fitzgerald's 
recommendations. There is no doubt in my mind at least, that the media was 
mightily influential in helping Mr Cooper make up his mind. There is also no 
doubt that had some of his ministers, who simply could not wait to shoot off their 
mouths, shown more discipline, the media might not have been nearly so valuable 
and influential. And that is the worry. It took a lack of discipline to set the media 
baying. Had foot and mouth disease not struck Mr Lester, Mrs Chapman and Mrs 
Nelson and lock-jaw Mr Cooper, we might not have seen such a worthwhile result -
although that is not a foregone conclusion. But in the end, the Nationals were 
dragged kicking and screaming to support the Fitzgerald process rather than its 
preferred option of seeing it "go to buggery".20 
Here was a case of the media actually performing - putting people on the 
spot, hitting them with questions and actually appreciating the import (or stupidity) 
of their answers. They did not roam as a pack, but they were following the breaks 
created by others. And when you have a minister like Mr Lester, everything is on 
your side. You have just to keep bowling them up and the chances are he will hole 
out sooner or later. 
The other aspect of competition, the concentration or diversity of outlets, 
needs to be considered as well. There was no real newspaper competition 
throughout the Bjelke-Petersen reign. And the newspaper is most important in 
considering the setting of agendas. The electronic media look to the newspaper 
for their daily raw material - not totally, I know, but significantly. And there was 
only Queensland Newspapers. When the Daily Sun arrived, there was a change in 
Bowen Hills and for a time there was an atmosphere of competition abroad. I do 
not get the feeling that there is any more. 
The Queensland Government tried to exploit the situation by switching its 
advertising away from Queensland Newspapers because it was not sufficiently 
under the thumb. We needed more competition than we had and we need more 
than we have. 
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Tomorrow's Agenda 
Clearly some people in the media have adopted a new approach. There are 
more challenges now to the pronouncements of government and a much less 
fawning attitude on the part of reporters who once used to giggle (or was it cackle) 
when the premier of the day focussed a derisory attack on one of their colleagues. 
The Courier-Mail has a reporter doing nothing else but Fitzgerald follow-up 
stories. ABC radio has toughened up its local afternoon current affairs output. 
But radio and television news do not have or do not allow the time to deal with 
anything in detail. Local current affairs on television has been pretty much handed 
over to 77!e 7.30 Report and it has not had a record of doing much at length. So it 
is better, but not vastly - and it could all change in a trice. 
What we can expect is that journalists might reflect on their performance in 
the last two decades, and on what they do in their daily working lives. There is not 
enough self-examination in all sorts of areas of media practice and convention. 
We simply are not nearly as good as we think we are. 
The body polific in Queensland has gone through the Fitzgerald wringer 
and look at what was squeezed out. Just imagine what would happen if we put the 
media under the microscope of a royal commission as Ranald Macdonald 
suggests.2i 
Who sets the agenda is one thing, and the newsmaker has as much 
advantage as the news reporter. But it is who sets the standard that is important, as 
much in the media as in politics, and there is not enough concern about the 
standard. 
There are three things on tomortow's agenda - no more cosy journalism, the 
best FOI legislation we can get, and defamation law reform. 
1. D. Sturgess QC, chairman. Commission of Inquiry into Sexual Offences 
Involving Children and Related Matters Report (Brisbane: Queensland 
Government Printer, 1984). 
2. At the time, McWilliam was News Director of Channel O, Brisbane. 
3. Television journalist with Channel O. 
4» Brisbane Courier-Mail journalist whose articles on massage parlours and 
illegal casinos set the scene for Chris Masters' expose 'The Moonlight 
State" which precipitated the Fitzgerald Inquirv: 
$. An extensive literature on agenda setting exists. The best definition of the 
term was provided perhaps by Cohen who said, "the press may not be 
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successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is 
stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about". B.C. Cohen, 
The Press and Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). 
6. Mr Parker was the most senior police officer to admit corruption before the 
Fitzgerald Inquiry. 
% P. Applegarth, "Self-censorship of the media in Queensland", Social 
Alternatives, vol. 5, no. 3, (1986): p. 60. 
8. Ibid. 
9. A settlement between Alan Bond (the Nine Network) and Premier Bjelke-
Petersen which was the subject of investigation by the Australian 
Broadcasting Tribunal. 
10. G. Evans, "Why Defamation Actions are on the Rise", Australian Journalism 
Review, vol. 11, (1989): pp. 4-9. 
11. G.Evans, Private communication. 
12. Applegarth, "Self-censorship of the Media", 
13. Courier-Mail, 1 July 1989, p. 9. 
14. J. Phillips, 'The Changing Face of PR", Courier-Mail, 4 March 1989, p. 27. 
15. G.E. Fitzgerald QC, chairman. Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal 
Activities and Associated Police Misconduct, Report (Brisbane: Queensland 
Government Printer, 1989), para. 3.9.3., p. 142. 
16. /6/(i.,para.7.7,p.211. 
17. Applegarth, "Self-censorship of the Media", p. 61. 
18. J. Wallace, "Reporting the Joh Show: The Queensland Media", M.J. Cribb 
and P.J. Boyce in eds. Politics in Queensland 1977 and Beyond (St. Lucia: 
University of Queensland Press, 1980), p. 205. 
19. Kingsley Fancourt and Robert Campbell presented on Nationwide first 
hand evidence of police corruption in Queensland, based on their 
experience in the Police Force. 
20. Statement attributed to Queensland National Party Police minister, Vince 
Lester at a country police gathering shordy before the 2 December 1989 
State election. 
21. Former Managing Director. David Syme and Company, Melbourne. Mr 
Macdonald has spoken in favour of such an inquiry for many years - most 
recently at a conference on media reputation sponsored by the Australian 
Press Council at Bond University, 25 October 1989. 
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Evan Whitton 
The Fitzgerald vision for reform turns, and rightly turns on parliamentary 
democracy, which we may define as honest government by the will of an informed 
public. Even a cursory examinafion of the elements in that definifion will show 
that parliamentary democracy is a rare, if non-existent, commodity anywhere, but 
thanks to the heroic efforts of, amongst others. Bill Gunn, Mike Ahem, Ian 
Calhnan QC and Tony Fitzgerald QC, Queenslanders now have a chance to make 
a new beginning. The role of the media will be crucial in making it happen. 
It must be said that the Fitzgerald Report may seem to be just a tiny bit out 
of balance; it assigns roles to lawyers that may go some way towards bankrupting 
the State, but does not appear to understand the media's historic role in the 
development of parliamentary democracy. Indeed, it dismisses the media in a few 
rather perfunctory and partly inaccurate paragraphs. This is a matter for no more 
than mild regret; ignorance of the true function of the media may be hardly less 
usual among practifioners of journalism than amongst lawyers. 
The challenge is thus to set down a few simple ideas and then to try to 
communicate them to the citizenry, including the polificians and the lawyers. We 
can but try. 
Simple Idea Number 1: There is only One Electoral System Tliat Can Begin to 
Achieve Parliamentary Democracy 
The Australian Consfitufion requires that members be "directly chosen by the 
people". Perhaps we can all agree on that. If we do, a respectable argument could 
be mounted that all Commonwealth elections are unconstitutional. By definition, 
a system in which electorates return only one member disfranchises nearly half the 
voters; their views are not represented in the House. The Senate has a better 
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system, but there electors can basically vote only for a party, not directly for 
individual members. 
It follows that electorates should have more members than one, and they 
should be elected by a form of proportional representation to allow various shades 
of opinion to be represented. The best forms of proportional representation are 
those used in Tasmania, which has successfully been using the system for more 
than eighty years, since 1907, and in Ireland since 1937. The best indication of the 
value of the Irish system is that the politicians have twice tried, by referenda in 
1959 and 1968, to change it, but each time a majority voted to retain it. 
The only problem with the Tasmanian method is that it is called the Hare-
Clark system. Having, for my sins, at one time been a newspaper editor, I can 
advise that the attention span of some in that unfortunate calling necessarily 
averages about 2.4 seconds. Mention Hare-Clark and the eyes glaze over; it all 
seems too complicated to comprehend; let alone convey to the readers. 
Politicians are grateful for this. News executives should thus devote 2.4 seconds of 
their time to directing some harmless grudge on the staff to bone us on the system 
and present it clearly to readers (or audience). 
The system in fact, is not complicated at all. Tasmania has five electorates 
corresponding to the five Federal seats. Each electorate returns seven members. 
Voters have a voice in filling casual vacancies; they are filled according to 
preferences marked on the ballot paper. The major parties thus field almost 
double the number of candidates they expect to get elected. The system obliges 
the parties to offer voters a wide potential choice among their candidates. 
"Robson's Rotation" - printing ballot papers in batches so that each candidate gets 
a turn in various positions on the ballot paper - ensures that the "donkey" vote does 
not distort the result. There are no safe seats. 
Interested parties trot out all sorts of arguments against the Hare-Clark 
systems. I do not have time to rebut them here, but they are all spurious. 
I cannot imagine why Tony Fitzgerald QC, having got a commitment from 
Messrs Ahern, Goss and Innes to implement his recommendations, did not simply 
recommend the Hare-Clark system. Had he done so, any competent 
parliamentary draftsman could have had the legislation ready on 4 July, the day 
after Fitzgerald reported. The simplest approach would be to join every two of the 
twenty-four Federal electorates into twelve State electorates, and to have seven 
members in each. Everybody in the electorate except lunatics, and perhaps even 
them, could thus hope that at least one of the seven might roughly represent their 
views. 
As for the politicians and the not entirely faceless people who appear to 
direct them, I trust that my colleague, Quentin Dempster, will, in his devastating 
way, individually interrogate them along these lines. 
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Question: Do you believe in parliamentary democracy? 
Answer. Yes. 
Question: Then you will recommend the Hare-Clark system of 
proportional representation? 
Answer. No. 
Question: Then you don't believe in parliamentary democracy? 
Answer. You mongrel! I know you are out to get the National 
Party/Liberal Party/Labor Party. 
A word of warning: if the media perform their role properly and public 
pressure obliges politicians to accept the logic of proportional representation, their 
fallback position will be to recommend a variation of it, called the "party list" 
system, which is the one mostly used in Europe. When you hear the words "party 
list", you should reach, if not for your gun, at least for that excellent weapon, the 
egg, used by the good citizens of Warwick against that scoundrel Billy Hughes. 
The "party list" does not give voters a choice of candidates within parties; it leaves 
that privilege to the machine, in effect, probably Sir Robert Sparkes (President of 
the Queensland National Party) or his equivalents in the other parties. 
Simple Idea Number 2: The Press Invented the Institution of Parliamentary 
Democracy 
All media proprietors, editors, reporters, and teachers of journalism should have 
those words stuck permanently in their hats and on the walls of their offices and 
should meditate on them for a minimum of 2.4 seconds daily. The assertion may 
come as a surprise to some, including Tony Fitzgerald but its validity is easily 
demonstrated by reference to pages 153-155 of that useful work of reference. Can 
of Worms IJ, and in a paper delivered in November 1989 at the Fourth 
International Anti-Corruption Conference. I crave the indulgence of the author in 
briefly replicafing here some of that data. 
The modem British Parliament was invented in 1689. So far from engaging 
in parliamentary democracy, the Parliament instantly became a centre of organised 
crime, as defined; a group fo people acting outside the law on a continuing basis 
for some benefit, including money, and which uses cormption as fundamental part 
of its modus operandi. Politicians in the eighteenth century used bribery to get a 
seat; accepted bribes for their votes; and, as a matter of routine, took part in 
criminal arrangements. As the American journalist, H.L. Mencken observed, 
accurately you may think, the only way to look on a politician is down. 
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A necessary adjunct of corruption is secrecy. This was immediately 
threatened when Daniel Defoe, as the first leg of his great quinella (the other 
being his invention of the novel fourteen years later), invented modern journalism 
in 1704. My mentor, S.C. Chandler, put it this way; the oldest, and sadly most 
forgotten, rule of journalism is to tell the readers what is really going on. The 
battle, in which the trade of authority had all the heavy artillery, was joined. The 
politicians used four weapons to prevent scrutiny of their corruption; they bribed 
such proprietors as were amenable, and sought, by taxation, privilege and the libel 
laws, to intimidate and break those who were not. All those weapons, except overt 
taxation, are still in use. 
When journalists and printers sought to report the parliamentary debates, 
the politicians claimed it was a breach of privilege, punishable by prison, to do so. 
(In Queensland, no less than elsewhere in Australia, a simpler method and happily 
less painful to reporters is used; the House rarely sits.) Some who persisted went 
to Newgate prison. It was not until 1771 that pressure of public opinion in London 
obliged the politicians to throw in the towel. By this victory, and against the will of 
corrupt politicians, the press invented a measure of parliamentary democracy. 
Thwarted on that point, the politicians were still able to use their other 
weapons against the press. Overt taxation, by way of the Stamp Act 1712, was not 
abolished until 1855. Walpole used the forerunners of MI5 to pay out more than 
50,000 pounds (sterling) to newspapers in the ten years from 1732 to 1742. Pitt 
induced the Irish Government to vote its own extinction in 1800 by bribing Irish 
politicians with 3 million pounds (sterling) in cash, more than fifty new peerages, 
and government sinecures. Patriotic Irishmen who objected were shipped out to 
Australia. Alas, this had an unfortunate consequence; some of the descendants of 
the patriots, who became dominant figures in Labor Party machines in Queensland 
earlier and in New South Wales more recently, had as relaxed an attitude to 
corruption - as just part of the rich tapestry of life - as the traitors, and this has had 
a deleterious effect on parliamentary democracy. Bribery is no doubt as much in 
vogue as ever; certainly in the 1930s, even the late Adolf Hitler was able to buy, 
for $400,000 a year, the editorial policy of a major United States chain of 
newspapers. 
And if all else failed, there was always the libel laws. The modern English 
writer, Reyner Heppenstall asserted that the laws exist for the protection of rogues 
in high places; John Alman. publisher of the London Magazine, put it this way in 
the eighteenth century: "A man had better make his son a tinker than a printer. 
The laws of tin he can understand, but the law of libel is unwritten, uncertain and 
indefinable. It is one thing today, another tomorrow. No man can tell what it is. It 
is sometimes what the King or Queen pleases, sometimes what the Minister 
pleases, sometimes what the Attorney-General pleases." 
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And, he might have added the judges. Although the independence of the 
judiciary was nominally invented by the Act of Settlement 1701, Lord Francis 
Williams observes in Dangerous Estate that "newspapers were at the mercy of 
judges who often scarcely bothered to conceal their readiness to act as agents of 
Ministers". 
In the circumstances, it is not surprising that the people of the United States 
cut themselves adrift from the rottenness of England, its Parliament, and its legal 
system. In 1791, the United States Congress passed the First Amendment to the 
Consfitufion: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech or 
of the press ..." This is the cornerstone of freedom of opinion, and hence of 
parliamentary democracy in the United States. Australia is not so fortunate: the 
defamafion laws in this country derive from the wretched English laws. There can 
be little doubt that the situation in Queensland would have got to the state it did, if 
the media had the protection of the United States First Amendment. 
There are three major planks in any program of checking the cormption of 
rogues in high places and the activities of their colleagues in organised crime; a 
standing commission on cormption; freedom of information legislation, and a 
media unshackled by the laws of libel. Fitzgerald recommended the first two, but, 
although he offered some disobliging remarks on politicians' use of the libel laws 
to stifle crificism, he unaccountably neglected to recommend the third. 
Simple Idea Number 3: Having Invented the Institution of Parliamentary 
Democracy, the Media have a Responsibility to Maintain or Restore it in the Face of 
Those who would Subvert it by Corruption 
We are all conservafives now. Indeed, it seems to me that, whatever political 
allegiance journalists may claim - and I believe they should have none - they are by 
the traditions of their trade, properly conservative in this area. 
That good Dalby boy, Gary Sturgess, Director-General of the NSW Cabinet 
Office, who, as architect of the NSW Independent Commission Against Cormption 
(ICAC) and freedom of informafion, is a hero of all who believe in parliamentary 
democracy, asserts that culture is as significant in the persistence of cormption as 
stmctures may be in checking it. That is to say, an old lag in the trade of authority, 
in a culture tolerant of cormption, can get a result by way of the wink and the nod. 
Thus, however effective the new stmctures in Queensland may prove, the media's 
role will remain cmcial. 
Sturgess' new state, true heir of the English system, was as rotten from 1792 
as Queensland was from 1859; both offer important case studies of what happens 
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when the media does not adhere to its responsibilities, and what happens when it 
does. 
The following chapter by Chris Masters, whose historic role in extirpating 
corruption in both States could not possibly be overestimated, suggests some 
strategies for tackling corruption. I add a few thoughts on this subject. It seems to 
me that events in the past two decades suggest that the major requirements of the 
media in reporting corruption - persistence and stamina, adequate time for 
reporters, and two types of disclosure journalism, disclosure of facts and disclosure 
of pattern - run in parallel. 
Robert Bottom has persisted in reporting corruption and organised crime 
since 1971. His work has been conducted at some risk to his life, but that is a 
professional hazard. As Lord Francis Williams observed; "The estate of journalism 
is a dangerous one. It ought to be so both for those who work it, and those they 
scrutinise." I offer no adverse remark on the stamina of some who may appear to 
succumb to fatigue after a couple of years at the work. There are very few Bob 
Bottoms in journalism anywhere in the world, and as few outside it. Bottom's 
stamina on the other hand has achieved nothing more than a role in obliging 
governments, without notable enthusiasm, to initiate more than a dozen major 
inquiries touching on corruption and organised crime and along with the work of 
Chris Masters and others, in changing the climate on corruption in New South 
Wales and Queensland. 
The techniques of such as Bottom and Masters include building up a 
network of sources in the trade of authority who accept their responsibilities to the 
institution of parliamentary democracy by being prepared to break, on a daily basis 
if necessary, spurious confidentiality enshrined in the local equivalent of the 
Official Secrets Act. I pause here to note that the Fitzgerald Report, which heaven 
help us, does not have an index, was scathing on reporters who are "leaked" 
information and who "delude themselves that they are not being used ... Both the 
journalist and the source have a mutual interest: both want a headline ... 'leaks'... 
become a way of making the media act as a mouthpiece for factions within the 
Government."! That may be, but it strikes me as a seriously limited view of the 
way such as Bottom and Masters operate, and of the motives of them and their 
sources. 
The techniques of the second type of disclosure journalism, that of a 
pattern, are summed up by the recent Pultizer Prize winner, Jim Steele, of the 
Philadelphia Inquirer: "The challenge is to gather, marshal and organise vast 
amounts of data already in the public domain, and see what it adds up to." If the 
typical sound of the fact-discloser is that of tireless feet crunching in the gravel, 
that of the pattern-discloser is of files rustling. 
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Over time, this sort of work may have a cumulafive effect on the cHmate 
and the culture. The work of Phil Dickie in the early months of 1987 seems to me 
to have had elements of both techniques, and so prepared the climate for Chris 
Masters' thunderclap of 11 May, 1987 to have the effect it did. In this context, I 
should also note Quentin Dempster's great piece of pattern journalism in March 
1986, 'The Sunshine System", which revealed a pattern of rottenness going back 
seventy years. The only thing wrong with that documentary was that the ABC did 
not have sufficient care for parliamentary democracy to repeat it every week until 
its message was absorbed in the hinterland. 
As it happens, I have done a litfie pattern journahsm myself, but, as may be 
imagined from the fact that I am essenfially a reporter on Rugby Union, my 
contribution was quite modest. However, I was pleased to be apprised of the 
apparent effecfiveness of the method when an eminent lawyer rang up to complain 
about a little traverse I had made of something or other: "Why are you ringing 
me?", I plaintively asked, "I'm just a harmless dmdge scrabbling among the 
yellowing files." "I don't know about 'dmdge'," the eminent lawyer said (I have to 
be careful about the gender here), "but you're certainly not harmless." 
In combination, the various disclosures of Bottom, Masters, Dickie, 
Dempster and others had an ineluctable logic that emerged in this State in 1987 
and in New South Wales in 1988. In New South Wales, prompted by Gary 
Sturgess, Nick Greiner ran an election campaign on a platform that included 
restoring parliamentary democracy via the three major anti-cormption planks 
noted above. Nick Greiner may also have been encouraged in these noble 
undertakings by Sturgess' assessment that a cmcial four per cent of voters are 
thought likely to change their vote solely on a perception of the parties' attitudes to 
cormpfion. Everything else being equal, this would theoretically turn a 50-50 
result into a landslide 54-46. Greiner has thus far implemented the first two (to 
some embarrassment among some of his Cabinet colleagues), but his draughtsmen 
appear to be finding the libel laws as complex as Mr Alman and his tinker found 
them in the eighteenth century. Even so, the Greiner Government may thus 
appear, at least theoretically, to be as close to offering parliamentary democracy as 
any in the world. 
We may hope that the local media, mindful of the fact that the press 
invented parliamentary democracy and so has an obligation to restore it, adheres 
to its responsibilities sufficiently to ensure that Queensland shortly follows suit. 
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ADDENDUM 
1. On using the media to buy respectability. 
People in the media generally, and very often among the public, have an idea who 
the crooks are, even if they cannot prove it. But the media can at least prevent the 
crooks from buying respectability cheap. 
Social pages are mostly a thing of the past in newspapers round the world; 
in some places, to buy respectability you now have to actually spend a sizeable 
sum, such as endowing a university chair. In Brisbane, the social pages live on; it 
is still a cheap way to buy respectability by throwing a party and inviting the media. 
The resulting photographs and breathless prose indicate that the person who threw 
the party is a social leader, socially acceptable. 
Media chiefs have an obligation not to allow their organs to be so cynically 
used, and their customers to be so cynically abused. It also does their own 
credibility no good at ail among such of their customers as have a pretty good idea 
that the person who got a flattering "write-up" is a crook. 
'2. On use of the "This is bullshit" slug. 
David Halberstam, in his book on the Vietnam War, The Best and the Brightest, 
noted that the Saigon press corps religiously attended briefings by military flacks 
who asserted that they were winning the war. The press knew the statements were 
nonsense; they called the briefings the "five o'clock follies", but they dutifully 
reported their false assertions without comment. 
Looking back, Halberstam thought the reporters were remiss in their duty 
to their readers; they should have instructed the typesetters to insert a slug saying, 
"This is bullshit", after every fourth paragraph. 
Looking back over the Bjelke-Petersen years, it seems clear that the Bjelkist 
regime's longevity derived in part from the media's failure to find some way of 
using the equivalent of the bullshit slug. Even in these more enlightened days, we 
still see the most outrageously false assertions being reported deadpan. This may 
help the credibility of the speaker, but it does nothing for the credibility of the 
media. 
Notes 
1. G.E. Fitzgerald QC, chairman. Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal 
Activities and Associated Police Misconduct, Repori (Brisbane: Queensland 
Government Printer, 1989), p. 142. 
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Tackling Corruption — Some Strategies 
Chris Masters 
There was a strategy for making it happen, for ensuring the Four Comers program 
"The Moonlight State" had some effect. I caimot pretend it existed in my broad 
consciousness when we were preparing the program, but it lurked somewhere in 
the half-light and now, with hindsight, reveals itself a little more clearly. 
I lived and worked in Queensland for some fime and was familiar with an 
aimual cyclone of media reports about the excesses and hypocrisies of the Bjelke-
Petersen administration. They usually crossed the coastal border from the south, 
raffled the window panes for a moment and disappeared, requiring a minimum of 
mopping up. I used to puzzle about the lack of effect. The evidence was often 
powerful. Joh would splutter some indigestible alphabet soup defence and nothing 
changed. If anything, there was a slight, perceptible improvement in his 
popularity. If the reporting was perceived as another snide, smart-arsed assault by 
the southern media, then the southern media brought comfort to the enemy. In my 
fime in Queensland, I had seen how irritating the smart-arsed southern media 
could be. I was anxious to avoid making the same mistake. We had to be fair and 
we had to be seen to be fair. 
It goes without saying the report also had to be powerful and accurate. The 
slightest error was like a dead mouse in a delicatessen. It would be swept up and 
eagerly dangled before the public as evidence that everything was contaminated. 
I think Four Comers was also reasonably well served by a certain wariness 
about public inquiries. We had been through a few before. Lawyers hired by a 
government to inquire into a matter of potential grave embarrassment to that 
government are not likely to forget who is paying the bill. There are a hundred 
ways to ensure these things fail. The lawyers can fail to call the proper witnesses 
and fail to ask the proper questions. The police assigned to conduct the field 
enquiries can actively cormpt proceedings or through subtle mischief, ensure the 
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silence of important witnesses. We anticipated such an inquiry, and in the post-
script to the program, we said so. 
There were some anxious days soon after the program was broadcast. 
Throughout the entire three months of research, a stumbling legion of morally 
exhausted former policemen told me to go home. They had little patience for the 
exercise, seeing only more pain. "Today's news is tomorrow's wrappings. The 
public don't care anyway", they told me wearily down the telephone. A half-baked 
expose could cause even more harm. Witnesses who were encouraged to come 
forward would be shot to bits, thereby ensuring no other fool would take a similar 
risk for at least another decade. 
Despite my stern call for a proper public inquiry, I cannot say I was 
particularly optimistic. After three months, I had caught some of their defeatism 
and cynicism. As anticipated, my telephone rang constantly for a week after the 
program was broadcast. This is something else experience had taught us. A report 
like this can act as a lightning rod for more valuable information. We were careful 
to have people there to take the calls. Most of these callers are nutters and the 
exercise can be tedious, but it was worthwhile and it did deliver more helpful 
evidence. 
The next problem was figuring out what to do with the evidence. The 
summons to Queensland to appear before this fledgling inquiry was not met with 
enthusiasm. Like the Queensland Government which appointed him. I knew little 
of Tony Fitzgerald and expected even less. The ABC legal department, with 
wisdom and fiscal courage, appointed a Brisbane barrister, Bob Mulholland QC, to 
offer us some protection. Mulholland is an excellent barrister and a good man. I 
suspect he was happy to work "with the angels". Certainly, he did so for a much 
smaller fee than he would have attracted elsewhere. 
The most important strategy we learned was to withhold some important 
evidence. The best way to peel back a layer of whitewash is to be in a position to 
produce the very evidence they say does not exist. Our research uncovered a range 
of people in the brothel community angry enough to talk if they felt it was safe to 
do so. The evidence was sufficient probably, to have allowed us to name three 
policemen. 
Two were connected to the Licensing Branch: Sergeant Harry Burgess and 
Inspector Allan Bulger. The other was their superior, Assistant Commissioner 
Graeme Parker. One reason I left them out, particularly in Burgess' case, was that 
I felt they would be held up as sacrifices. They could be publicly punished while 
the system which created them escaped unscathed. We were certain the system 
was more the villain than the individuals, but the evidence on the individuals was, 
at the least, a good starting point for a serious inquiry. Some of this evidence came 
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oirr way before the program was broadcast. Some more filtered in following the 
transmission. 
I left our Sydney office dragging my feet to the "Irms of Court" building in 
Brisbane. When I emerged from the lift I was met by a lawyer of slight 
acquaintance, who grabbed me by the lapels and told me with fierce sincerity, that 
if I did not have strong evidence, I would be carried out of town on a stake. I 
began to get an inkling some of the lawyers here at least, might be alUes rather 
than enemies. There was an unexpected motivation within Brisbane's legal 
community to correct some obvious public ills. I was not used to lawyers 
demonstrating a great degree of collective public conscience. 
Mulholland did a good job encouraging me to cooperate with Fitzgerald 
and his team. I was equally forceful in persuading the lawyers to be very careful 
about the police assigned to assist the Inquiry. It was naive to imagine all of them 
could forget their loyalties overnight. It was reasonable to presume some would be 
required to report the progress of their invesfigafions to the Queensland police 
hierarchy. Ultimately, the Fitzgerald lawyers received courageous and loyal 
service from the police invesfigators but the initial caufion was justified. 
One obvious problem was that the witnesses in the criminal community, 
those in the brothel and Ulegal gambling trade were not going to cooperate with 
police, when they knew jx)hce were part of the same cormpt system. Some of the 
witnesses could be persuaded, with difficulty, to meet the lawyers. 
I have often thought the first such meefing, which occurted weeks after 
The Moonlight State" was broadcast, every bit as important as anything within the 
program. Two women who worked as receptionists at a brothel agreed to a 
meefing. I arranged for them to collect me. They arrived in a gleaming BMW, a 
pair of well dressed Brisbane "yuppies". One had taught high school, the other was 
a sensible, successful businesswoman. The lawyers were impressed too. The 
women were excellent witnesses, speaking cogently and without embellishment of 
the murky details of the brothel trade and the poHce protection system. I felt the 
loss of innocence in that room. 
A good month of hard work followed that program. This is time and space 
the media does not normally provide. Mostly, we have to clock on to the next 
story. Four Comers travelled about Brisbane and the hinterland meeting new 
witnesses. When appropriate and possible, we introduced them to the Fitzgerald 
lawyers. 
My role wound down as the Inquiry hearings got underway. Colleagues like 
Evan Whitton and Quenfin Dempster did a marvellous job shadowing the inquiry 
developments and helping make the rest of Queensland as angry as they were. 
Quenfin sensibly encouraged me to cooperate with Phil Dickie of Brisbane's 
Courier-Mail. As far as I was concerned, the image of the Courier-Mail and Phil 
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Dickie as modern heroes, belonged more to the realms of popular fiction than 
anything derived from fact. I was angry about some things and unjustifiably jealous 
about others. Sufflce to say there was value in cooperating rather than tearing 
each other to bits. 
I moved on to other stories with a little less energy, but a little more 
confldence, believing I had polished some of these "anti-corruption" skills. The 
next time it did not go so well. A report about corruption in the South Australian 
police force whimpered while Queensland roared. There are numerous reasons 
for this. My report had a premature birth being pushed to air before I could 
collate all the available facts. The South Australian Government brought off a 
pre-emptive strike by announcing an inquiry by the National Crime Authority 
before we went to air. Now, eighteen months after the report, a comparatively 
small police corruption problem, certainly by Queensland standards, is still 
awaiting effective action. One lesson of the Fitzgerald Inquiry which echoes 
through the cabinet rooms across the land, is never play a wild card like Fitzgerald 
again. 
So now we have to devise new strategies and it will not be easy. The next 
time a government agrees to an inquiry which precipitates its own demise, it will he 
an even greater miracle than the last. 
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I beUeve it is appropriate for me to tell you my basic position on some of the issues 
I deal with in this chapter. First of all, it is my belief that the job of the media is to 
tell the public what is really going on. For the working journalist, this must be 
done under considerable constraints, be they technical, legal or instimtional. If I 
can borrow a phrase used by Evan Whitton, the an is one of "getting it in, without 
commitfing either libel or adultery". 
This is a multi-level process, with the first level being the reporting of what 
happens day to day. This is the bread and butter of the media and I suppose we do 
a fair to middUng job of picking the significant occurrences out of a host of daily 
announcements, happenings in courts and parliaments, seleaive leaks and so on. 
There is another level where what is occurring is being obscured from the 
public view for a host of rcEisons that can include national security, commercial 
confidenfiality and outright criminaUty. Here the journalist's job is to fenet out 
the facts that someone, somewhere does not want revealed, and report those facts. 
It should come as Utfie surprise to anyone that those occurrences are not nearly as 
well refKDrted as the facade of announcements and events, and that a proportion of 
such facts only comes to light years after they occur. This is the enterprise known 
generally as invesugafive reporfing. 
The final level is where a journalist sits down, assembles and works out 
what isolated occurrences add up to. This, which could be called reporting the 
overall pattern, is the sort of journalism most feared by those with something to 
hide. It needs a great deal of space, which often is not particularly available on the 
broadsheet or the broadcast band. It also mns the risk that readers and viewers 
are often f>erceived to have a greater attention span for new revelations about the 
loves of a distant royalty or members of the acting fraternity, than they have for 
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detailed analysis of the doings of supposedly respectable businessmen, elected 
public officials or public servants. 
This might be categorised as the conflict between an entertainment function 
and an information function in the media. This intrudes also into another style of 
journalism which is often misnamed investigative journalism. I call it the 
"breathless" style of reporting and it consists of sensationally worded "revelations" 
of nothing at all. The hallmarks of it are that an unnamed source alleges that 
unidentified villains, have been, are, or are about to be, involved in unspeakable 
actions which are never quite specified. At its worst, this is an excursion into 
fiction. At its best, it is still an expression of laziness in that the journalist, who 
may be identified by a large byline with "exclusive" written over it, has done no 
checking of his or her own, into the source or the allegations. Even if the 
allegations have some basis in something, this type of story, identifying no one and 
being specific about nothing, has all the impact of a marshmallow cricket bat. 
There have been plenty of these stories about corruption in Queensland. 
They have achieved nothing. When the first edifion of my book The Road To 
Fitzgerald was released, one Melbourne bookseller promoted it under the 
headline: "Queensland. Beautiful one day, corrupt the next." The reality is that 
Queensland has long been corrupt but only recently perceived to be so. This 
failure of perception is a failure of the media. I have been asked to describe how 
the media brought on the Fitzgerald Inquiry. I make no apologies for including 
the media's failures as well as its successes. 
The starting date for this analysis is the mid-1950s, when Labor 
governments who had presided over and participated in corruption for decades, 
gave way to a coalition of the Country and Liberal Parties. Some members of the 
Queensland Police Force were then engaged in, among other activities, collecting 
bribes from SP bookmakers, organising robberies and fencing stolen goods. Some 
of the money collected as bribes in country towns is alleged to have found its way 
into something loosely called a "Premier's Fund". 
One of the first tasks of the new Government was to appoint a new police 
commissioner. It chose the Criminal Investigations Branch (CIB) superintendent 
Frank Bischof, possibly because he was a Protestant and it had long been agitating 
about Catholic influence in the police force and public service. More significantly, 
Bischof was chosen despite complaints from at least two police officers that he was 
corrupt. These complaints were known to the Australian Labor Party Opposition 
and quite probably to some journalists. The dominant impression one gains from 
reading the news reports of the time is, however, that Bischof was a public spirited 
man much given to lecturing wayward juveniles on the error of their ways. Bischof 
later gave this job to a protege, one Terry Lewis. Both earned the accolade 
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"Father of the Year". This was remarkable in quite another way as well - Bischof 
had no children of his own, or at least not with his wife. 
Some of Bischofs other proteges, one Tony Murphy and one Glen 
Hallahan, were acquiring the media reputations of being the best detectives. 
These police often associated wnth journalists in hotels, racetracks and clubs. It is 
a point worth making, that some police who are later suspected or revealed as 
cormpt have cultivated journalists to the extent that they have become almost 
media legends. Later, as in the case of Fred Krahe (New South Wales) and Glen 
Hallahan (Queensland) some of these police, even when retired in semi-disgrace, 
were able to use their contacts to land short term jobs in the media. I took a close 
look at this milieu in Bischof-era Queensland and found a group of associations 
around one particular hotel which included detectives, journalists, SP bookmakers 
and nightclub managers. Some of the people in that particular fraternity went on 
to notable careers in the police force, the media, poUtics, crime and development. 
Now I am not saying that these associations are necessarily sinister, but their 
rsunificafions can be detected through the years. It is interesting to note an 
Australian Insfimte of Criminology paper of a couple of years ago found that 
journalists who have exposed police cormption generally worked outside the usual 
police rounds. 
Bischof and some of his troops got themselves into a spot of bother over 
supposed goings-on at another hotel, and this was the subject of the Gibbs Royal 
Commission into the Nafional Hotel Allegafions 1963-64. The rorts that were the 
subject of the Royal Commission's Terms of Reference were said to be common 
knowledge at the fime and do seem to have been the actual state of affairs. The 
Commission found to the contrary, possibly partly through being subverted by the 
pohce and not assisted by the public. The media restricted itself to reporting the 
evidence faithfully. 'When Shirley Brifman exposed the police rorting of the 
Inquiry years later, no one in the media went back to the original reports of the 
commission to see how her claims stood up. This exercise was actually done, by 
cifizen Peter James who privately published a book. In Place of Justice. The book 
itself should have aroused wide media interest but its release was generally 
ignored. Another opportunity for going back and re-examining the Royal 
Commission was lost when the media contented itself with simply reporting Tony 
Murphy's perjury trial, Brifman's suicide and Murphy's comments after the case. 
When Whitrod was appointed, the media was quite amenable to being used 
uncritically in the various police union campaigns against him. No journalist, 
except later Evan Whitton, drew the connections between some notable union 
figures, their statements and campaigns, and Whitrod's campaign against 
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cormpfion. Some of Whitrod's senior police are still quite bitter over their 
treatment by the media in this period. However, the Scotland Yard Inquiry and 
the Southport case, where those accused of cormption successfully employ the 
tactic of accusing their accusers of cormption, was extremely well reported. To 
honest police in those days it very much seemed that the media favoured the 
cormpt and their fellow travellers. 
In 1978-79 and later, two inspectors named Hicks and Jeppesen both 
contacted a number of journalists and found them reluctant or unable to take up 
their allegations. Articles to the detriment of both found their way into the 
newspapers at critical times, however, and not surprisingly, both declined to have 
anything further to do with journalists, including Chris Masters and myself, in later 
years. Murphy appears to have exaggerated in the media his role in the Anoa and 
Mr Asia dmg affairs in this period, but Keith Wright's remarkable parliamentary 
statement on SP bookmaking was just blandly and fairly briefly reported along with 
denials from police superintendent Atkinson and SP bookmaker, Stan Saunders. 
To my mind, which might be coloured by hindsight, there were enough details and 
leads in this statement to form the basis of a media investigation. Properly done, 
this could have forced some action; instead it became another missed opportunity. 
There was always a story lurking in police promotions and non-promotions, 
particularly for those journalists aware of the old Consorting Squad dynamics in 
pre-Whitrod days. 
Junior officers in the Narcotics Bureau provided a lead to media stories and 
parliamentary comment that led to the extension of the Williams Royal 
Commission. The Royal Commission's Report left a host of unanswered questions 
and leads which themselves could have been followed up, but were not unfil I did 
so eight years later with the Fitzgerald Inquiry in full and spectacular swing. 
The Mareeba area dmg connections, just as potentially potent as the 
Griffith area dmg connections, have received only fitful attention over the years, 
most competently from a freelance reporter named Greg Chamberlin, now editor 
of the Courier-Mail 
The media performed rather better in the period 1982-85, initiating, rather 
than just reporting, some allegations of cormption. Investigations begun were not, 
however, generally persisted with nearly long enough. I started work as a 
journalist in this period and have to plead an element of mea culpa. Labor 
politician Kevin Hooper's allegations (not all of them correct) were reported 
rather than investigated, although the Courier-Mail did take the trouble to locate 
and describe the illegal casinos that were said to exist. The ABC Nationwide 
(Fancourt-Campbell) reports of March 1982 were good journalistic work which did 
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result in the Police Complaints Tribunal. There was a missed opportunity here, 
however, in that noone detailed the links between the "mafia godfathers" named by 
Hooper, and the involvement of the same persons in the Fancourt-Campbell 
allegations of payments. The writs flowed in and the stories stopped. But the 
statements of claim lodged by Murphy and Lewis told their own story - eventually -
after Evan Whitton and I dug them out of the Supreme Court registry. 
In 1985 Courier-Mail reporter Tony Koch did some excellent work on male 
brothels in Brisbane and helped provoke the Sturgess Inquiry into Sexual Offences 
Involving Children and Related Matters 1985, Koch's work made the advance of 
tying in legwork of his own to what was gleaned from his informants, but the 
investigation could have gone much further. If he had taken the references to 
"Hector" as a lead for a tramp through Corporate Affairs and the Titles Office, he 
could have anticipated the Sturgess Report and my own profiling of the vice 
syndicates. The Moore-male brothels scandals showed how effectively media 
investigations and politicians using parliamentary privilege could complement each 
other. 
This is one important factor in why Queensland's media has not performed 
as well as that in other states. There an allegation will be raised in one fomm, 
kicked along a bit further in the other, and this process will continue until the 
scandal is more or less sufficiently exposed. In Queensland, Parliament has been a 
relatively ineffective fomm sitting for lunatic hours over well-separated periods of 
derisory duration. The minuscule periods of "question time" have been and still 
are, effectively stuffed with Dorothy Due questions and long rambling dissertations 
by ministers. Adjournment debates after midnight are not likely to be well 
reported in the media. There were no all-party committees of review and the 
Auditor-General, in theory an officer of Parliament, has, in fact, answered mainly 
to the Executive. A general style of auditing (called flick and tick) that focuses on 
whether amounts add up correctly and are charged against the correct account, is 
also unlikely to detect gross impropriety. Far better that the auditor also asks how 
and why money is spent. 
What Sturgess said on the vice industry quagmire was again reported at the 
time and insufficiently followed up. His code numbers cried out for identification 
but no journalist turned to the task. A year later I started my overall investigation 
of vice, casinos and the Licensing Branch, but I had identified the players through 
searching the public records before I realised I had duplicated the Sturgess work. 
If I had been a bit more alert a year earlier, I could have saved myself something 
of a slog. 
What I have said about the reporting of allegations against police was also 
true of allegations about political figures. There was some highlighting of the 
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strange influence of Sir Edward Lyons, with his drink driving charge, TAB 
shenanigans, judicial lobbying and National Party wheeler dealing. Suruiay Mail 
journalist, Cedric Allen had a lot to do with digging out some of the facts and quite 
a bit was leaked in Parliament, to the great advantage of the probable leaker, Russ 
Hinze. But the journalist who put it all together was Evan Whitton and his work 
was published in a series in Sydney and generally ignored where it mattered, which 
was in Brisbane. 
Quenfin Dempster of the ABC did an excellent job of detailing how the 
State worked in a television program going under the title, "The Sunshine System". 
That program was something of a watershed, but Queensland's other media 
greeted it with a resounding silence. The same thing generally happened with 
some excellent Four Comers episodes over the years. The national media broke 
the story; the Queensland media failed to follow through. 
And that was one of the differences in 1987, when media enquiries did 
produce a result. Key elements of the national and the local media were then 
working along the same track. There were other important differences from the 
media work on cormption of earlier years. One of those differences from my point 
of view, was that I was not reporting allegations and their inevitable denials. I was 
detailing the results of prolonged investigations. What was being said in the 
articles was factual and undeniable. The other difference was persistence. I was 
not about to let the story die - it was a matter of building a case, brick by brick. 
One story led to the next. Each publication brought forward fresh informants. 
After a while, each publication was producing a reacfion which itself demonstrated 
the nature of the system, whether it was an illegal casino hastily moving house or a 
police assistant commissioner issuing a writ. And all the fime the Four Comers 
cameras were rolling away preparing for their decisive intervention. Evan Whitton 
has referred to "The Moonlight State" as a program that was "detonated" rather 
than merely shown. It is a fairly apt description. 
To recap briefly: Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen and the National Party 
confounded the pundits by winning a second term in office in their own right in 
November 1986. Chris Masters, who was then with the ABC Four Comers 
program, had been to Queensland to spy out the lie of the land after receiving 
information about an attempt by one Queensland Bureau of Crime Intelligence 
officer to bribe another. In that period Four Comers had also done an excellent 
program on the inadequate performance of the Queensland Police Complaints 
Tribunal which, as usual, had been largely ignored by the Queensland media. 
My background was one of living on the fringes of Fortitude Valley, having 
taken a National Party backbencher on a tour of the area and as a result, engaged 
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in a paper dispute with a senior police officer on how styles of enforcement lent 
credence to generalised allegations of cormption. 
After the election, a chief of staff, with his mind on a story intended as 
sensafionalist trivia more than anything else, asked one journalist then another to 
find out who owned a building which contained Brisbane's most prominent brothel. 
He called the building "Sin Triangle". The job was passed down to me and I used it 
as the excuse to do a wide-ranging investigation on who controlled the vice 
industry. 
In a newspaper article on 12 January 1987, I identified those people and a 
proportion of their interests. The Deputy Premier and then Police Minister, Mr 
Guim, he who so often now claims credit for the Fitzgerald Inquiry in the pages of 
a certain credulous tabloid newspaper, dismissed that story with the immortal 
observafions that there was no evidence that massage parlours were used for 
prosfitufion and there was no evidence of any organised crime involvement in 
them. This was a response of the time-honoured kind and in Queensland it had 
usually meant that that was the end of the story. However, in this case it was not -
the train started heading downhill and in due course a lawyer named Tony 
Fitzgerald who may not have even read that article over his breakfast table, was 
called in to be the driver. 
The general media response to the article was as usual - Brisbane's 
television stafions set up cameras outside brothels to record the police raids that 
would close them. Of course, they were not closed. To my mind the only thing to 
do was to quietly continue the investigation. From that point on, however, I had 
some help, first from an ex-Licensing Branch officer, one Nigel Powell, and later 
and less directly, from an ABC Four Comers team, which bounded back up to 
Queensland demanding to know who had written this article. 
The three elements had come together - a whistleblower or two, one tiny 
part of the local media, and an influenfial part of the national media. I wrote a 
further succession of articles building on that first one and Four Comers detonated 
a program which forced a response from the Government. The legal profession 
then exerted its influence to ensure the inquiry was a real one, not a whitewash. 
The Fitzgerald Report recommended wide ranging institutional reform in 
Queensland. The media is undoubtedly one of the significant institutions. To my 
mind, Fitzgerald could have been much more critical of the institution of the 
media than he actually was. There have been some improvements in the media as 
a result of the Fitzgerald process, but not nearly enough. 
My own work and that of Four Comers demonstrates the value of proper 
investigative work by journalists. That is, do not msh straight into print with just a 
politician's or informant's word, but corroborate and corroborate. 
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This is time consuming, expensive and often leads down dead ends. Overall, it is 
not fostered by any of Queensland's media organisations. 
My own experience is this. I have had support from some individuals within 
Queensland Newspapers (notably editor Chamberlin) but the organisafion as a 
whole has been tolerant rather than supportive (that is, I can work in this way if I 
so insist, but have to fight and stmggle for resources as basic as secure filing or a 
desk. Never mind that those doing equivalent work in the Sydney Moming Herald 
and the Age have offices of their owm and can call on the support of other staff. 
But if you win an award or write a book, we will blow the tmmpet). The toleration 
of investigative work by individuals is not, in my book, a commitment to 
investigative journalism. 
I believe that an effective commitment to investigative journalism by media 
organisations is one component of the long term campaign against both organised 
crime and institutional cormption. Another is better journalism overall, 
parficularly that which militates against the bland reporfing of statements without 
even the most cursory examination as to their tmth or probability. The media 
should not be so content to be so used by public figures. 
Journalist selection and training would also seem to be in need of some 
attention, though here I cannot speak from first hand experience - I was never 
educated or trained in the profession. It does, however, seem to me that talented 
and committed youngsters often miss out because they do not know the right 
people or have the best school pedigree. Journalism has an image as a glamour 
profession - a lot of recmits who are disappointed that the reality does not match 
their image pass through to ludicrously well-rewarded pseudo-journalism in 
government, television or public relations. 
I am not particularly competent to comment on television, but my 
impression is this: if newspapers cover important issues in a trivial way then the 
coverage they get on television is yet more trivial {Four Comers, Quentin 
Dempster's 7.30 Report and some other programs are emphatically exempted from 
this gross generalisation). Triviality does, however, seem to be rewarded by ratings 
success. It is a conundmm, but full marks and support to the strivings of the 
Australian Broadcasfing Tribunal. 
Defamation acfions do not prohibit investigative journalism as is sometimes 
supposed, but they do inhibit it, probably for proprietors more than journalists. 
Many writs result from careless or sloppy journalism or sub-editing and the writ 
here is usually as indefensible as the original article. A glance down the list of 
those who have sued shows, however, that the writ for defamation is a favourite 
resort of villains and that politicians and police officers are two of the largest 
categories of people who sue. 
There are strong cases for significant reform of the law, basically because. 
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while it is extensively resorted to by villains, it also fails to protect anyone without 
significant financial resources from unfair treatment by the media. The issue was 
studied by the Australian Law Reform Commission but no government of any 
political complexion has seen fit to take up the Commission's recommendations or 
do anything much other than host numerous seminars on the subject. It is 
undeniable that writs, even where ultimately defensible, are a large cost, time and 
resource drain on any form of investigative journalism. Reform would be welcome 
and should be a priority of any government claiming to be accountable. 
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Judicial Culture and the Investigation of 
Corruption: A Comparison of the Gibbs 
National Hotel Inquiry 1963-64 and the 
Fitzgerald Inquiry 1987-89 
Ross Fitzgerald 
Dr Fitzgerald made the following statement prior to the delivery of his paper at 
the Fitzgerald Vision for Reform Conference, 29-30 November 1989, in response to 
media reports that files compiled by the Queensland Police Department's Special 
Branch had been destroyed. 
PROLOGUE 
Secrecy is the bottom line of corruption. Let me repeatl Secrecy is the bottom line of 
corruptioru 
What I am about to say distresses me more than most of you would care to 
realise, but at a conference dealing with Fitzgerald's vision for reform, it is crucial to 
put what follows on the public record. 
As a citizen and an historian concemed with telling the tmth about what has 
happened in the past, the recent irretrievable destmction of Queensland special branch 
files, days before a state election and before the Liberal or Labor parties could bring in 
Freedom of Information legislation, appalled me beyond belief 
Wlien 1 listened to Sir Max's defence of this action, like many others 1 was 
speechless. 
As Sir Max is a person of absolute integrity, I can only assume his support of 
the shredding was either an error of judgment resulting from Sir Max's lack of 
knowledge of the political history of this State, especially since 1949, or that he was 
grossly misadvised as to the nature and content of the files. 
How can one leam from the mistakes of the past if the public record is 
destroyed? And do not be mistaken, those 22,000 or so files would have produced 
ample evidence, at the very least, that the state special branch of the highly politicised 
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Queensland Police Force acted not as a servant of the law, but as an arm of the 
National Party Government of the day; as, in effect, a secret police 
It is saddening to say so, but such a precipitate destmction of the special 
branch files seems to me to be a notably inauspicious start both to cleaning up the 
cesspit that was Queensland's political culture, and to bringing about a situation 
where, as Tony Fitzgerald wished, the tmth about the workings of this state can be told 
and rendered intelligible. 
But it is not possible to leam from the past if the record does not exist. 
"Justice is not a cloistered virtue: she must be allowed to suffer the scmtiny and 
respectful, even though outspoken, comments of ordinary men." Lord Atkin, 
Ambard v. the Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago, 1936. 
A central dilemma facing those investigating cormption is determining what 
procedures - political, investigative and judicial - can be used to detect, expose, and 
excise cormption from public life. A fundamental problem is that networks of 
organised crime and cormption are built up in and sustained by existing political, 
police and judicial routines. Cormption does not so much work against the 
prevailing social system, as work with it, finding a protective niche in its routines. 
The Hon. Gerald Edward (Tony) Fitzgerald QC has, for example, pointed to the 
existence of a police culture. Its assumptions and unwritten codes of behaviour 
shielded the cormpt who used their extensive working knowledge of routine 
investigative, administrative, political and judicial procedures to further their 
collective aims.i 
In adopting certain innovative procedures in conducting the Commission of 
Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities and Associated Police Misconduct, it could 
be argued that Fitzgerald was also implicitly addressing the role of what I shall call 
a "judicial culture" in the investigation of cormption. Fitzgerald recognised the 
need for commissions of inquiry to be quasi-judicial; that is, to be effective they 
demanded stepping outside the normal bounds of judicial procedure. The 
fundamental task of a commission of inquiry as Fitzgerald understood it was not to 
determine the guilt or innocence of individuals; rather, it should be an 
inquisitorial attempt to determine the tmth. It must be a wide-ranging inquiry, 
rather than the investigation of particular allegafions conducted on an adversaria! 
basis. 
When the structures of reform in the criminal justice system of Queensland 
are being put into place, it is vital that the effects of judicial culture on the conduct 
of public inquiries be subjected to more explicit debate. This is so for a number of 
reasons. 
Firstly, the Fitzgerald Inquiry did not address the role of judicial culture as 
explicitly as it did the police culture. This is understandable given the priority of 
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investigafing police misconduct. Nevertheless, the idea of a judicial culture - a set 
of assumpfions and codes of behaviour governing the judiciary - was implicit in the 
formulafion of the iimovative procedures by which the Inquiry was mn. 
Specifically, these innovations addressed the failure of the formalistic judicial 
procedures, adopted by Justice Harry Talbot Gibbs in the 1963-64 National Hotel 
Inquiry, to remove key cormpt players from the field of play in Queensland and 
beyond. 
Fitzgerald also made explicit reference to the judiciary in his 
recommendafions for a Criminal Justice Commission (CJC).2 A good deal of this 
section in the Report deals with Mr Angelo Vasta QC, who was permanenfiy 
removed from the Supreme Court following the Parliamentary (Judges) 
Commission of Inquiry conducted by three retired judges: the Rt Hon. Sir Harry 
Talbot Gibbs, the Hon. Sir George Hermann Lush, and the Hon. Michael 
Manifold Helsham. Indeed, the fallout surrounding Vasta, the Fitzgerald Inquiry, 
and the Parliamentary Judges Inquiry raises some further questions regarding 
judicial culture. Briefly, if a comparison of the Nafional Hotel and Fitzgerald 
Inquiries demonstrates that judicial culture is inimical to the success of 
commissions of inquiry, then that problem is compounded in the case of inquiries 
into the behaviour of judges. As it turned out, the Parliamentary Judges 
Commission has confused rather than clarified the public's perception of the 
judicial culture's own understanding of appropriate standards of conduct. 
Indeed, if there is a common thread to be found in a comparison of the 
National Hotel Inquiry, the Fitzgerald Inquiry, and the Parliamentary Judges 
Inquiry, it is the complete inappropriateness of the application of formalistic 
judicial procedures and the judicial ethos to inquiries into cormption. 
Consequently, a discussion of judicial culture must be part of any context-based 
approach to stmctural and procedural reforms in criminal justice. 
The National Hotel Inquiry 
Continuing to play the game is not the way to get cormpt players off the field. This 
is the central procedural lesson to be learnt from the failure of the National Hotel 
Inquiry. In hindsight, that failure can be seen as monumental. Rather than 
exposing corruption, it probably had the opposite effect of emboldening key 
corrupt players.3 Hence, in his Report, Fitzgerald observed that the list of police 
officers represented at the National Hotel Royal Commission included many who 
were again the subject of allegafions in 1987 and 1988; for example, John William 
Boulton, Graeme Robert Joseph Parker and Jack Reginald Herbert "who have 
now admitted cormption, although Parker and Boulton deny, unconvincingly, that 
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they were cormpt at the time of the National Hotel Inquiry."'' Such a comparison 
of personnel only confirms, in hindsight, the degree of failure. But eveh without 
the benefit of hindsight, the National Hotel Inquiry was doomed to ineffectiveness 
by narrow terms of reference,5 inadequate investigative powers and procedures, 
and the absence of witness protection or indemnities.^ 
The Inquiry had been set up to investigate specific allegations of police 
misconduct at the National Hotel, initially raised in the Parliament by lawyer and 
ex Deputy Mayor of Brisbane, Colin Bermett, Labor MLA for South Brisbane. At 
the end of a speech on conditions in the police force on 29 October 1963, Bennett 
made a passing claim that senior police officials were drinking after hours and 
condoning prostitution at Brisbane's National Hotel.7 On 11 November it was 
announced that a Royal Commission of Inquiry under Justice Harry Gibbs was 
instructed to look into the allegations. After conducfing the Inquiry for seven 
weeks, commencing on 2 December 1963 - that is, with virtually no time at all for 
preparation - the Commission concluded that the laws relating to the sale of liquor 
had been breached without the detection or intervention of the police, but found 
that"... there is no acceptable evidence that any member of the Police Force was 
guilty of misconduct, or neglect or violation of duty in relation to the policing of 
the hotel, the conduct of the business or the operations or the use of the hotel, or 
the enforcement of the law in respect to any breaches alleged or reported to have 
been committed in relations thereto."8 
Fitzgerald comments: "It is easy to understand those findings. Nothing in 
the terms of reference or stmctures of the Royal Commission, including the range 
of parties represented before it, the assistance and facilities available to it, and the 
evidence which it received, or in the social and polifical environment of the time, 
would have alerted it to the possibility that it confronted an orchestrated 'cover up' 
based on, and supported by, institutionalised police attitudes and practices."' 
Evan Whitton is less generous: "It is proper for a judge to operate, as it 
were, in vacuo in a court action, but a person holding an inquisition might be 
expected to bring to bear a keen perception of men and events. Indeed, if 
intelligence as to (Police Commissioner) Bischofs tme character had penetrated 
even the Toowoomba monastery in which (Whitton) was then cloistered, it may 
seem that Gibbs, in making the positive finding that neither Bischof nor any officer 
had been guilty of misconduct, must have led a spectacularly secluded and 
innocent life at the bar and on the bench."lo 
Whatever the status of the above, the important point is that it has now 
become clear that the way in which the Inquiry was set up and conducted meant 
that the truth could never be known. Gibbs, for example, was provided with 
Counsel Assisting, but was not given any real investigative resources. It is 
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interesting to note that, by his own admission, Don Lane was one of the members 
of the Queensland Police Force who assisted Gibbs by "making inquiries for the 
Commission and (serving) subpoenas on its behalf." This was despite the fact 
that D.F. Lane was also one of those Queensland police officers listed as being 
"represented at the National Hotel Royal Commission".^ 
Gibbs was also constrained by exceedingly narrow terms of reference. His 
enquiries, as Ian Callinan has pointed out, were confined to "what was alleged to 
have happened at one hotel, over one specified period only".i3 
Narrow terms of reference lend an incidental aura to an Inquiry; that is, 
the focus of such investigations is on discrete events. Corruption, on the other 
hand, can be rather uneventful - consisting as much of a network of relationships 
and a system of influence, as of specific misdeeds. 
Allegations of specific misdeeds can also be denied. In adversarial 
litigation, opponents and witnesses can be simply discredited. Indeed Counsel 
McGill, acting on behalf of the National Hotel and its licensee, could not accept 
Justice Gibbs' view that some evidence from a witness might be tme even though 
other aspects of their testimonials were false. McGill offered the opinion that 
"once you substantially shatter a witness, the witness is gone".i4 
The procedures of the courtroom can play into the hands of those who want 
to prevent the fullest and widest inquiry into the tmth. Commenting on the 
National Hotel Inquiry, Fitzgerald observed a typical modus operandi among 
cormpt Queensland police for dealing with investigations: "In a pattern that has 
been repeated many times since, police closed ranks behind those being 
investigated. Evidence was collected to demonstrate that the National Hotel had 
been the subject of conscientious police attention, and to discredit those who made 
allegations against police and their interests."is 
A key witness of the National Hotel Royal Commission, prosfitute Shirley 
Brifman, stated on television in Sydney in 1971 that police had persuaded her to 
perjure herself at the Inquiry. Jack Herbert also later admitted to Fitzgerald that 
he had given "entirely fictitious evidence" regarding John Komlosy, one of the 
witnesses against the police. Herbert had falsely claimed to Justice Gibbs that 
Komlosy said that he wanted to "get even" with the hotel's owner.is This 
demonstrates the point: corrupt police know how to work judicial procedures for 
their own purposes. Police were able to "verbal" their opponents, with devastating 
effect because the Inquiry was conducted on an adversarial basis. 
The possibility of adversarial infimidation was undoubtedly one reason why 
very few members of the public came forward with information at the Inquiry. But 
witnesses to the misconduct of others were also not indemnified from prosecution 
for their own transgressions. As Evan Whitton explains, Gibbs had to work with 
"defective legislation". He "could not compel witnesses to give self-incriminating 
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evidence; he could not give them immunity from prosecufion; and he could not 
chase them across the border".n 
While conceding that the legislation was defective, it is also clear that 
Justice Gibbs, for his part, did not take full advantage of the flexibility available 
within the legislation effecting commissions of inquiry. He chose to mn the 
Inquiry along familiar lines, fully aware that the legislation did not demand it: 
"Although in my enquiry I was not bound by the mles of evidence (Section 17 of 
The Commission of Inquiry Acts 1950-54), I did endeavour to adhere to those mles 
as far as possible. I received some hearsay evidence on the basis that it might lead 
to the discovery of further admissible evidence to indicate what other persons 
might usefully be called as witness. As a general mle, however, I did not allow 
hearsay statements to be admitted for the purpose of proving matters the subject 
of inquiry which were in dispute.-is 
He added: "In the nature of things it is often difficult when conducting a 
Royal Commission to determine what evidence will prove relevant and it is 
therefore particularly necessary to be rigourous in excluding evidence that is 
plainly irrelevant."is 
According to Ian Callinan, this "formal" approach was "not likely to be 
effective".2o Comparison with the Fitzgerald Inquiry suggests that this assessment 
is correct. Nevertheless, it misleads if we simply conclude that judicial 
conservatism was at fault. Justice Gibbs' procedural claims should be examined in 
context. 
A closer look at the conduct of the National Hotel Inquiry indicates 
existence of a judicial ethos rather than application of strict procedures. One of 
the witnesses against the police, John Komlosy, was, for example, subjected to 
sustained attacks by counsel for the police, the cabinet, and the National Hotel. 
There was a great deal of hearsay evidence, and accusafions - much of which was 
later asserted by Brifman and Herbert to have been false - by counsels for the 
police. At the same time, requests by Komlosy to have counsel represent him were 
repeatedly refused. According to Peter James, Komlosy was "told by the judge that 
the proceedings of the Royal Commission could not be held up while a counsel 
was found".2i James argues that there was, however, plenty of time for irrelevant 
questioning; Gibbs himself even asked Komlosy to bring in his Junior certificate 
for perusal!!! A fmstrated Komlosy, again, according to Peter James, "replied that 
he was getting fed up producing things, and, 'I am objecting most sincerely. Not 
one gentleman has asked me anything about the National'."22 
Although Gibbs preferred to conduct a commission of inquiry within the 
familiar atmosphere of adversarial contest, he would have been aware that the 
Queensland Commission of Inquiry Acts, 1950-54 did not require adherence 
vigorous or otherwise, to judicial procedures: 
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Section 17. Commission not to be bound by rules as to procedure or 
evidence 
A Commission, in the exercise of any of its functions or powers, shall not be 
bound by the mles or practice of any court or tribunal as to procedure or 
evidence, but may conduct its proceedings and inform itself on any matter 
in such a manner as it thinks proper, and, without limiting in any way the 
operation of this section, the Commission may refer any technical matter to 
an expert and may accept his report as evidence. 
The abandonment of this statutory flexibility and the prevalence of a 
judicial ethos meant that the National Hotel Inquiry was conducted according to 
those procedures wathin which the cormpt had learned to work. As such, this 
inquiry inadvertently played into the hands of the cormpt. 
It is perfectly understandable that a judge conducting an inquiry would lean 
towards the familiar ethos of the courtroom. But this is to miss the fundamental 
point, and perhaps the most contentious in regard to the role of judicial culture in 
the investigation of cormption: commissions of inquiry should be inquisitorial, not 
adversarial, in character. 
While, to thoughtful observers, this may now seem obvious, it is also a 
logical implicafion of the conditions which prompt the call for commissions of 
inquiry in the first place. "Usually (not always) commissions are established 
because more conventional measures have failed: breakdowns in proper 
procedures have occurred, and propriety in public life has failed: such 
circumstances call for unconventional remedies."23 
Indeed, concern about the relationship between the judiciary and 
commissions of inquiry is not new. In 1923, Sir William Irvine, the Chief Justice of 
Victoria, "thought it inappropriate that Supreme Court Judges be appointed Royal 
Commissioners". His main argument was that the principal duty of judges was "to 
hear and determine issues of fact and of law between the King and a subject, 
presented in a form enabling judgment to be passed upon them ..." Informal 
inquiries "though presenting on their face some features of a judicial character, 
result in no enforceable judgment, but only in findings of fact which are not 
conclusive and expressions of opinion which are likely to become the subject of 
political debate". Sir William held that inquiries into specific misconduct could be 
the subject of judicial determination in the courts. The matters before 
commissions of inquiry on the other hand, were seldom so limited and could not 
therefore logically be the subject of judicial determination.24 
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According to Ian Callinan, the ghost of Irvine was recalled when a 
commission of inquiry was being empowered to investigate the allegations of 
police misconduct in Queensland.25 Such systematic misconduct was graphically 
presented in Phil Dickie's reports in the Courier Mail and in Chris Masters' ABC 
Four Comers program "The Moonlight State". 
The subsequent Inquiry was headed, not by a judge, but by the Hon. Mr 
G.E. Fitzgerald QC. It is, however, important to remember that the Queensland-
born Fitzgerald had been a judge from 19 November 1981 to 30 June 1984, in the 
Federal Court of Australia (and during the same time in the Supreme Court of the 
Australian Capital Territory), before resigning to return to limited private 
practice.26 
While twenty-four years earlier, Gibbs had started with little more than "a 
throwaway remark in state parliament", Dickie and Masters (aided by 
incormptible ex-Licensing Branch Constable Nigel Powell) had gathered a mass of 
documentation Fitzgerald could use.27 Hence, the Fitzgerald Inquiry started from 
a much better base than the Gibbs' Royal Commission. Fitzgerald gave himself 
plenty of time before his Inquiry began. He also set up hiS own investigative staff, 
which became virtually a small police force of its own. A master tactician, he did 
not have to rely on Queensland police files and police services, as Gibbs had, 
almost exclusively. 
From the very beginning, it seemed that the Fitzgerald Inquiry was being 
organised with a particular view to learning the lessons of the past. A number of 
specific improvements were sought, including expandable terms of reference, the 
provision of adequate investigative and administrative resources, indemnity for 
witnesses, and a willingness to conduct an open and public inquiry. 
These innovative procedures cannot righfiy be assessed without considering 
their context; that is, we must understand the underlying principles which guided 
the choice of tactics. Most centrally, Fitzgerald had a clear and operational 
understanding that the aim of a commission of inquiry was to be inquisitorial in the 
best and proper sense of that word. In contrast, Gibbs - who has a fine legal mind 
but was quite legalistic in his approach - thought of himself as a judge when he was 
conducfing his commission. 
The failure of the National Hotel Inquiry to remove cormpt players from 
the field (or even to identify them) had produced a valuable and simple lesson: 
judicial procedure could miss the wood for the trees. For Fitzgerald there was no 
question of pursuing questions of individual guilt or innocence in regard to specific 
misdemeanours. Instead, he aimed to uncover and bring to light the social, 
political and systemic conditions under which cormption could occur and to offer 
recommendations for the reform of these social, political and administrative 
contexts. The terms of reference, therefore, specifically included inquiry into, 
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"Whether existing legislation and procedures are adequate to ensure that conduct 
of the kind referred to ... is detected and reported to appropriate persons".28 
Fitzgerald clearly understood the procedural implications of the fact that 
organised crime and cormption is not simply a chaotic manifestation of disorder, 
but is also the dark-side of existing economic, political, social, and judicial 
stmctures. To conduct his Inquiry successfully, the nexus between current 
institutionalised practices and organised cormption had to be broken. 
To take one example. In the National Hotel Inquiry, according to Callinan 
"A very strong counsel Sir Arnold Bennett QC, acted on behalf of the members of 
Cabinet but treated the police force and the Ministers as if ... the two were 
monolithic, that is without any different interests."29 This had the effect, as we 
have seen, of heightening the adversarial character of proceedings and 
intimidating witnesses. Fitzgerald, on the other hand, broke the institutional nexus 
at this point by adopting the practice that "any Cabinet Minister or policeman or 
official against whom a real basis for a case to answer was established, obtain his 
own separate representafion".3o 
The most controversial tactic used by Fitzgerald was undoubtedly the 
granfing of indemnities to corrupt witnesses. To many members of the public, 
thinking simply in terms of fingering the guilty and punishing wrong-doers, this was 
often mystifying. Some believed that indemnities were only given so that "bigger 
fish" could be netted. More correctly, the indemnity tactic was integral to a 
context-based Inquiry; that is, it was thoroughly consistent with Fitzgerald's 
intenfion to uncover cormpt systems rather than to prosecute individuals. 
Concerning the highly controversial granting of indemnity to one of the "big fish". 
Jack Herbert, Fitzgerald stated: "It is... vital that whatever steps are available be 
taken to maximise the prospect that the tmth is told. If individuals escape, even 
important criminals, even if all escape, but a basis is laid for a new and better 
future, that is preferable to a continuation of the past. Every effort must be made 
to obtain a Police Force which can effectively combat crime".3i 
The importance of removing the players from the field was paramount as 
Fitzgerald's comments on former Assistant Commissioner Graeme Parker 
chillingly confirm: "Many of the offences for which indemnity was granted would 
otherwise never have been discovered, let alone prosecuted. It is fanciful to 
pretend that those indemnified would otherwise have all been sentenced to lengthy 
prison terms. Parker, for example, would probably still be an Assistant 
Commissioner, quite possibly in fine for appointment as Queensland's next 
Commissioner of Police.-32 
Fitzgerald's purposeful adoption of the inquisitorial style in the context of a 
public inquiry inevitably created tension. It seemed to some, not least to those 
mentioned adversely at the Inquiry, that the innocent could become too easily 
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embroiled. Fitzgerald's solution was openness: individuals were given the freedom 
to present their point of view and deny allegations, but without any procedural 
impulse to engage in adversarial contest. 
A problem which arose for Fitzgerald in adopting this tactic was that there 
were no guarantees that an open inquiry would not be selectively reported. 
Allegations were often taken out of context, and insufficient attention was given to 
reporting the full context. Fitzgerald would often address members of the media 
on this issue.33 Another unfortunate by-product of the inquisitorial style was public 
perception that a large degree of evidence was hearsay. Fitzgerald was keen to 
correct this public misperception, fed by the media's bias towards reporting 
controversial allegations. He declared in his report that the majority of evidence 
brought before the Inquiry was of a kind that would be admissible in a court of 
law.34 
Clearly, Fitzgerald has proved that the battle against cormption requires a 
carefully controlled (and suitably checked and balanced) set of non-routine 
procedures. Law-enforcers and judiciary must at times step outside formal zones 
and legalistic procedures to pursue and bring to justice the cormpt. 
The problem arises, however, that while the inquisitorial style is manifestly 
applicable in the case of police misconduct, the judiciary seems to be a limiting 
case. It claims a liminal zone of its own; that is, because its "independence" ought 
be preserved at all costs, it represents a threshold beyond which it is improper to 
pass. This seems to place the judiciary outside the "normal" boundaries of proper 
inquiry. Justice Angelo Vasta of the Supreme Court (as he was then), for example, 
argued that the independence of the judiciary would be compromised if he was 
forced to appear before the Fitzgerald Inquiry. 
Indeed, Fitzgerald made detailed reference in his report to Vasta's lack of 
cooperation. He argued the judge's actions distracted and jeopardised the Inquiry 
at its most cmcial stage, when key political figures were appearing before it.35 This 
point was also taken up in public debate by Quentin Dempster, who argued that 
the Inquiry melee surrounding Judges Vasta and Pratt was a bonus for the real 
targets. "Let's get back to chasing the crooks", he wrote.36 
We need not take up the issue here of Vasta's motives and propriety. 
Clearly, however, the tension between the inquisitorial demands of public inquiry 
and the set of assumptions which guide behaviour in the judicial culture was not 
completely resolved in the Fitzgerald Inquiry. 
The Judicial Culture 
As far as Fitzgerald was concerned, the behaviour of judges legitimately fell within 
his terms of reference.37 His purpose was to delve as widely as necessary to 
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determine the tmth. 'Tmth", he argued, "does not cease to be tmth because 
prominent cifizens are involved, and an investigation which aims to find the tmth 
caimot be curtailed or circumscribed to exclude categories of persons from its 
purview."38 He continued, "Any contenfion that any investigation (except an 
inquiry which has been appointed by the Parliament to recommend whether a 
judge should be removed) which comes up against some matter in which the 
behaviour or relationships of a judge arises for consideration should be abandoned 
or curtailed is unrealistic and untenable in practice."39 
Those judges named in the Inquiry (Vasta and District Court Judge Eric 
Charles Ernest Pratt) were offered the same rights as others to appear before it 
and to make statements. Vasta particularly resented the intmsion, and claimed 
that to appear before the Inquiry stmck at the heart of that focal symbol of judicial 
culture, the independence of the judiciary. Vasta also vigorously and publicly 
questioned whether Fitzgerald, as a QC, was qualified to inquire into the 
behaviour of a Supreme Court judge. 
The ethos of judicial culture, which had procedurally undermined the 
effectiveness of the National Hotel Inquiry, now threatened to dismpt Fitzgerald. 
Indeed, Fitzgerald was so dismayed at Vasta's attacks on the Inquiry that he 
contemplated abandoning it.-w Judicial independence was being drawn upon to 
claim that judges could exclude themselves from participating in an inquisitorially-
based inquiry. This was a severe challenge to the integrity of a context-based 
inquiry, from which no one else had been excluded. 
In a letter to the premier, Fitzgerald recognised his dilemma: 
The independence of the judiciary is undoubtedly the most important 
feature associated with Mr Justice Vasta's position. A commitment to equal 
treatment for all may have to yield if such an approach would imperil the 
judiciary's independence. Conversely, especially having regard to the public 
concern at what had been revealed in the Inquiry, care must be taken to 
ensure that concern for the judiciary's independence does not lead to a less 
thorough scmtiny of judicial conduct, create a public perception that there 
are special mles and perhaps "cover-ups" available for a privileged few, or 
possibly cause a failure to dispel any doubts which may exist concerning 
judicial integrity.'ti 
It could be argued that Fitzgerald's concern for the independence of the 
judiciary led to him to forego his full inquisitorial rights. For reasons which need 
not be examined here, he gladly handed over the task of inquiring into the 
behaviour of the judges to a Parliamentary (Judges) Commission of Inquiry, to be 
carried out by three retired judges: the Rt Hon. Sir Harry Talbot Gibbs (Presiding 
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Member); the Hon. Sir George Hermann Lush; and the Hon. Michael Manifold 
Helsham. (This Inquiry bore considerable similarity to a body set up in 1987 by 
the Commonwealth Parliament to examine matters concerning High Court Justice 
Lionel Murphy; Sir George Lush was also a member of that body.) 
The problem of the relation between inquisitorial pubhc inquiries and 
judicial culture is compounded in the case of inquiries into judicial misconduct. 
Fitzgerald, however, still questioned whether an inquiry seeking to determine 
whether a judge should be removed from office needed to be "effectively 
adversariar'.i2 Vasta was certainly demanding an adversarial style contest. 
Fitzgerald had remarked in a letter to the premier: "Many who have been caught 
up in the Inquiry share Mr Justice Vasta's wish to be excluded from such a process 
and to be called upon to face particularised allegations of which evidence is 
already available."''3 Indeed, it could be argued that Vasta achieved his wish, to a 
degree, in the Parliamentary Judges Inquiry. It is doubtful given his fate, however, 
that he achieved it to his safisfaction. 
The conclusions reached by Gibbs et al, in the Parliamentary Judges 
Inquiry, however, raise a serous question as to whether an inquisitorial style will be 
adopted in the future. The Parliamentary Judges Inquiry was, in part, a retreat 
into the formalistic and familiar ethos of the judicial culture. Gibbs et al, for 
example, chose to firmly establish what, at the beginning of their inquiry, they 
called a "civil and curial" basis for hearing evidence.'^ And while they did 
recommend that Parliament remove Vasta from office - largely but not entirely 
because of the improper dealings of Vasta's family company Cosco Holdings (a 
toilet paper manufacturer in Brisbane) - in their Summary of Conclusions they 
trenchantly voiced doubts about the value of wide-ranging inquiries: "The 
Commission, as a result of its experience in conducting this inquiry into Mr Justice 
Vasta and into Judge Pratt, has formed the clear opinion that the holding of an 
inquiry into the question whether "any behaviour" of a judge warrants removal is 
open to grave objection. It is one thing to inquire into specific allegations of 
impropriety but it is quite another to conduct an inquisition into all aspects of a 
judge's lifc'^ ts 
"Why not?" one might ask. Gibbs et al, concluded, "an inquiry of the latter 
[that is, an inquisition], kind exposes the judiciary to unacceptable risks that 
pressure will be applied to its members and becomes especially dangerous if 
instigated by pressure groups or as a result of media clamour".46 
Why the judges questioned the value of an inquiry into judges is not entirely 
clear when viewed in the context of the whole Fitzgerald Inquiry. Their parting 
shot seems to hint at sinister external factors - pressure groups and media clamour. 
But as Evan Whitton has commented: "Are Gibbs et al, saying it is better to have 
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the judiciary sprinkled with such types as Vasta, who, in their opinion, had engaged 
in fraud on the revenue, rather than pry into their private lives."^^ 
At one level the question of whether judges should inquire into judges again 
raises its head. The concept of self-regulation was certainly a major casualty of the 
Fitzgerald Inquiry. At another level, a deeper problem is at work. In the light of 
what may be learnt from a comparison of the National Hotel and Fitzgerald 
Inquiries, we need to ask how realistic is it to expect that inquiries conducted by 
judges wiU be inquisitorial? The pressure on Gibbs in 1963-64, and on Gibbs et al 
in the Parhamentary Judges Inquiry, shows how easy it is for those steeped in the 
judicial method to adopt the adversaria] position. A person whose training has 
been in such a method must display special singularity and courage in order to 
overcome this and assume an avowedly inquisitorial stance, as Fitzgerald so ably 
did in his Inquiry. 
It is worth noting that the Gibbs panel found that "there is no evidence to 
suggest that there was anything improper at all" to be inferted from the various 
entries in sacked Pohce Commissioner, Sir Terence Lewis' diaries referring to 
Angelo Vasta. On the question of possible pverjury in relation to his denial of his 
alleged friendship with Sir Terence Lewis in the 1986 Matilda defamation case, 
Gibbs et al accepted Jusfice Vasta's explanation that "his acquaintance or 
friendship' with Sir Terence was not one which would interfere with the discharge 
of his official duties. 
Accepting that the judge dehberately gave false evidence to them about 
what became known as the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) matter, the 
panel found that there was "a very strong reason" to explain why Justice Vasta 
should give a false account, namely that he had previously committed himself to an 
absolute denial of the matter in the 1986 defamafion easels Remarkably, although 
the judges found Vasta's denial before them was "false, and dehberately so", they 
noted that Vasta gave his evidence to them after the Act, under which they were 
inquiring, came into force and, in the absence of submissions on this point, said 
that it would be "quite wrong ... to reach a conclusion" about whether Vasta's 
evidence before them constimted misbehaviour warranfing his removal from the 
Supreme Court bench.49 
Whether or not the Parliamentary Judges Inquiry played into Vasta's hands, 
the door has been left wide open in the future for a return to the demonstrably 
ineffectual formalistic adversarial procedures of the past - at least for judges. 
IronicaDy, it was precisely the wide terms of reference, in particular, the 
reference to "any behaviour", which was responsible for Vasta's demise. The 
question of influence between Lewis and Vasta was quickly dealt with; there 
rarely is any hard evidence for such things. Yet, despite their conclusion that 
judges should oiJy be required to face specific allegafions, Gibbs et al were of the 
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opinion that it was not necessary for them to determine whether any specific 
behaviour "in itself was enough to warrant his removal. Taken together, however, 
they were. 
On the one hand, then, Gibbs et al were claiming the desirability of 
abandoning an inquisitorial style in the case of judges and dealing only with 
specific allegations. On the other hand, they refused to determine whether any 
specific behaviour of Vasta warranted his removal from the bench. 
It is fair to say that the Parliamentary Judges Inquiry conclusions have not 
clarified the issue of judicial standards. They have raised more doubts than clarity 
concerning the role of the judicial culture in investigafing misconduct and 
corruption. 
The return to formalism has created a disturbing public perception that 
there is in judicial culture a concern for the tree-and-leaf detail, which seems to 
miss the woods for the trees. In the end, as Quentin Dempster wrote, it appears 
that the retired judges had beaten Vasta with a feather - his alleged tax fraud.so 
As well as not determining whether, for example, Vasta's stance in the 
Matilda defamation case was in itself misconduct warranting removal from office, 
the retired judges also determined that there was no evidence that Vasta's judicial 
judgment had been affected by his transgressions. Evan Whitton points out that it 
is not entirely clear whether the judges based this determination upon any detailed 
examination of the transcripts of Vasta's cases.5i 
The wider community has every right to be confused. Judges claim the right 
to independence and the respect of the wider community as exemplars of fair play. 
Yet a panel of three retired judges at a cost of $3,000 a day each, cannot give any 
specific guidance as to whether alleged acts of deceit, fraud and giving false 
evidence of themselves are condonable behaviours for a judge. 
A public understanding of the basis for judicial ethics, including what 
comprises "acceptable friendships" for a judge, is no clearer after the 
Parliamentary Judges Inquiry. Yet, it is precisely such a clarity which, according to 
the Hon. Mr Justice Thomas, is the most urgent necessity in regard to judicial 
ethics. In his book. Judicial Ethics in Australia, Justice Thomas offered insights info 
the judiciary's self-understanding of the misconduct quesfion. His basic position is 
that in Australia at least, informal processes have worked well up to now. 
(Unfortunately, this is somewhat like Bertrand Russell's luckless "verification 
turkey" who believed in its own perpetual existence until Thanksgiving morning.) 
Thomas also examined in some detail overseas experience in regard to 
independent judicial misconduct commissions. He questions their value. Where 
independent commissions exist, he claims, a good deal of time is taken up by 
unsatisfied litigants. He argues somewhat dubiously, that the existence of judicial 
order commissions have not decreased the amount of judicial misconduct and so 
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are sui)erfluous.52 By the same logic, however, it could be argued that courts do 
not decrease the crime rate and judges could also be dispensed with. 
The unpalatable alternative to judicial self-auditing, for Thomas, is the 
growth of bureaucracies full of public servants concerned with "empire building". 
Finally, he argues that independent commissions produce a situation in which 
"judges are under siege". Consequently, "... the best judges will no longer accept 
appointment to the bench and the system progressively degrades".53 This image of 
barristers quaking in fear of being offered an appointment to the bench is surely 
hard to sustain with any seriousness. 
If Gibbs et al have called into quesfion the value of an "inquiry into judges", 
what will happen in the future? Will they, for their part, not make themselves 
available? Will they accept Sir William Irvine's advice and stay out of commissions 
of inquiry? Or when it comes to investigating judicial misconduct, will the 
pressures within the judicial culture to exclude non-judges from the field of play be 
too great to withstand? 
As far as the general community is concemed, it does expect its judges to be 
of the highest calibre, but this is not guaranteed by the office itself, nor is it a 
genetic attribute of those called. What we have learnt of our police applies also to 
judges. Tony Fitzgerald claimed that the police are "likely to reflect the general 
social culture, including its weaknesses (for example materialism) and also to 
include a roughly representative proportion of individuals who break the law".54 
Yet judges too are drawn from the wider community and presumably are also 
prone to every human weakness. According to Fitzgerald "unpalatable though it 
may be, the harsh reality must be faced that a community, especially an affluent 
and quite widely cormpfible community, may occasionally throw up a cormpt 
judge'.ss 
This is an honest starting point. The best way to ensure the independence 
of the judiciary is to develop effective mechanisms which will guard and protea it. 
This means not only recognising the possibility that judicial misconduct may occur, 
but also developing enlightened strategies for deaUng with it. In Fitzgerald's 
words. The mechanisms for preventing and detecting official misconduct must be 
able to operate in such regrettable circumstances, and must not be obstmcted by 
some approach which places judges effectively above and beyond any scmtiny."56 
At the forefront of the development of such strategies must be the honest 
recognition that there are contexts in which formalism with regard to judicial 
procedures may inhibit reforms. 
Judicial independence is cmcial to ensuring that upright men and women of 
high character and standards administer the law fairly and without bias. But 
independence must never be confused with insularity or idiosyncrasy. 
Paradoxically, judicial independence caimot be treated in isolation from the social 
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and political context. We have already seen how the cormpt have adapted to 
judicial procedures and found protective niches within it. It would be an irony if 
the independence of the judiciary prevented the widest possible implementation of 
a contextual approach to dealing with public corruption. 
The rest of the community has no cause for complacency. According to 
Fitzgerald, the routine practices of the media, for example, played their part in the 
Queensland social context.57 And, yes, even historians, have at times concentrated 
on the application of quasi-judicial procedures of verification and evidence to the 
exclusion of questions of social and political context. 
Most importantly, these issues continue to be relevant. Already, judges 
have been at the forefront of attempts to modify the Fitzgerald recommendations 
for a Criminal Justice Commission (CJC).58 This is despite the fact that Fitzgerald 
himself, aware of the need for "special sensitivity" regarding the judiciary, 
recommended that the authority of the Chairman of the Criminal Justice 
Commission should be required and that the Chairman ought to consult with both 
the Chief Justice and the Attorney-General before initiating any inquiry into the 
official misconduct of a judge.s? His Report also made clear that any such 
investigation should be confined to allegations which, if established, might warrant 
removal of a judge from office.«) Interestingly, while the Criminal Justice 
Commission Acl, which came into operation on 4 November 1989, incorporated 
these suggestions, it omitted any reference to the Attorney-General.^ 
The Queensland community has leamt valuable lessons from dealing with 
police culture. By comparing the National Hotel Inquiry and Fitzgerald Inquiry, it 
has also witnessed the relative value of context-based inquisitorial inquiry over 
formal judicial procedures. In the light of these lessons, the community must judge 
whether in the investigation of cormption the judicial culture and its claims to 
independence should remain untouched. In the end, it will be of little use 
reforming legislation and stmctures if the codes and assumptions employed by the 
judiciary do not take full advantage of flexible procedures. 
The bitter lessons of the past must be learnt. If they are not, Queensland 
could well see the need for another Fitzgerald Inquiry within the next twenty four 
years, or even less. 
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Unstuck 
Brian Toohey 
The Fitzgerald Commission was established in accordance with long established 
practice in Australia. It gave early promise of proceeding along normal lines wath 
greater skill - and to greater effea - than most of its predecessors. The radical 
departure occurted when it came to the final Report which refused to make 
findings on the evidence. I wish to argue that this tradition has been abandoned at 
severe cost to the reform process. 
Fitzgerald's Terms of Reference set him squarely within the category of 
commission described by the Australian Law Reform Commission as, "first and 
foremost, fact finding bodies called on to investigate and make recommendations 
as to alleged abused in public affairs, alleged serious crimes or derelictions of duty 
affecting the public at large."i 
Fitzgerald certainly did not spare himself when it came to the part about 
recommendations. It is just that he skipped the part about making findings on 
facts. What is more, many of the observations and recommendations that he did 
make were about matters on which he had taken litfie or no evidence. Unhappily, 
the common belief that the Fitzgerald Commission demonstrated the existence of 
high level cormption within Queensland before setting out detailed 
recommendations on how to deal with the problem is not borne out by even the 
most cursory reading of the final Report. 
At the hearing stage, the technique of offering indemnities to senior police 
produced confessions of cormption that might otherwise have taken months of 
exhausting, and possibly inconclusive, investigation. These early breakthroughs, 
plus the process of hearing most of the evidence in public, helped create a level of 
media support, even adulation, that has rarely been achieved by other 
commissions. On those occasions when sections of the media turned fractious, 
they were reminded rather firmly of the contempt provisions available to a 
commissioner. At one stage, Fitzgerald took the bizarre step of demanding that 
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the Courier-Mail hand over all financial records relating to the money it had made 
from escort service and massage parlour advertising along with copies of all 
articles it had mn on the Commission. Doubtless some moral point was being 
pursued here, but coming from a member of a profession which will take money 
from any client, no matter how despicable, it seemed to lose some of its force. 
This minor aberration aside, however, the conduct of the Commission foi 
the greater part of its life was a significant success. Admittedly, time was wasted 
on trivial examples of low level police cormption, but that is not unusual as a 
commission thrashes about in search of larger prey. Ultimately, what was 
disappointing was the failure to ask cmcial questions of senior politicians and the 
refusal to call witnesses, particularly businessmen, who could throw light upon 
important evidence. In contrast to the hearings, the final Report is remarkable for 
the way in which it simply ignored the requirements of the initial terms to report 
upon the behaviour of named individuals such as Gerald, Antonio, and Vincenzo 
Bellini, Vittoria Conte, and Hector Hapeta. 
After the Terms of Reference were widened, Fitzgerald heard serious 
allegations against politicians and senior police and managed to uncover pertinent 
documentation about certain questionable financial transactions. He did not, 
however, build upon this evidence to produce an overall picture of cormption, let 
alone provide findings about specific examples in the police force or the political 
and business spheres. 
Fitzgerald did not lack resources or adequate personal recompense for his 
task. The Commission cost $24 million of which $2.3 million were fees paid to 
Fitzgerald himself for a little over two years' work. This would appear to be about 
400 per cent more than a top silk could earn at the Brisbane bar and almost 1,000 
per cent more than the average judge is paid. 
The failure to make findings on the evidence before him is all the more 
surprising in view of the undertakings given in what Fitzgerald liked to call 
"homilies" delivered as part of the hearing process. On 19 October 1987, he said: 
I accept that there will be an obligafion on me when I ultimately represent a 
report to the Government to ensure to the best of my ability that any 
unsubstantiated allegations are put to rest. The efficacy of that step to 
redress any possible damage to an innocent person's reputafion must await 
publication of that report, but, once that occurs, I consider that both the 
community and innocent people who are named in evidence will be better 
served by freedom to publish the evidence as it is given than by restrictions 
which will occasion continued cynicism or lingering suspicions that there 
has been a cover-up...2 
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These words were repeated on 26 October.3 
Fitzgerald also promised that he would deal with those who, upon 
considerafion of the evidence, were regarded as guilty. On 31 August 1987 he said: 
"Once a process such as this is started, it must be carried to a satisfactory 
conclusion. If significant culprits escape the net, they are to some extent 'sanitised' 
and in an even stronger position to pursue their activities and escape detection in 
the future."-! 
The Deputy Commissioner, Patricia Wolfe, in a homily of her own on 20 
June 1988, gave a graphic depiction of the sort of behaviour being dealt with: 'The 
demimonde with which the Inquiry is concerned is not a jolly place peopled by 
happy-go-lucky fun lovers sampling the pleasures provided for them by generous 
benefactors. It is a world of greed, violence, cormpfion and exploitafion, where 
the weak and the immamre are preyed on even to the extent of the indescribable 
evil of the peddling of addictive dmgs by which youthful lives are destroyed''.^ 
Strong language, indeed! But any expectation raised by this robust 
statement that the Commission might make findings on the evidence regarding 
greed, violence, cormption, or dmg dealing in its final report was not fulfilled. In 
the words of his own homily, it appears that many culprits will be "sanitised" by the 
omissions of Fitzgerald's Report, or, as he puts it with admirable frankness in the 
Report itself, "the guilty will be delighted no conclusions have been reached".* 
Instead of carrying out the promises made in the homilies, Fitzgerald 
contented himself with the assertion that everyone was entifled to be considered 
innocent unless a court found otherwise. Nonetheless, the legislation under which 
Fitzgerald was operating makes plain that a commission's inquiries are to take 
precedence over those of any court.^ His refusal to make findings means that 
much of the conflicting evidence taken during the hearings will remain unresolved 
with any harm to innocent people's reputations continuing unabated. His 
justification, in summary, was that it was no use dwelling on the past and that the 
more important task was to erect stmctures for the future to combat cormption in 
Queensland. A further argument is that adverse findings could prejudice a future 
trial. The potential for prejudice may exist but there are numerous examples from 
the past where courts have not taken such a view of the findings of a royal 
commission. The Slattery Commission, for example, drew adverse conclusions 
against former NSW Corrective Services Minister, Rex Jackson, but this was not 
considered by the courts to have prejudiced his subsequent trial. 
Fitzgerald did not consider the problem to apply to the unfavourable 
publicity surrounding evidence given about several witnesses in the course of his 
Inquiry, although he could, of course, claim that findings by him carried more 
weight in a juror's mind. Many would argue that the situation is no different to 
committal proceedings in which jurors might be influenced by a magistrate's 
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decision that sufficient evidence exists for someone to stand trial or to the upshot 
of findings from the NSW Independent Commission Against Cormpfion (ICAC) 
that led to criminal charges. Others would argue that jurors are quite capable of 
concentrating their minds on the evidence before them rather than being 
mesmerised by something they might have read two or three years before. 
From the writer's perspective, the success of a royal commission need not 
be judged on the extent of punitive court action that ensues in its wake. There may 
well be cases where there is litfie public benefit in attempting to send some old 
men to gaol. Detailed findings about how cormption actually worked might bring 
about more public awareness of the need for reform than the often narrow and 
protracted business of a trial. In any event, it is for the courts - not prosecutors or 
investigators - to decide whether a fair trial is possible. 
Not only did Fitzgerald refuse to make findings about individuals, he 
declined to make findings about the general pattern of cormption in Queensland. 
He confined himself to a supposed neutral summary of parts of the evidence. 
Given the substantial resources available, it should have been feasible to bring 
down a four volume report: the first meeting his initial terms of reference on 
brothels and the like; the second outhning cormpfion in the highest ranks of the 
police force (there was no need to chase down every constable who had received a 
"freebie" from a freelance prostitute); the third assessing the probity of the 
relations between politicians and the various businessmen with whom they had 
financial relations, and the fourth setting out his recommendations for the future. 
As Professor Clem Lloyd puts it: 
Without analysis and assessment, the stmcture falls to the ground and the 
summary is virtually useless for inculcafing into the public mind the basis 
for the transfiguring of the political and administrative culture of 
Queensland. The summary doesn't do the job that Fitzgerald demands of it 
... Fitzgerald makes much of his Commission's mission to inform the public 
and establish in the community the basis for urgent reform. It is fair to 
judge the Report on the basis of the educative and propagandist roles 
claimed for it, and on both counts it largely fails ... There seems no valid 
reason why Fitzgerald should not have properly analysed the historical, 
causative elements and made appropriate findings upon them. Indeed, his 
laudable aspirations for quick and substantive reform would seem 
dependent on such a procedure. Fitzgerald conceived his Report as a 
'catalyst and platform for continuing reform' designed to restore public 
confidence and improve political processes - 'the focus is on the future, not 
the past'. The problem is that without sufficient understanding of the past, 
it is difficult to design a blueprint for the future and to make it stick. By 
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playing down past abuses, the refusing to make findings upon them, 
Fitzgerald erodes his case for reform.s 
Fitzgerald's decision not to make any findings about individuals, critical or 
otherwise, still leaves the question of what happens to those whose behaviour 
might not warrant criminal proceedings but nevertheless amounts to public 
impropriety. Lloyd draws attention to the 1930 Royal Commission into the 
behaviour of two former Queensland premiers, Ted Theodore and Bill 
McCormack, in the purchase of the Mungana mines. Historians who have since 
examined the issue considered the Royal Commission findings of impropriety 
soundly based although court action did not succeed at the time. For example, 
K.H. Kennedy writes in The Mungana Affair, "that the Crown failed to obtain a 
verdict in a civil suit, and would almost certainly have failed in a criminal 
prosecution, in no way alters the fact that the defendants had acted in collusion to 
profit dishonestly at the Crown's expense, in flagrant disregard of their public 
duty."9 The Labor lawyer and historian, Michael Sexton, came to similar 
conclusions in a paper delivered to a Canberra conference in 1984.io 
Even if it were considered desirable to remain silent about those who might 
be subject to criminal charges somewhere down the track, this is not a reason to 
refrain from comment on those who fall outside the scope of the criminal law but 
are in breach of normal ethical standards of public conduct. Limits in the law 
relating to secret commissions, for example, might prevent charges of bribery being 
laid without removing the possibility for a significant conflict of interest whose 
existence could well fall within the bounds of appropriate comment from a royal 
commissioner. 
The issue was given sharp reUef in the evidence taken by Fitzgerald about 
various financial transactions between businessmen and politicians in Queensland. 
Details were given of large loans, often repayable at an indeterminate time in the 
future, made to Russell Hinze by property developers and others who were seeking 
decisions within his ministerial disaetion. The Report notes that in the four years 
to 30 June 1987, over $800,000 were described as "loans forgiven" or "loans written 
off" in the Hinze Group financial accounts.H Hinze was a man of considerable 
assets, yet none of the businessmen was called to explain why he should have 
received such generous treatment. 
Unfortunately, Fitzgerald's comments in his final Report did not rise above 
the trite. He says: 'Those (businessmen) with whom dealings took place may have 
neither sought nor received preferential treatment and no conclusions of 
impropriety have been drawn.'i2 The businessmen "may" (or "may not") have done 
lots of things in their dealings with Cabinet ministers in Queensland. Some "may" 
even have been that old fashioned type who expected a return on funds outlaid. 
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Expensive royal commissions are established, however, because questions 
have been raised about what "may" have occurred - at the end of the process of 
inquiry the public can reasonably expect answers that explain what actually has 
happened. Yet Fitzgerald did not even seek in some of these transactions to go 
beyond the corporate entity used to find who were the principals. 
Sometimes we get a name but little more. "Why did the Cowrie 
Corporation, for example, which wrote off a loan of $80,000 to Hinze's Waverley 
Park Stud Pty Ltd, not make a greater effort to get its money back? All Fitzgerald 
tells us is that the loan had been made by a Victorian, Roger John Burt, and that 
Hinze had said he did not know Burt, or whether Cowrie Corporation was acting 
as agent or principal, and if an agent, for whom. In fact, the Cowrie Corporation is 
associated with a distinguished Melbourne businessman who had development 
interests on the Gold Coast. Even if Fitzgerald would not draw any conclusions 
about the propriety of the transaction, why could the public not be told who was 
involved? 
Fitzgerald's handling of a $3million loan from the European Asian Bank to 
a Bjelke-Petersen family company is even more difficult to justify. Sir Job's friend, 
Sir Edward Lyons, and Sir Joh himself had been involved in the negofiations for 
the loan. A report from a European Asian Bank official produced in evidence said 
that it had been told that granfing the loan would help it get government business 
and that refusal would have a negative impact on its future in Queensland. 
Although the loan went ahead, Fitzgerald contented himself with recording that 
Sir Joh denied that he had "provided any basis for those comments".i" 
What happened? Did the Bank make it all up? Alternatively, who was it 
who provided the basis for the comments and were they authorised to do so? 
Fitzgerald does nothing to enlighten us, simply giving Job's denial and leaving the 
Bank's credibility hanging in the air. Even if Fitzgerald did not wish to draw any 
conclusions, calling someone from the Bank to give its version of this cmcial memo 
would seem to have been a task well within the time available to him as well as a 
simple requirement of fairness. 
Fitzgerald repeated the formula used in regard to direct transactions 
between politicians and businessmen when it came to political donations: "Persons 
or organisations who made donations to the National Party of Australia (Qld) may 
have neither sought nor received preferential treatment and no conclusions of 
impropriety have been drawn."i5 Fitzgerald's apparent faith in the purity of the 
human spirit in business transactions with governments may be touching, but it 
does not appear to be shared by Adrian Roden QC, in comments he has made in 
the course of the inquiry he conducted on behalf of ICAC into various land 
dealings on the northern New South Wales coast. 
While Fitzgerald refused to make findings on the evidence before him • 
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something for which he was trained as a lawyer - he was happy to take up much of 
his Report with essays on police culture and possible management stmctures for 
the force that could have been written without the whole process of a royal 
commission and probably better written by someone with more expertise in these 
areas such as a sociologist, public administrator, or criminologist. Similarly, 
although he took no evidence on the topic, he was not deterred from making 
recommendafions for an electoral redistribution which has become the main focus 
of the reaction to his Report. Getting rid of the gerrymander has merit but it 
hardly ranks at the core of dealing with cormption - New South Wales has 
managed to have a flourishing cormption industry for decades without rigged 
boundaries. 
Unfortunately, one of the most superficial sections is on organised crime, in 
which he repeats all the stereotypes without the slightest attempt to anchor it in 
the evidence before the commission. According to Fitzgerald organised crime "is 
like a Hydra, and the removal of some of its heads will not kill it", is Its architects, 
we are told, hide behind a "veneer of respectability"n, while the profits of 
organised crime are used to "buy skilled services from expert lawyers, accountants, 
financial and other advisers. That money also buys sophisticated technology ... 
(which) includes electronic communications, interception and monitoring 
equipment, secure information processing and storage systems, good transport and 
the best weaponry".i8 
The notion that subjects of Fitzgerald's investigation such as Hector 
Hapeta, could use anything more sophisticated than a telephone, let alone "secure 
information processing and storage systems" is simply fanciful. If Fitzgerald found 
anyone further up the line who remotely fitted these breathless caricatures of 
organised crime figures, he singularly fails to share his discovery with us. That, 
unhappily, is the result of his decision to depart from the normal requirements of a 
royal commission to make findings on the evidence and to concentrate instead on 
musing about a new administrative stmcmre for Queensland. 
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Did Fitzgerald Go Too Far? A Response 
From the Queensland Law Society 
Greg Vickery 
Did Fitzgerald go too far? The question is one of great complexity. 
Counterbalancing the vigorous assertions of those who are of the view that the 
Report did go too far are the equally held views of those who believe that it did 
not go far enough. This chapter will examine some of the reasons why these 
diametrically opposed views can be so strongly held. 
At the outset, it is necessary to examine briefly the Terms of Reference of 
the Fitzgerald Inquiry, the ambit of which was enhanced markedly during the 
Inquiry. The initial Terms of Reference required the Commissioner to inquire 
into the conduct of five named individuals in respect of cormpt conduct.' Further, 
the Commissioner was required to report in general terms whether existing 
legislation and procedures were adequate to ensure that cormpt conduct was 
detected and reported.2 
A month after the Commission of Inquiry was established the period to be 
investigated was extended from June 1982 back to January 1977. An additional 
fourth Term of Reference was added requiring the Commission to report on any 
other matter arising out of the existing Terms which seemed proper and in the 
public interest.^  
On 25 August 1988, this fourth Term of Reference was expanded, invifing a 
report by the Commissioner of any matter or thing "concerning possible criminal 
activity, neglect or violation of duty or official misconduct or impropriety, the 
inquiry into which to you, shall seem meet and proper in the public interest". 
Thus Commissioner Fitzgerald's Terms of Reference were changed from a 
most specific inquiry regarding certain persons alleged to be involved in particular, 
and identified illegal activities, to an extremely wide-ranging brief to examine any 
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possible criminal activity, official misconduct or impropriety "as appeared to the 
Commission to be in the public interest". 
This chapter will look first at the views of those who believe the Report did 
not go far enough, in that it did not address each of the specific References. Those 
who looked to the Report for a clear statement concerning the criminality or 
otherwise of the conduct of the individuals names in the initial Terms of Reference 
may have been disappointed. To them, the response of the Queensland Law 
Society is that one of the greatest risks of commissions of inquiry and royal 
commissions, as perceived by lawyers, is the potential of such inquiries to 
jeopardise the proper administration of criminal justice by adversely affecting the 
prospects of a fair trial of persons indicted as a result of the findings of such 
commissions. In addition, there is grave risk of destruction of the reputation of 
persons named in the proceedings of the commission without such persons ever 
being charged with an offence or being afforded the chance to restore their 
reputations. 
The competing merits of open or closed hearings and questions relating to 
the publication of detailed findings, are issues of polarised debate. 
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Mark Weinberg QC, recently 
queried the wisdom of having public hearings at cormption commissions given the 
attendant media publicity. He remarked that the mles of evidence do not apply to 
the conduct of such hearings and it followed that allegations based upon nothing 
more than hearsay, or hearsay upon hearsay, could be aired and reported without 
any finding having been made as to their veracity.'* 
The contrary view has been argued by Adrian Roden QC, Assistant 
Commissioner of the New South Wales Independent Commission Against 
Cormption (ICAC). He was of the opinion "that justice done behind closed doors 
is open to abuse and must be beyond question. Public confidence in the 
administration of justice cannot be maintained within a context of secrecy ..."^  
Tony Fitzgerald QC, took the view that the proceedings before his Commission 
should, for the most part, be open to the public. 
The further problem that a commission of inquiry may raise for the general 
administration of criminal justice is the publication of the Report itself. On this 
question the Government hesitated for some time before resolving to table and 
publish the Report as soon as it was received. 
The two factors - the public conduct of the greater part of the Inquiry and 
the publication of the Report - are to be commended, but such a course once 
adopted requires its own specific constraint if a fair trial is to be available to those 
subsequently charged. 
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Much of the material likely to jeopardise the fair conduct of future trials 
has not been published or examined in detail in the Report. That material instead 
has been passed to the office of the Special Prosecutor, which was created prior to 
the completion of the Commission and before the establishment of the more 
recently enacted and embryonic Criminal Justice Commission (CJC).' 
It is the view of the Law Society that the difficult problems which confront 
any royal commission have been adequately addressed by the style of the 
proceedings and Report of Commissioner Fitzgerald and the procedures 
subsequenfly adopted in relation to the prosecutions which have been or will be 
commenced as a result of the Inquiry. 
It is more difficult to address the suggestion of those who maintain the 
Report goes too far. It is certainly tme that few Queenslanders who studied the 
initial Terms of Reference given to Commissioner Fitzgerald would have 
anticipated that the final Report would recommend the creation of a permanent 
Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) or the more unlikely Electoral and 
Administrative Review Commission (EARC) with its recommended task, inter alia, 
of a review of the State's electoral system. 
It is believed that few, if any, Queenslanders would have had any 
comprehensive appreciation of the extent of the activities examined in the Report 
under the heading "Some other aspects of recent politics in Queensland". That 
section deals at some length with instances involving ministers of the Crown in 
numerous activities in circumstances where the Report suggests a real or apparent 
conflict of personal interest and public duty may have arisen.'' It will be seen by 
many as adequate justification for the EARC recommendation. 
The Queensland Law Society sought and obtained leave to appear before 
the Fitzgerald Commission and made submissions upon those References relating 
to the adequacy of existing legislation to detect and deal with official misconduct 
and cormption. 
The Society submitted that the evidence received by the Commission had 
revealed a need for the creation of an independent commission against cormption 
and asked for the establishment of such a commission for a term strictly limited by 
a sunset clause of approximately three years. The Society's submissions used as a 
model, the 1988 New South Wales legislation creating an independent anti-
cormption commission in that State {New South Wales Independent Commission 
Against Cormption Act 1988), and recommended the adoption of similar legislation 
in Queensland, subject to a number of relatively minor but significant 
amendments. 
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The Society's submissions also examined the work of the New South Wales 
Ombudsman in the investigation of complaints against police for the three years to 
August 1987. As a result, the Society also recommended retention and 
restmcturing of the Police Complaints Tribunal (Queensland). Specifically, the 
Society suggested that the procedures and legislation in place in New South Wales 
{The Ombudsman Act) and the Police Regulations {Allegations of Misconduct Act) 
had demonstrated that allegations of misconduct against serving police officers 
could be dealt with effectively by carefully selected serving officers seconded to an 
independent investigatory body, provided that such a body was given the necessary 
legislative powers and, more importantly, adequate financial resources. The 
Society, previously a vehement critic of the relatively ineffective Police Complaints 
Tribunal in Queensland, believed that, with the necessary injection of resources 
and power, it could develop into a specialised and effective body which could 
attract and enjoy public confidence. 
Assessment of Fitzgerald Recommendations 
This section deals principally with the recommendations for the creafion of a 
criminal justice commission, with its enabling legislation {Criminal Justice 
Commission Act 1989) and the extent of the justification for the extraordinary 
powers which are to reside in that permanent commission. The Report 
recommended the creation of a permanent commission to bring together a number 
of functions not properly addressed in Queensland at present. It will provide a 
mechanism for the continuation of investigations into official misconduct in this 
State. It will oversee reform of the police force. It will maintain and develop 
criminal intelligence services. It will monitor the administration of criminal justice 
generally and it will generate proposals for reform of the criminal law. In short, it 
has a broad charter in all aspects of the criminal justice system and some of the 
functions given to it may not necessarily sit comfortably with others. 
The function of initiating criminal law reform was not one which the Society 
had contemplated as appropriate to an anti-cormption commission at the time it 
made submissions to the Fitzgerald Inquiry. The Society has, of course, since had 
the benefit of the written report and has considered the numerous findings of 
Commissioner Fitzgerald in relafion to the unsafisfactory aspects of the present 
legislative processes in Queensland, particularly in areas of criminal law and 
general public order legislation. The Report examined the ramifications of the 
politicising of the administration and observed that a system which had provided 
the Executive Government with comprehensive control over the careers of pubhc 
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officials had created special pressures upon them as a result of which merit had 
been ignored often and political loyalty had in some cases been rewarded.* As a 
result, the independence and impartiality of the public service had been eroded 
and the Parliament had been deprived of the opportunity to consider all relevant 
factors in making important legislative policy decisions, 
The Report found that a major consequence of politicising the bureaucracy 
was a reliance on inappropriate considerations in the decision making process. 
The Report identified both inadequate critical assessment by government of draft 
legislafion and lack of an adequate mechanism by which new or contrary views 
could be expressed. 
It has long been of concern to the Society that detailed commentary and 
submissions to government in relation to proposals for the amendment of 
legislation, particularly in relation to public order and criminal law matters, have 
often gone unheeded. The submissions have been dispassionate and have been 
intended to draw attention to the unwarranted or the unintended results of 
proposed legislative changes or have drawn attention to the iniquitous or unjust 
provisions in existing legislation, {The Dmgs Misuse Act). They have on occasions 
in the pjist failed because of opposition from those in public service who are 
charged with the administration of the existing law. 
Much of this legislative reform is now placed in the hands of the CJC. The 
Commission, however, is also charged with an important role in the enforcement 
of the criminal law (in conjunction with the Director of Prosecutions and the 
Special Prosecutor). Great care will be needed to ensure that future amendments 
to the criminal law are not biased towards facilitating new methods of intmsive 
investigation and the prosecution of the accused at the expense of basic civil 
liberties. 
On this point, the Society draws attenfion to two legislative changes which 
have occurred in conjuncfion with the work and report of the Fitzgerald 
Commission. Both changes have the potential to alter substantially the balance 
which as been established over many years between the rights of the citizen and 
those of the State in the administration of criminal justice. 
Firstly, the amendment to Section 14 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act 
1950-89 which occurred on 16 March 1989. This section had previously provided 
that anyone who answered questions or produced documents before an inquiry 
under compulsion of the Act was protected from self-incrimination in relation to 
such "statements or disclosures" in any subsequent civil or criminal proceedings. It 
is contended that this amendment has dramatically reduced the traditional 
immunity from self-incriminafion by removing the protection previously afforded 
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to statutory declarations by witnesses tendered in response to the questions of a 
commission of inquiry. The Society had no opportunity to comment on the 
amendment prior to its enactment because, like so much public order legislation in 
this State in recent years, it passed through all stages in the House the day after its 
introduction as a result of Standing Orders being suspended. The Society 
subsequently urged repeal of the amendment and has been informed by the 
Special Prosecutor that he would not seek to introduce in evidence a self-
incriminatory statutory declaration provided in response to a question asked under 
compulsion at the Commission of Inquiry. 
While the commendable atfitude of the Special Prosecutor provides a 
satisfactory practical result, the criminal law should not have to rely for its 
operation upon the attitude of senior officers charged with its enforcement. The 
amendment remains most unsatisfactory. 
A not dissimilar machinery provision is to be found in Section 20 of the 
Special Prosecutor Act 1988. This section provides absolute protection to the 
Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry and any person assisting the commission 
from any requirement to produce in any proceedings, any document or material in 
the possession of the commission or to divulge any information to any person. The 
Commission was at the same time, permitted to communicate such informafion to 
the Special Prosecutor but was able to direct the Special Prosecutor in turn, not to 
further divulge that information. Section 21 endeavours to provide the machinery 
to ensure that such material in the hands of the Special Prosecutor, if necessary for 
the fair trial of an accused, would be available or admitted upon that trial. 
This complex provision seeks to restore some of the common law rights 
removed by Section 20. The machinery provided by the section is imperfect but 
the Society does not propose to canvass in detail the problems that may arise in its 
satisfactory operation. It is sufficient for the purposes of this paper to observe that 
Section 21 does not provide any machinery to access material in the hands of the 
Commission when that material has not been communicated to the Special 
Prosecutor. In such circumstances, the accused may have no knowledge of the 
existence or nature of the material. Even if the existence of the material was 
suspected and in the course of a prosecution, it became relevant to the fair trial of 
the accused, there is no machinery by which that material could be brought to the 
attention of the court because of the comprehensive protection afforded by Section 
20. 
This section was the subject of an unsuccessful objection in submissions by 
the Society prior to the enactment of the legislation. A recent case serves to bring 
the Society's concerns into focus. One of the significant powers of the Fitzgerald 
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Commission was to facilitate the granting of indemnities from prosecution to those 
who appeared before it. The case referred to arose from the evidence of one such 
indemnified witness and provides an example of the dangers inherent in the 
section in the Special Prosecutors Act referred to.' 
In that case it was alleged that the evidence of an indemnified witness 
which was sought to be used in the prosecution of an accused was so tainted by 
threats and inducements offered to the witness that it should not be admitted. The 
Fitzgerald Commission at first took steps to resist the discovery upon subpoena of 
the material which disclosed the nature of the dealings between the investigating 
officers and the indemnified witness. By agreement, however, tape recorded 
material did subsequently come before the trial judge. 
The trial Judge, de Jersey J., in mling against the prosecution found that 
attempts to instil fear in the witness, notwithstanding his repeated denials, were 
such that there was a very grave risk that the witness' statements were not tmthful 
but were "his response to what he felt the Inquiry officers wanted him to say". 
If Section 20 of the Act had been in force at the relevant time, there would 
have been no power to force any production of the tapes which revealed the 
circumstances in which the indemnified witness made statements incriminating the 
accused. The case serves to highlight the dangers which may flow from the 
concentration of extraordinary inquisitorial powers in one body or commission. 
There is a general tendency to favour the state in important changes in the 
balance between state and citizen in the administration of criminal justice. As was 
indicated previously the Society has submitted that an independent commission 
should be created to investigate public cormption, but such a body should be 
subject to a sunset clause. It is that point which will now be enlarged upon. 
Commissions of inquiry in this country traditionally are armed with 
extraordinary powers. However, the limited life and the specific (and public) 
Terms of Reference of such commissions tend to act as an inbuilt safeguard 
against three potentially grave problems, namely: the abuse of power; external 
cormpfion influences; and improper or inappropriate intmsion by government. 
The Society has supported the creation of a commission to complete the 
matters raised by, but not finalised by the Fitzgerald investigations. The Society 
does not, however, believe that there is a case for the establishment of a 
permanent commission with the wide powers proposed in the Criminal Justice 
Commission Bill. The permanent nature of the CJC and the broad and general 
ambit of its Terms of Reference may lead to a greater risk of susceptibility to the 
three problems referred to already. 
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What avenue does a person with a genuine grievance against the CJC now 
pursue? Without effective review procedures in place, how will public confidence 
be sustained in a permanent body when allegations whether they be tme or 
malicious are brought against it? 
It is the concern of the Society that there is no fail-safe mechanism which 
will ensure that a permanent commission does not fall victim to the ills which were 
examined and idenfified in other arms of government by the Fitzgerald 
Commission. 
There is, unfortunately, a recent history of many abuses of the criminal 
justice system in Queensland. Such instances identified in the Fitzgerald Report 
and by earlier inquiries include cases where criminal elements in the police force 
have brought false charges, have fabricated evidence or have intimidated both 
members of the public and other serving officers. There are examples of 
politicians zealously calling for massive applications of police resources to 
perceived problems which are essentially moral issues or revenue matters rather 
than matters which are tmly criminal in nature. The Fitzgerald Report has 
identified this tendency in many varied examples and controversial issues such as 
abortion, the banning of obscene publications, and SP bookmaking. It is self-
evident to the Society that as the powers to police the criminal law become more 
arbitrary and more intrusive, there follows a greater risk of abuse of those powers 
and the reduced prospect of detection of such abuse. 
The Terms of Reference of the Fitzgerald Commission in respect of the 
illegal dmg trade in Queensland have been mentioned previously. The Report, 
however, does not canvass significantly the extent of the dmg trade in Queensland. 
It does observe that the huge profits from dmgs and the number of organised 
criminal suppliers are matters of notoriety in the State and that attempts to stamp 
out this illicit traffic have consumed extraordinary resources, but have largely 
failed here, as in the rest of the world.i" The Report further states that those 
attempts have caused more incursions on the civil liberties of people and revealed 
more corruption than has been the case in policing any other criminal activity. 
If the statistics of law enforcement agencies are to be accepted, then the 
illegal dmg trade is both the most profitable and most dangerous criminal activity 
in modern .society, and is the most capable and effective in subverting the agencies 
created to control it. There have been many recorded cases in this country 
demonstrating the success of those involved in the illegal dmg trade in cormpting 
individual law enforcement officers and agencies, including cormption at the 
highest level. 
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On balance, the Society has come to the view that the Fitzgerald Report has 
gone too far in that the CJC is not the subject of a sunset clause. The Society 
would have preferred a sunset clause so that Parliament could examine the reports 
and recommendations of its monitoring committee at the expiration of the fourth 
year of the life of the CJC. Unless Parliament then resolved to extend its term, the 
CJC would automatically wind-up at the end of the fifth year of its term, and the 
tasks given it would then be referred to those authorities previously responsible for 
them or to any new bodies which may then be established. 
In conclusion, the Society has been gratified by the response to the detailed 
submissions which it has made in relation to the structure and powers of the CJC. 
A considerable number of the Society's submissions were adopted in the 
amendments to the Bill which passed through the House in October 1989. The 
Society understands the legislation will be further reviewed next year and 
additional amendments could be anticipated. It is to be hoped that the need for a 
sunset clause will be re-examined at that time. 
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Different? 
Scott Prasser 
This chapter focuses on the sorts of issues confronting the Fitzgerald Commission, 
as a public inquiry, in having its recommendations not only accepted by 
government, but also implemented.! By implementation we mean, "to carry out, 
accomplish, fulfil, produce, complete."2 
Implementation is the "making it happen" part of the public inquiry process 
- a process that begins with the inquiry's initial appointment, the setting of terms of 
reference, selection of members and goes on to include investigation, research, and 
analysis until it culminates in the formal presentation of the inquiry's written 
report. Implementation is the next step. Implementation is putting action to 
recommendations. No matter how long and winding the road was for an inquiry in 
preparing its report, the real task is in translating the inquiry report into action. As 
Frank Costigan, who chaired the Royal Commission into the Painters and Dockers 
Union warned on the eve of the Fitzgerald Report's release: "One thing needs to 
be understood. Really, the easy job has been done (i.e. the preparation of the 
inquiry report) ... The hard work is to be done from now on ... that's the 
implementing of it."3 
This chapter is not concerned with the substantive content of the Fitzgerald 
Report. Rather attention is given to identifying the key prerequisites required for 
the successful implementation of an inquiry's recommendations, and comparing 
these with the Fitzgerald Commission. 
The Importance of Implementation 
The inevitable test of an inquiry's success is whether its recommendations have 
been implemented, or perceived to be implemented. No matter how competent an 
inquiry report, how well it did its investigations, how much publicity it received or 
the status of its membership, in the final analysis the extent to which an inquiry's 
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proposals are carried out becomes for many, the final and only criterion of 
assessing whether an inquiry is a success or not. Implementation of 
recommendations is every inquiry's dream waiting to be fulfilled and every 
inquiry's nightmare it wishes to avoid. This concern with implementation arises for 
a number of reasons. 
Foremost amongst these, is that successful implementation of an inquiry's 
recommendations would dispel some of the cynicism by commentators and the 
public about public inquiries in general. J.C. Courtney's comments about the 
dissatisfaction with Canadian royal commissions is a good summation of this: "... 
royal commissions have proved popular targets for criticism ... It is claimed that 
royal commissions ... are frequently appointed to relieve the government of 
pressure ... that the government does not seriously intend to implement the 
commissioners' recommendations ... that the ... commissioners ... are not detached 
from and unsympathetic towards the ... government of the day ... are too costly and 
... the reports ... do little else but gather dust in archives ..."'' 
In the United Kingdom, A.P. Herbert believed that royal commissions and 
other types of inquiries were appointed "not so much for digging up the tmth as for 
digging it in".5 In Australia the lack of action by governments provoked one 
journalist to conclude that public inquiries were "a wilful waste of public money 
and private time".6 Non-implementation has given inquiries a bad name. As 
Martin Bulmer observed, "the greatest degree of dissatisfaction with royal 
commissions has been at the implementation stage".'' Sheriff reinforces this view: 
"... the achievement of a Royal Commission or Committee cannot be judged only 
on the basis of the intrinsic or absolute value of their recommendations, but also 
on the extent to which the changes they propose are implemented".* 
Slow or non-implementation of inquiry reports seems an occupational 
hazard of inquiries. The pattern always appears the same. Some crisis, serious 
allegations of impropriety, or accumulated criticism provokes a government to 
appoint a public inquiry. Prominent persons are appointed, public hearings held 
and government support for the inquiry seems strong and unequivocal. The final 
report is released amid much publicity and government statements of apparent 
unreserved acceptance of the recommendations. Inevitably this proves in many 
cases to be a false dawn. By its temporary nature the inquiry is disbanded and its 
members dispersed. Without the ongoing drama of public hearings or the 
newsworthy nature of public revelations media and public interest lapses. Nothing 
happens. 
Mr Jusfice Moffit's comments about the lack of government action 
concerning his (into Cormption in New South Wales) Justice Woodward's (Dmg 
Trafficking) and Frank Costigan's (Painters and Dockers) Inquiries reflect the 
frustration by inquiry members about the non-implementation of their reports: 
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"Genuine decision and acfion is ... postponed and often avoided ahogether. 
General recommendations ... have been made by a succession of inquiries but... 
the response has largely been negative, at best piecemeal on isolated matters, 
usually in a watered down form. An inquiry, being complete, some matters may be 
taken up, but otherwise the reports and recommendations are pigeon-holed."? This 
lament is not atypical. Many of those involved in the various federal and state 
inquiries in the areas of cormpfion and administrative reform have stated similar 
concerns and fmstrations.io Indeed, the repeated number of inquiries in these 
areas (and other areas of public policy) indicates the lack of acfion on the different 
reports." Inaction it seems begets further inquiries. 
This pattern is also the case in Queensland. The Fitzgerald Commission 
was to some extent the culmination of the lack of government acfion concerning 
other royal commissions and inquiries into police and related areas during the 
preceding two decades.12 As Coaldrake and Wanna comment about these other 
pre-Fitzgerald inquiries in Queensland: "The occasional inquiry had been 
established ... But such inquiries were limited in their terms of reference, and their 
findings or recommendations were either politically marginalised or simply 
neglected. Demands for action ... were systematically ignored."i3 
Another reason why implementation of inquiry reports is deemed to be 
important is that governments are often judged by their willingness to accept, 
almost without question, an inquiry's recommendations. Whether the report got it 
right is often ignored in this demand for "acfion". Delay by governments is 
frequently portrayed as sabotage, conspiracy and a gross dereliction of duty on the 
part of governments. The governmenf s right to assess, test and evaluate a report 
is too often ignored in the demand for 'action'. When governments reject 
inquiries, commentators are apt to infer from this that although the government 
established an inquiry it did not really have an open mind on the matter. A course 
of action was already decided. The inquiry was only some symbolic act to promote 
a perception of consultation and openness. As Michelle Grattan observed, the 
Gmen Assets Test Inquiry failed to have its unanimous recommendafions accepted 
because "it did not give what was wanted".i4 Professor Fowke's comment on this 
demand is worth noting: "With our modern cult of progress and of activism we can 
apparently never admit the possibility that under certain circumstances the best 
action may be no action at all."i5 
This editorial from the Courier-Mail on the release of the Fitzgerald Report 
highlights the demand for unconditional acceptance of the Fitzgerald Report: 
"Now that Mr Fitzgerald has given the Government guidelines ... they must be 
followed without deviation ... Mr Fitzgerald has discharged a difficult duty in an 
admirable fashion. Now it is up to the Government to restore public confidence in 
those institutions which have been so damaged for so long."i6 
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Indeed, the parficular nature of the Fitzgerald Report and its immense 
public impact had forced the Queensland Government under Premier Ahern to 
accept its recommendations "lock stock and barrel" a year before it was released.n 
This is unprecedented with inquiries. Controversial inquiries such as the Costigan 
Royal Commission and others investigating ministerial impropriety during the last 
twenty years have not received such carte blanche endorsement before they have 
actually reported. The implications of this open door policy and the expectations it 
raised concerning the acceptance and implementation of all aspects of the 
Fitzgerald Report regardless of their suitability needs to be appreciated. 
Lastly, implementation verifies that an inquiry got it right concerning the 
particular issue it was investigating. Failure to implement, for whatever reason, 
reflects badly on the inquiry and its members. It is for this reason that those who 
chair inquiries often lay great stress on the need for their recommendations to be 
fully carried out without deviation, modification or compromise. This is a 
combination of belief in the report, and the desire to show how much influence the 
inquiry, and they personally have in government circles. 
Commissioner Tony Fitzgerald believed his Inquiry had got it right. He 
stressed the connection between implementation of his recommendations and the 
solving of Queensland's corruption problems: "The recommendations in this report 
are aimed at allowing permanent institutions and systems to work properly ... This 
report endeavours to identify the major problems. It refers to issues which show 
the need for the introduction of new stmctures and systems, and revision of the old 
ones, as foundations for reform."is 
Like many an inquiry chair before him, Fitzgerald warned against any 
piecemeal adopfion of his recommendations: "This report proposes a package of 
reform, comprising a number of elements. Each element has advantages and 
disadvantages, but the whole is aimed at achieving the best balance between 
competing considerafions. Each component is vulnerable to selective criticism ... 
Acceptance of any such selective criticism could lead to an altered and reduced 
package, perhaps worse than useless.-i' 
This now brings us to the fundamental issue of identifying the prerequisites 
needed to ensure successful implementation of a public inquiry report and 
comparing these to the Fitzgerald Inquiry. 
Prerequisites for Implementation 
Regardless of the presfige and publicity concerning the Fitzgerald Commission and 
its now perceived place in Queensland's political history, the fact remains that it is 
a public inquiry. Its strength and limitations are set by its basic stmctural form as a 
public inquiry and the place of such bodies in our political system. For instance. 
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public inquiries in the Australian polifical context have no formal constitutional 
standing. Unlike the Swedish system20 public inquiries in Westminster 
democracies exist at the whim of governments. Their appointment , membership, 
terms of reference, resources and deadlines are decided by the government of the 
day, not by any prescribed constitutional rules or set out formula. What happens 
to an inquiry report is very much dependent upon the government. There is no 
requirement (unlike Federal parliamentary committee reports)2i for governments 
to respond formally to an inquiry report. 
Governments in our political system have a range of techniques at their 
disposal to thwart the implementation of inquiry recommendations, such as: 
Nip in the bud approach by giving an inquiry limited terms of reference, 
unreasonable deadlines, poor resources (e.g. Gibbs Royal Commission into 
the National Hotel Allegations) and at times also, careful selection of the 
inquiry's members ;22 
Ignoring them, whereby no formal response is ever given (e.g. Sturgess 
Inquiry into Sexual Offences Involving Children and Related Matters);23 
Find flaws response by which the report is not condemned outright, but 
faults are found and further investigations are either suggested or initiated 
(e.g. Evatt Royal Commission into Agent Orange);24 
Open attack technique by which a government publicly attacks the veracity 
of the inquiry report and in some cases the chair (e.g. Eraser Government's 
response to the Woodward Royal Commission into the Australian Meat 
Industry);25 
Bureaucratise them response by which a number of committees or task 
forces are established within the bureaucracy, ostensibly to make an inquiry 
"happen", but with the knowledge (or hope) that normal inter-departmental 
rivalries and professional jealousies would either strangle or at least slow 
down the implementation process (e.g. Lucas Committee of Inquiry into 
Enforcement of Criminal Law in Queensland);26 
We fully accept, are doing it, or have done it strategy by which a government 
removes demand for action over an inquiry report by repeatedly stressing 
how implementation was or is in the process of occurring (e.g. Premier 
Neville Wran's responses to criticisms from Justice Woodward concerning 
Royal Commission into Dmg Trafficking).27 
Given these circumstances and the general disillusionment about the 
impact of public inquiries already highlighted, is implementation of an inquiry 
report a lost cause? Dr Peter Wilenski, who chaired and was a member of several 
inquiries, believes not. "Determined efforts", he states, "can in the right 
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environment create major change in systems of public administration."28 For 
Wilenski, the problem has been that attempts to develop, "prerequisites of reform 
and to pursue a strategy to overcome anticipated resistance", have been "rarely 
pursued".29 
So implementation of inquiry recommendations is not automafic. 
Successful implementation of inquiry reports requires all or some of the following 
prerequisites to be met: 
1. Adequate time, resources and terms of reference. 
2. Sufficient public and political interest both during and after the inquiry to 
ensure the report can be sustained on the political agenda. 
3. Continuing role of the inquiry and its members in the formal 
implementation phase. 
4. Active promotion and publicity of the report by inquiry members. 
5. Creation of new institutions and procedures to oversee and take 
responsibility for implementing the recommendations. 
6. Recmitment of new personnel into existing and new institutions. 
7. Legislative backing for the recommendations. 
8. Nature of recommendations. 
9. Political will and support.3o 
Each of these will now be examined in relation to the Fitzgerald Inquiry. 
1. Adequate Time, Resources and Terms of Reference 
Adequate time, resources and appropriate terms of reference are needed to allow 
an inquiry to get to the hub of the problem. Although public inquiries are 
technically 'independent" from government as noted, their terms of reference, 
resource allocations and reporting deadlines are in fact set by government. Justice 
Woodward, who headed the NSW Royal Commission into Dmgs lamented that 
"unpleasant results can be avoided by refusing to extend the terms or the time ..."3i 
Similarly, Frank Costigan, chairman of the Royal Commission into the Painters' 
and Dockers' Union sought (unsuccessfully) an eight month extension to his 
investigations, which he said, unless granted would make it impossible, "... to 
maintain the thmst of my investigations or to hand them over to a new crime 
authority in an efficient and sensible manner".32 Other examples can be cited.33 
In this regard, the Fitzgerald Commission has differed from most other 
public inquiries established in Australia. Initially it was envisaged as a brief su( 
week inquiry. As the then Justice Minister Paul Clauson stated at the time, "We 
would not like the inquiry to become a major production."34 The Labor Party 
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Opposition saw such statements and restrictive deadlines as making the inquiry as 
ineffective as its many predecessors.35 Once the Fitzgerald Inquiry began and 
because revelations were made public, it became unstoppable. Within a month of 
its original appointment, its Terms of Reference were expanded. Its deadline was 
extended. In the end, the Commission set its own deadlines. Sk months after its 
establishment, the Commission of Inquiry Act 1950-1989 was amended to give the 
Fitzgerald Inquiry addifional powers such as to electronically monitor premises, 
subpoena witnesses from interstate and to compel witnesses to answer questions. 
Fitzgerald asked for, and received extra assistance in the form of assistant 
commissioners, research staff and an apparently unlimited budget.36 As one 
journalist commented, "the inquiry has blossomed from mini series to mega 
production dimensions".37 Indeed, the Fitzgerald Commission became the titan of 
inquiries. It cost more, ran longer, employed more staff than almost any other 
inquiry in Australia's history^ - another first for Queensland? 
2. Sufficient Public and Political Interest 
The reason why the Fitzgerald Commission was so successful in gaining adequate 
powers and resources brings us to the second prerequisite for implementation -
sufficient public and political interest. Once established, many inquiries and the 
topics they are investigating quietly disappear from the political agenda. Indeed, 
inquiries are often seen as an important technique used by governments to control 
the political agenda and to render controversial issues harmless.39 
This does not always have to be the case. Inquiries can adopt certain 
strategies to overcome these limitations. For instance, holding public hearings and 
promoting media reporting of the proceedings can help highlight the activities of 
the inquiry and thus promote public interest and political support. 
The Fitzgerald Commission appreciated this and developed appropriate 
strategies to promote interest and support. As the Fitzgerald Report explains: 
"This Inquiry could not have proceeded without public confidence, co-operation 
and support. That meant the Inquiry had to be as open as possible, so that the 
public including people with information, could see that it was a genuine search for 
the truth. Such a course was also necessary so that the Inquiry could generate 
enough momentum to overcome any attempt which might have been made to 
interfere."'to 
Hence, explains Fitzgerald, "apart from one brief sitting ... all the evidence 
of the Inquiry was heard in public",4i and "with a few exceptions, all exhibits were 
made available to the media".42 Without this openness and despite the adverse 
effect it had on some individuals because of hearsay evidence, the Commission 
concluded it "could not have got as far as it did".« 
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The Fitzgerald Inquiry was in contrast with the previous Queensland 
inquiries into cormption (Gibbs Royal Commission and Lucas Inquiry).44 These 
were largely conducted behind closed doors and did not gain the public exposure 
and interest to sustain them after their investigations were completed. With the 
Fitzgerald Inquiry the public hearings became a focal point of media attention and 
the nature of the evidence given at these hearings meant that public interest was 
both sustained and heightened.ts The culmination of this media and public 
interest was seen on the actual release of the Fitzgerald Report on the 3 July 1989. 
There was intense media coverage of the Fitzgerald Report unprecedented for an 
inquiry in Queensland or Australia. 
3t Continuing Role of the Inquiry and Members 
A continuing role for an inquiry and its members in the actual implementation 
process is seen as essential for success. However, this rarely occurs with public 
inquiries. As Martin Bulmer concluded in this regard about the British experience 
of inquiries, there was usually: "an absence of any machinery for follow-up ... A 
commission goes out of existence once its report is produced and plays no part in 
the implementation of its proposals. Individual chairmen and members do 
continue to campaign for its recommendations, but in a personal capacity".'t6 
Inquiries are transitory in nature. They lack constitutional status and 
powers. There are no requirements for governments to either formally respond to 
inquiry reports, or to allow an inquiry and its members to have any ongoing role in 
implementation. In these circumstances, says Wilenski, governments can "ignore a 
report until its recommendations become obsolete".'*7 Alternatively, the report 
may be given to the public service for both assessment and implementation. Too 
often public servants are "preoccupied with their continuing functions"''* to take on 
an additional duty with much energy. Also, the public service or parts of it, may 
have been the cause of the inquiry's establishment. If so, there will be a reluctance 
to accept an inquiry's proposals. This has been a greater problem for inquiries 
concerned with institutional cormption. Where and to whom in the existing 
public bureaucracy should such inquiry reports be lodged? In such cases, without 
any ongoing role for inquiry members, it would be easy for the inquiry report to be 
"hijacked", by the more permanent institutions of government. The Fitzgerald 
Commission itself noted how the Lucas Inquiry (1976) was not only "hijacked" by 
the key departments of the Queensland Public Service, but also one of its key 
members, Des Sturgess was never later contacted or consulted: "In a cynical 
exercise of obfuscation and delay, the Government set up a committee comprising 
Lewis, the then Solicitor-General, and the then Under-Secretary Department of 
Justice, to review the Lucas Report. For practical purposes that was the end of the 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
106 Scott Prasser 
matter for over a decade. Sturgess was never again contacted by anybody 
representing the Government about the Report, which was effectively ignored."'*? 
Not only does the lack of any continuing role for an inquiry mean its 
recommendations may be ignored, but also it means an inquiry does "not have the 
opportunity of defending its report against criticism or rebutting criticism."5o Its 
recommendations may, in these circumstances be misinterpreted or 
misunderstood. This was precisely the complaint of Sir Ernest Savage who chaired 
the Queensland Public Sector Review Committee (1987). He argued that the 
Queensland Government's failure to implement his four most important 
recommendations was because: "counter proposals were put to ministers in private 
and/or in circumstances where the original reform proposals had no advocate. 
Sadly, there are some who are interested not only in maintaining a power base, but 
in extending it - sometimes over matters which were outside their perceived area 
of responsibility.51 
Because the problems identified by the Fitzgerald Report were the 
"products of long term deficiencies in public administration",52 these issues of 
sabotage are even more pertinent. The Fitzgerald Inquiry appreciated this and 
proposed that: "To facilitate a timely handover of control of the information 
system and its accommodation and to ensure continuity of the investigative process 
it will be necessary for this Commission of Inquiry to remain functional until the 
CJC [Criminal Justice Commission] and its essential elements are established and 
capable of providing continuity of operations."53 
For the Fitzgerald Commission, the release of its initial report was not the 
end of its role, but the beginning as "the work started by this Commission of 
Inquiry has not been completed".s4 Its real task was "to found the process of 
reform",ss and "much remains to be done".S6 
Other inquiries such as the Costigan Royal Commission have made similar 
comments about the breadth of the problems discovered and the need for 
continuity. It was Fitzgerald's firm demand for an ongoing role of the Commission 
in its actual report, combined with the Queensland political environment at the 
time whereby the National Party Government could not politically afford to refuse 
its requests, that made the Fitzgerald Commission so different and successful in 
this regard. Consequently unlike other inquiries, the Fitzgerald Commission did 
not disband upon the release of its report, but continued as an interim organisation 
until the CJC and Electoral and Administrative Reform Commission (EARC) 
were established. 
In relation to a continuing role in the implementation process of key 
Fitzgerald Inquiry members and staff, there was a mixed result. Certainly, many 
staff involved in the Inquiry's data gathering and investigative activities did remain 
with the Interim Commission and have subsequently been appointed to the CJC 
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and EARC. Doug Dmmmond QC, who had inifially joined the Commission as a 
Senior Counsel Assisting, and was later appointed Special Prosecutor, has 
continued in this role. Peter Forster who acted as a consultant to the Commission 
was subsequently appointed to head the Special Implementation Unit (see later). 
However, the Inquiry's Chairman, Tony Fitzgerald, quickly disengaged himself 
from any formal role in the implementation process. He refused offers to serve as 
interim chairman of the CJC, and within a month of the Report's release he 
resigned without public explanation his consultancy to the Implementation Unit. 
Understandably, given Fitzgerald's dominant role in the whole inquiry process, his 
lack of any continuing role provoked some public concern as this editorial from the 
Australian highlights: "Mr Fitzgerald ... has been at the centre of attempts to 
reform cormption in Queensland ... By agreeing to act as a consultant for the 
Government on electoral reform he consented to remain at the centre of that 
process. Mr Fitzgerald's resignation has cast doubt on the thoroughness and 
effectiveness of the reforms ... His desire to retreat from the limelight is 
understandable. But in the circumstances he has one more duty to perform.'s? 
Fitzgerald appears to have rejected this duty. Exacerbating 
Fitzgerald's non-involvement in the implementation process was the subsequent 
resignation, two months after the Report's release, of Deputy Commissioner and 
Interim Commissioner, Gary Crooke QC. Similarly, the other Deputy 
Commissioner, P.M. Wolfe ceased any continued activity with the Inquiry after its 
release. Such omissions of key personnel does raise concerns about continuity and 
whether the major thmsts of the Fitzgerald Report will be both implemented and 
understood. It puts special pressure on the new chairs of the CJC (Sir Max 
Bingham) and EARC (Tom Sherman) as to whether they will correctly interpret 
the Fitzgerald recommendations. Indeed, the lack of involvement by Fitzgerald 
and others makes the appointment of the CJC and EARC chairs and members 
particularly important. Only time will tell whether these have been right. 
Certainly, Fitzgerald missed an opportunity rarely given to an inquiry chair to fully 
oversee implementafion of his recommendations. 
4. Active Promotion and Publicity of the Report by Inquiry Members 
Not only should inquiry members and personnel have an ongoing role in 
implementation, but also there needs to be active public promotion to maintain 
general interest and pressure. As Bulmer says, inquiry "chairmen and members 
should be prepared to remain active after the formal end of the work in order to 
develop or maintain public interest ... and to ensure that it is not ignored by the 
government".58 
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As discussed, in our system of government inquiry members have no such 
formal ongoing role unless invited by the government. There is no guarantee this 
will happen. Some who chair inquiries do take on the responsibility of actively 
promoting the report as a result of their personal commitment to the inquiry and 
belief in its veracity. Justice Phillip Evatt believed the findings of his Royal 
Commission into Agent Orange ought to be "shouted from the rooftops".59 He and 
his assistant John Coombs were active in defending the Royal Commission against 
criticism.*) Similarly, former Justices Woodward and Moffit were willing to 
promote their reports and criticise governments for their inacfion.6i There are also 
precedents for inquiry members to be formally and directly involved in the 
implementation process concerning their reports. Dr Peter Wilenski, for instance 
chaired the task force to oversee his report on the New South Wales Pubhc 
Service. 
Tony Fitzgerald did not embrace such a public role. He gave no formal 
press conference on the release of his report, wanting instead to "return to the 
anonymity of his legal profession."62 As highlighted, Fitzgerald quickly disengaged 
himself from the formal implementation processes of the Inquiry. Except for a 
couple of brief public comments criticising the implementation process and 
admitting that he had been a "fool to lead the Inquiry"" Fitzgerald has not been 
acfive in promoting his Report. Fitzgerald seems to have wanted to have it both 
ways - seek and demand full implementation, condemn the government for its 
failure to do so, while avoiding any participation in the implementation process or 
public promotion of the Report which would have assisted this. Such reticence 
may considerably limit implementation should public controversy develop over 
particular proposals. 
5. Creation of New Institutions and Procedures 
A fifth prerequisite for implementation is the creation of a "new institution which, 
once created within the bureaucracy, will continue at least for a fime, to promote 
... change".64 This goes beyond an inquiry continuing on for short time after its 
report has been completed. It is also more than just the inquiry members either 
informally or officially promoting the report in public or providing advice to 
governments. It is about giving an inquiry report some bureaucratic 'home' so that 
it will not be dismembered quite so quickly and easily by existing bureaucratic 
interests and priorities. As R.J.K. Chapman concluded in his survey of inquiries 
involved with public sector reform, "the best mechanism is to leave 
implementation to a newly created body".65 Indeed, public inquiries in seeking to 
ensure implementation of their proposals often suggest, if not special 
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implementation units, then new stmctures to take over new and existing 
functions.66 
To ensure the success of the special implementation units or new stmctures 
to oversee an inquiry's recommendations, certain conditions have to be met. Such 
units need to have a high level of pohtical and bureaucratic authority. TTieir status 
must be unambiguously linked with the influential and powerful. Status opens 
many doors in the public bureaucracy sometimes regardless of in-line formal 
responsibilities. Such units also need defined powers so that where persuasion 
fails, orders can follow. There is the need for these units to work laterally with 
government departments by informal contacts with all levels of staff and not just 
senior officers. Such connections require considerable and subtle negotiating 
skills, collegiality and openness, as well as a sound knowledge of the system, 
processes and key personnel. Only in this way will an implementation unit really 
know what is happening and whether the recommendations are filtering through to 
the "coal-face" without distortion or misinterpretation. 
The Fitzgerald Commission developed several strategies in this area. 
First, it proposed a special implementation unit to be established in the 
Premier's Department. Its rationale for this unit was that: "There are matters of 
urgency arising from the recommendations ... which cannot await the formal 
establishment of the CJC. It is therefore essential that immediate action is 
initiated to establish a small consulting cell reporting to the Premier to function as 
an implementation unit for urgent activities."67 
The Commission, in a way unusual for a public inquiry, even went so far as 
to recommend the person to head this new implementation unit - Peter Forster, a 
management consultant and former senior Queensland public servant who had 
worked for the Fitzgerald Inquiry. 
This recommendation was quickly accepted by the Ahern National Party 
Government. In terms of the criteria discussed above, the Implementation Unit 
appeared to meet all the requirements for success, having status, authority, 
appropriate personnel and reporting directly to the Premier. 
However, the role of the Implementation Unit was soon thrown into doubt 
by Ahern's successor 68, Russell Cooper who established an Independent 
Commission for Change and Reform to be headed by well known businessman and 
experienced public inquiry chair, Jim Kennedy. This new Independent 
Commission seemed to be taking over some of the functions originally prescribed 
in the Fitzgerald Report for the Implementation Unit such as the formation of the 
CJC and EARC yet without totally absorbing Forster's Unit which was to report to 
the Kennedy Commission.69 This change was seen by then Opposition leader 
Wayne Goss as a "sell out of the Fitzgerald Report's recommendations".™ This 
may have been premature. Cooper's initiative here may have reflected his desire 
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to appoint someone with whom he has had a good working relationship?! and a 
desire to get things done, rather than any attempt to circumvent the Inquiry. 
Proper assessment of the Independent Commission has not been possible because 
it was quickly abolished by the Goss Labor Government in December 1989. 
Second, the Fitzgerald Report proposed two other mechanisms to assist 
with implementation which were to be established "as soon as possible".72 These 
were the CJC and EARC. Fitzgerald's rationale for these two bodies was as 
follows: "The establishment of each of those bodies will provide a firm foundation 
for reform. It is those permanent bodies which will have the opportunity and the 
resources to continue the work of this Commission with respect to electoral, 
administrative and criminal justice reforms. Those bodies, and not this Inquiry, 
will provide the appropriate fomm for debate and determination of what specific 
reforms should be made."73 
Fitzgerald wanted to avoid the fate of previous inquiries by attempting to 
establish two triggers of action for the implementation process. First, by proposing 
the CJC and EARC and making them permanent and legislatively backed 
organisations he was effectively bypassing the existing Queensland Public Service 
of which his report was so critical. Second, giving the CJC and EARC further 
areas to investigate and specific matters to monitor, Fitzgerald sought to make his 
Inquiry and its major thmsts less fixed in time and more on-going. Agencies like 
the CJC and EARC, if properly staffed and resourced, can both implement the 
basic recommendations of the Fitzgerald Report and at the same time go beyond 
the inevitable boundaries of an inquiry report. In Fitzgerald's terms these new 
stmctures symbolise the Inquiry's aims of becoming a "catalyst and platform for 
continuing reform".74 
In Wilenski's terms, these changes and the new reporting mechanisms 
proposed (e.g. the Police Commissioner to the CJC, the CJC and EARC to the two 
new parliamentary committees on Electoral and Administrative Review and 
Criminal Justice), the enhanced role of parliamentary committees in general and 
the greater emphasis on accountability, represent major changes to the 
Queensland system of government. These proposals, combined with the other 
reorganisations proposed by the Fitzgerald Report to the Pohce Department, the 
office of the Attorney-General and Justice Department will, in Wilenski's 
framework, help to "redistribute power"75 within the bureaucracy. 
6. Recmitment of New Personnel 
A sixth prerequisite for implementation is the "recruitment of new people into 
existing institutions".75 This is needed, stressed Wilenski, because new personnel 
bring with them "a commitment to change, a freshness and enthusiasm while being 
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unencumbered either with debts to people in the organisation or with attachments 
to existing processes or programs".?? The Fitzgerald Report has added 
considerable impetus to this process of opening up the system in two ways. 
First, there are the new organisations of the CJC and EARC already 
mentioned and the open recmitment of staff from outside the Queensland Public 
Service to fill the many positions now needed to support these bodies. Exactly how 
many is difficult to assess, but as Peter Paris of the National Crime Authority 
(NCA) observed "the CJC is going to be an enormous organisation - maybe a staff 
of a thousand."78 
Second, the Fitzgerald Commission, directly addressed the issues of public 
service recmitment and political neutrality. It argued for a more independent 
process of staff selection and appointment.79 In some areas, such as the Police 
Department the Fitzgerald Report specifically recommended the early retirement 
of senior officers such as Acting-Commissioner Ron Redmond.so ft also suggested 
that the new Police Commissioner and other senior positions should be filled on an 
interim basis.si Significantly, great emphasis is given in the Fitzgerald Report to 
the development of an independent process of staff selection. To facilitate this, 
the CJC was to have a major overseeing role in the selection of personnel in the 
PoHce Department.82 The Fitzgerald recommendations aim to establish a more 
open system whereby competent outsiders as well as capable existing staff have a 
fair chance in seeking positions. 
7. Legislative Backing for the Recommendations 
A seventh prerequisite for change to occur is the enactment of new legislation. 
Wilenski sums up the need for this: "Public servants may ignore a general 
exhortation from government or a circular from the head of the civil service. 
There are many such circulars and exhortations, sometimes conflicting ... this 
allows much room for interpretation and delay. Laws however, must be given 
priority and their interpretation must be given priority. Public servants are, in 
general, law abiding and laws do change behaviour in a lasting way, particularly 
where avenues are open for judicial review of administrative actions.-83 
Legislation, per se, cannot change the behaviour of public servants or 
politicians overnight. Cormption cannot be made to disappear by simply passing 
legislation. However, the existence of specific legislation can over a period of time 
modify behaviour. Legislation gives formal backing to certain practices (e.g. 
freedom of information) and can take issues away from the direct intervention or 
manipulation of government. Consequently it has been suggested that every 
inquiry report, "should have draft legislation prepared and appended to it"84 as this 
would make "chances of implementation higher".85 Not only would such legislation 
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give legal support for inquiry proposals, but also by being drafted by the inquiry it 
would more accurately reflect the inquiry's intentions. In practice, few inquiries do 
this. Inquiries usually only make general recommendafions. They may suggest 
legislative changes or amendments, but rarely draft their own. Such tasks are left 
to the government and the public service. 
In the case of the Fitzgerald Inquiry, it did prepare legislafion relating to 
some of its recommendations. The draft legislation for EARC and the CJC were 
penned by the Inquiry. Parts of this were later modified by the Nafional Party 
Government following criticisms from the Queensland Law Society and civil 
liberty groups. Because there was bipartisan support for the resulting amendments 
they cannot be regarded as significantly reducing the impact of the Fitzgerald 
proposals. 
Elsewhere, the Fitzgerald Inquiry sought to reinforce its recommendations 
by proposing either completely new legislation modelled on the laws of other 
states or nations (e.g. freedom of information, whistleblowing) or amendments to 
existing Acts (e.g. Public Service Management and Employment Act 1988, the 
Financial Administration and Audit Act 1977-88, Reform Commission Act 1968-84, 
and the Police Act). Underpinning these legislative proposals is the role (as 
discussed) of EARC and the CJC in the development of the new legislation and 
overseeing the amendments. Thus, Fitzgerald showed an awareness of the 
importance and need for legislative backing for his recommendations. Yet, much 
depends on the effectiveness of EARC and the CJC as to whether the legislation 
and amendments will reflect the real spirit and thmst of the Fitzgerald Report. 
8. 77ie Nature of the Recommendations 
R.J.K. Chapman noted that the nature of an inquiry's recommendations will have a 
great impact on the ease or otherwise of their implementation.86 Inquiries face a 
range of options in framing recommendations. They can be specific or concerned 
with general principles. Being specific with little regard to broader concepts may 
make inquiries appear practical. Preoccupation with specifics will mean 
recommendations may date quickly as events, individuals and organisations 
change. At the same time, an emphasis on general principles may make inquiry 
recommendations appear too remote, too long term, too irrelevant. Inquiries also 
have the option of providing a comprehensive or limited range of proposals. 
Comprehensive reports become difficult to digest. This was the basis of the 
criticism of the Coombs Royal Commission into Australian Government 
Administration (1976).87 Lastly, inquiries have the choice of making politically 
safe proposals, avoiding controversy and keeping within the mainstream of thought 
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on a subject. Alternatively they can take a more radical approach which may 
impede implementation. 
In relation to the Fitzgerald Report the issues it raised about the system of 
government and the electoral system were controversial. They were also 
unexpected given the terms of reference. What throws into doubt the 
implementation of these proposals is not their controversy, but rather their lack of 
preciseness. While the Inquiry raised concern about electoral laws, suggested 
consideration of whistleblowing and freedom of information laws it does not define 
what it wants. Instead, the Inquiry proposed that these, and many other matters be 
given further examination by the CJC and EARC. After all, says Fitzgerald, its 
aim is to "ventilate the problems - recommend approaches and mechanisms rather 
than make unsound attempts to prescribe solutions to complex problems".88 
For some this approach may mean the problems will continue to be 
ventilated, but the solutions will never be found. The lack of preciseness in the 
Fitzgerald Report on certain key areas will mean there will be considerable debate 
as to whether the Fitzgerald Report is being implemented or not. 
Another criticism of the Fitzgerald recommendations is that its section on 
the Police was too concerned with management and organisational issues. Policy 
and corruption issues should have dominated here. Reorganisation matters may 
be beyond the brief and competence of an inquiry like the Fitzgerald Commission 
with its dominance by legal professionals and its major focus on cormption. 
Consequently, implementation of the recommendations in this section could be 
affected by the viability of these proposals. 
Lastly, is the enormity of the range of proposals and their potential costs. 
Some inquiries are very conscious of these aspects and trim their 
recommendations accordingly. This does not seem to be the case with Fitzgerald. 
Peter Paris of the NCA sums up the complexity and expense of the Fitzgerald 
proposals: "I think the task is huge ... The CJC is going to be very large ... There is 
the EARC, combined with an administration law appeal commission ... and a 
complete restmcturing of the police force ... it's enormous ... It's going to cost a lot 
of money."89 
In the rush by all political parties to accept the Fitzgerald Report "lock 
stock and barrel" without any critical assessment of the proposals, these aspects of 
complexity and costs have been initially ignored. Although the political context at 
the time made government (and opposition) endorsement of the Fitzgerald Report 
inevitable, it is foreseeable that as the full implications (and costs) of the 
recommendations become more apparent and the political environment changes, 
future governments may lose their enthusiasm for implementing all the 
recommendations. In this regard, the Fitzgerald Report has failed. The Report is 
too wide ranging and too open-ended. 
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Political Will and Support 
Political will and support are the ultimate determinants of whether inquiry 
recommendations will be implemented. This political aspect may be irksome to 
some inquiry members who believe the worth of their proposals puts them above 
the political process. However, as Brian Smith observed, administrative reform is 
"political rather than organisational. It has a moral content, in that it seeks to 
remedy an abuse or a wrong, to create a better 'system', by removing faults and 
imperfections ... Reform is politicized change".9o 
The Fitzgerald Inquiry showed an appreciation of this point. It concluded 
that "the outcome of this Inquiry and Report must be determined by the political 
process, as should be the case in a democracy".9i At the same time the Fitzgerald 
Report also stressed how the political process in Queensland "has been one subject 
which this Commission has had to consider".92 Can implementation of inquiry 
recommendations be expected if they propose fundamental changes to the way 
government works and which are detrimental to existing power holders? 
Scepticism by, some such as journalist Chris Masters concerning the 
willingness of a National Party Government to implement the Fitzgerald Report 
seems well founded.93 After all, the Inquiry was forced upon the Nationals and 
soon gathered a momentum of its own which was too great for them to stop, slow 
or divert. The Report was highly critical of the nature and style of government in 
Queensland under National Party control. The Fitzgerald Report's emphasis on 
accountability, public interest, open government, administrative review, ministerial 
responsibility, the role of parliament, and the Westminster system were all an 
anathema to both National Party Government practice and the National Party's 
own internal stmcture and ideology.94 Then Premier Ahern was right when soon 
after the release of the Fitzgerald Report he declared that "the whole thing won't 
work unless there is a basic commitment by political leadership ... If there is 
integrity in the political leadership then it flows down to the grass roots ..."95 The 
problem, as the Fitzgerald Report highlights, is that there has not been that 
'integrity" in Queensland Government in the past. Could there be any under the 
post-Fitzgerald Nationals? 
Despite Premier Ahern's promise to implement Fitzgerald "lock, stock and 
barrel", subsequent events showed how difficult it was for the Nafionals to fully 
grasp, comprehend and accept the recommendations and underlying rationale of 
the Fitzgerald Report. For instance, despite the Report's concern about land 
rezoning. Cabinet a fortnight after the Inquiry's release approved large scale 
rezoning on the Gold Coast that appeared to benefit a National cabinet Minister.96 
National Party President Sir Robert Sparkes questioned whether acceptance of 
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EARC and the CJC was tantamount to the abdication of elected government.97 
Then there was Premier Cooper's Independent Commission for Change and 
Reform as discussed previously. Subsequent comments by Premier Cooper that 
CJC and EARC proposals might be rejected "for very good reasons"98 and that the 
Fitzgerald Inquiry had failed to produce any real concrete results concerning 
corruption99 raised doubts about a National Party Government's will to implement 
Fitzgerald. 
Moreover, the process developed by the Nationals to implement Fitzgerald, 
while meeting the formal requirements, missed the intrinsic criticism in the Report 
about the poor state of Queensland Government. Thus, parliamentary debate of 
the Fitzgerald Report was limited to one day and night. The two special 
pariiamentary committees recommended to oversee the EARC and CJC were not 
established. The suggested consultation with the Opposition parties concerning the 
senior appointments to the EARC and CJC was inadequately done. The National 
Party response increasingly appeared, like so many other government reactions to 
inquiry reportsioo, more about "how do we minimise the political damage" than 
"how do we make it happen". 
The Fitzgerald Report stressed that "reform will not happen if attitudes do 
not change".ioi The examples above suggest that despite the rhetoric of 
acceptance, the National Party's attitude to government had not changed. It may 
also be a case that after being in office for so long, and with its emphasis on 
leadership rather than debate, the Nationals were suffering from "cognitive 
dissonance" - an inability to hear or perceive alternative views. 102 Had the 
Nationals continued in office, it is very probable that like poor Basil Pascali's spy 
reports to the Turkish Sultan in Barry Unsworth's novel, the Fitzgerald Report 
would have "vanished into some kind of mighty pit... aimed to reduce all verbiage, 
however densely written, however solidly informative, to sludge",io3 and would not 
have been read, kept or understood. 
The elecfion of the Goss Labor Government in December 1989 has the 
potential to change all this, to give the Fitzgerald Report the political support it 
needs. Not only did the Labor Party make implementation of Fitzgerald one of 
the major planks of its election campaign, but also its interests are more 
coincidental with those of Fitzgerald. Pariiamentary, electoral and administrative 
reform have been key elements of the Labor Party agenda. The L^bor Party, like 
any new party in office is looking for ways to change existing practices, personnel, 
and stmctures. The Fitzgerald Report offers a means to this - partly as a blue-
print for action, and partly as a catalyst and rationale for change. Rightly or 
wrongly the Fitzgerald Report will be evoked in many future press releases by 
Labor ministers announcing one change or another. 
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Certainly, the change in government does not mean that controversy will 
cease concerning the Fitzgerald proposals. Many of these are open to wide 
interpretation. Many have been left to EARC or the CJC to develop. Whether or 
not these will be in the spirit of Fitzgerald will not always be easy to say. Electoral 
reform is a case in point. Nevertheless, the election of a new government, 
untainted by scandals and with little vested interest in defending past practices or 
existing arrangements, will give the Fitzgerald Report a far more favourable 
political environment for implementation. Indeed, Tony Fitzgerald's willingness to 
head an inquiry established by the Goss Government, into logging on Fraser 
Island, symbolises this new political context.io4 
Conclusion 
So, will the Fitzgerald Inquiry be different from other public inquiries concerning 
the implementation of its recommendations? Overall, the answer to this question 
is "Yes" for a variety of reasons: partly because the Fitzgerald Inquiry itself 
addressed the issue of implementafion and sought to develop appropriate 
mechanisms; partly because of the way the Inquiry was conducted and the public 
and media attention it attracted. Important as these factors are, a more 
fundamental reason why Fitzgerald will be more successful than other inquiries is 
the way it dominated the political agenda at a critical juncture in Queensland's 
history. It was released when a general election was almost due and a shift in 
power to a new government imminent. Rarely in Queensland's or Australia's 
history has a public inquiry become such a focus of public attention and the issue 
of implementation become the major issue in an election campaign. Try as they 
might, the Nationals during the 1989 election campaign could not divert attention 
from the issue of corruption and the implementation of the Fitzgerald Report. 
Indeed, the election came to be about which party was best to implement the 
Fitzgerald recommendations.ios 
The Goss Labor Government's actions since coming to office appear to 
indicate the voters were right in their choice of the party to implement the 
Fitzgerald Report. Not only has there been considerable action on the 
organisational stmctures proposed by Fitzgerald (e.g. the establishment of the two 
parliamentary committees), but also the spirit of the Inquiry in terms of 
government openness, consultation (e.g. concerning the Chair of the EARC) and 
accountability seems to be occurring. Certainly, divergences between Fitzgerald 
and the Go.ss Government's actions will, and have started to occur (e.g. 
establishment of a Senior Executive Service in the Public Service). Such 
divergences may not be an attempt to block or undermine Fitzgerald, but rather 
part of the normal process of government grappling with the realities of day to day 
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administration and interpreting an inquiry report, which is but one view about how 
things should be done. No doubt, the longer the Goss Labor Government is in 
power, the less enthusiastic it may become about certain aspects of the Fitzgerald 
Report (e.g. freedom of information). Nevertheless, if only half the 
recommendafions are implemented then Fitzgerald will have done considerably 
better than the many other inquiries into cormption. The prospects for this are 
good. 
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Blowing in the Wind 
Nigel Powell 
The Harm of Greed 
T'an Sun 
The reason why the people are starving 
Is that the officials "eat their taxes" too much. 
That's why the people are starving. 
The reason why the people are difficult to rule 
Is that authorities resort lo interference. 
That's why the people are difficult to rule. 
The reason why the people malce light of death 
Is that they are too eager for high living. 
That's why the people make light of death. 
Those who have nothing to make life pleasurable are worthier 
than those who value high. 
by Lao Tau 
On 14 November 1975, at the Ryton-on-Dunsmore Training Centre I passed out as 
top student of my course of 180 officers from police forces all round England. 
Halfway through his address to us newly trained officers, the guest speaker, the 
Deputy Chief Constable of West Mercia Constabulary, said something like this: 
"Now I want to address my next few comments to you, the men and women who 
have just completed your initial training. I want to tell you that when you get out 
onto the streets the biggest enemy in your job is not the burglar, the rapist or the 
car thief as you may think - it is the man in blue sitting next to you". 
In 1978 I migrated to Australia. I returned to England seventeen months 
later, having spent less than a year in the Queensland Police Force. My last five 
months were in the Police Licensing Branch. I could not handle the Australian 
culture. 
When I got back to England I found the newspapers full of the inquiry into 
the death of a New Zealander, Blair Peach. He had been hit on the head by a 
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tmncheon during a violent demonstrafion in London. He subsequenfly died. A 
post-mortem found that he had a congenital paper thin skull. No offending police 
officer could be identified. But the inspector in charge of the Special Patrol Group 
unit for that area was being held responsible and was, to my mind, being cmcified 
in the media and by the investigating authorities. The violence in my home town, 
Birmingham, had not diminished in my absence. 
I knew that even with the limited overseas experience I had, together with 
my previous record, I would be marked for quick promotion, provided I passed my 
exam. I reasoned - why should I put myself in that position? Get an ulcer and lose 
more hair when I could go back to sunny Queensland, adjust to the laid back 
lifestyle, lack of discipline and be on a better salary. I returned to take the easy 
option and within six months was back in the Licensing Branch for two and a half 
years. 
New Year 1982-83 I was working from 6.00 p.m to 2.00 a.m. I spent from 
1.00 a.m. to 8.00 a.m. in Hollywoods, an unlicensed nightclub owned and mn by 
Vic Conte and Gerry Bellino. I drank Baileys and ice; and I did not pay for a 
drink all morning. I was not sober when I left. In the 1983 election I voted National. 
I tell you these things not through any sense of confession, but because I 
feel it is important for you to have some idea of where I come from. Those events 
and many more are my context. I feel one of the mistakes we often make when we 
assess situations is to remove people or events from their context. If anything, that 
is my aim - to attempt to put police reform back into some sort of context, albeit 
incomplete. 
I must admit I have found it very difficult to address this topic. As I wrote I 
found myself becoming increasingly critical of police and polificians. I get angry 
with the politicians who have been and are prepared to use the police force for 
their own ends of retaining or gaining power. I get furious at the conservative 
siege mentality of a police force that cannot see that it is part of the community 
and not superior in any way. And I get furious with a new Commissioner who does 
not understand that the future is to some extent determined by the past. We have 
to learn from and acknowledge the past before we can successfully move on. 
Mr Newnhami, you have lost a golden opportunity to show that the police 
force does not have to be inward looking and defensive. It can be open and 
responsive to public needs. There are many in Queensland who have been victims 
of unjust times. Of course, it is inappropriate and powerless to play the victim role 
as many activists are doing at present. But it is also inappropriate not to be 
understanding when you are in a position of authority and power. What harm 
could have been done by releasing the Special Branch files? By shredding them, 
Mr Newnham, you have only increased suspicion and enhanced the divisive "us and 
them" attitude that is characteristic of the police force. 
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But I suppose I am most critical of myself. Somehow I still have not 
completely resolved the ease with which I became a part of a stinking system - a 
police culture that not only acts as judge and jury on others, but has wreaked havoc 
in the lives of many who are least able to look after themselves. It is unlikely that 
any of us will be treated like a gmb from Inala, a boong from Musgrave Park or a 
slope from Darra. But that is how many police think and act towards people I 
suspect you and I have little contact with. And personally, I do not think there is 
much difference between that approach and you or I treating the check-out 
operator or the parking attendant without respect. We are all human beings. We 
are all citizens of this planet and we do not act in isolation. We are responsible for 
the results of our acfions or, more importantly, in most cases, non-action. It is our 
lust for power and our fears that cause most of our problems in today's world. 
There are people out there who are being tortured and murdered for the 
sake of personal power. There are whole eco-systems being destroyed for the sake 
of material power. There are children who are starving to death for the sake of 
political power. There are species being lost for the sake of economic power. 
By this stage, I guess you could be feeling patronised, bored or even 
thinking what the hell has this got to do with reforming the police force. It is 
important to put our considerations of the Fitzgerald Report in perspective, give it 
a context. You see, too often, by not considering the context, we deal with 
problems in isolation and we end up applying a band-aid to staunch an arterial 
flow. I certainly do not intend to be patronising and I do not think I have said 
enough to be boring yet. 
Context has got a lot to do with changing one of the most conservative 
institutions in our society - the police force; a group that by its very nature resists 
change and yet is made up by and large of very ordinary people - that is, if anybody 
is ordinary; a group riddled by racism, bigotry, sexism and over all presides that 
unquenchable desire for wealth - yes, not much different from the community at 
large. Cynical? 
Remove the police force from its context - society - and inevitably any 
reform will be incomplete, lacking relevance. Fitzgerald did not do this nor did he 
remove his look at government from its context or his look at tendering. He put 
his neck on the line and presented a report that not only offered structural reform 
but had a spirit. And he gave us a report that is readable by all - not just a few 
lawyers or academics. This has engendered a feeling of belonging in many 
Queenslanders because, despite the political and media attempts to subvert the 
Inquiry and the Report, many have bought it, read it, understood it and now own 
it. 
To me it is Brian Toohey's criticism (see chapter 7) that is out of context. 
He has failed to account for the intangibles that dictate the mood of the time. To 
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sit back now and say he could have done better - he failed - is to suggest: 
1. inquiries in the past have cleaned up cormption; 
2. there are no continuing actions by commission staff; 
3. it does not take into account the atmosphere in political, police and judicial 
circles, to name a few. 
But to return to my topic. The worst aspects of police culture are not 
unique to Queensland. Only a few weeks ago I received some press clippings from 
a friend in England. It appears the Chief Constable of my first police force has 
recently suspended fifty-two detectives over various and persistent allegations of 
verballing. 
I feel like an albatross. Mr Fitzgerald and his team have named the beast 
but I still do not feel that we understand just how tight the culture is and, more 
particularly, how it is a symptom of our culture. Until we tackle the broader 
context, reform will be doomed to a short life. 
The biggest complaint I heard from police during the Fitzgerald Inquiry was 
the treatment of the hearings by the media and in particular, the use of the word 
"police" when talking about corrupt officers. They wanted journalists to use the 
phrase "some police". Now of course, they have a point - as with sexist language it 
is often a betrayal of deep rooted attitudes and certainly does not help to solve the 
problem. But it is noteworthy that this aspect aroused so much venom. Sure, 
many police would be simply trying to strike back blindly, but I feel it goes deeper 
and returns us to the problem we have with power and the exercise of power. 
Criticism has not worried the police force hierarchy unduly for years, 
because its members have felt content to have their consciences stroked by 
political patronage. And, in any case, the police have the power - to deprive a 
person of his or her liberty, whether by lawful or unlawful means, and they have a 
whole range of sanctions below that to employ on those who do not accede to what 
they perceive as the norm. The salvation of the citizen - the law - has been 
castrated by verballing, by inappropriate behaviour between some magistrates and 
police prosecutors, and castrated economically by the legal profession. 
But I think it is really noteworthy because here we have big tough police 
officers seemingly impervious to criticism - the domineering spirit of the police 
force is cmmbling around their ears. They are hearing day after day of not just 
allegation, but fact. Cormption has become a part of the fabric of the police force 
and this was perpetrated by officers and they are spitting chips about what 
journalists say, a breed I might add, they have almost absolute contempt for. Why"! 
They are fragile little souls - like most of us. Police, like the judiciary, the 
legal profession, politicians, the media - the list goes on - have cut themselves off 
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from the rest of society. They, like the others, think they see the big picture but 
their actions belie their thoughts. We have serving police standing for parliament 
and we have blatantly political meetings being held at police stations. Judges, who 
place themselves above others in society protest that their private conduct is 
somehow sacrosanct and of no bearing on their fitness for public office. We pay 
these people. 
Professional or job isolation is our adult security blanket. Once we get into 
a safe environment that gives us some degree of support and comfort, we feel 
constrained to protect it. We then slowly lose our objectivity. The rate and degree 
of the loss is determined by our individual need for security and acceptance and 
the nature of the group we have joined. 
The police force is a classic example. A male dominated hierarchical 
institution, its members often in conflict with those outside of the organisation, 
band together tightly for mutual support. This is because in the vast majority of 
cases they have not thought through their reason for being police and what their 
proper role is. 
For example: I came from England - a "Pom" - one down; a bit reserved 
and used to discipline - two down; arrested a detective in the first month of service 
- take off all brownie points. By the time I got to the Licensing Branch, despite my 
age and previous experience, I wanted to fit in. Keith Jackson, a former Kiwi 
police officer, identified the same pressure. Imagine the pressure on a green 
nineteen year old to conform when an embittered old sergeant says: "Come on, son 
- don't worry about that - look you've got to forget all that bullshit they taught you 
at the academy". 
There are ways in the police force of being accepted and feeling secure 
other than drifting along with the tide. One can play up to the stereotype - be as 
tough as anyone else, drink as much as anyone else, play-up, swear. But the most 
lasting and important effect of police culture is the alienation of the police force 
from the community, and vice versa. The remedy? Well, Mr Fitzgerald has made 
some fine recommendations - increase the intake of women, community policing, 
more regional control, reforming the management stmcture, the vital promotion 
by merit, and more. 
These are all stmctural changes that are necessary - but do not forget the 
context. While we continue in society to be driven by the lust for wealth and 
power, and continue to be manipulated by our fears, the police force will do the 
same, only more so. And no matter how much power the Criminal Justice 
Commission (CJC) is given, and the Commissioner to oversee and refashion the 
police force, it will only provide the terminally ill patient with a comparatively 
brief respite. Unless we all change. 
The natural state is balance. Nature has an inbuilt harmony. In the 
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relatively short time that we as a species have been on this planet, we have slowly 
built up ways of promoting consistent imbalance in our societies and our 
environments. 
Lasting change can never be imposed or even legislated for. Lasting change 
will occur only if we as individuals decide we want change. The large problems of 
society that our culture has inadvertently but inevitably fostered have not been 
solved so far. 
Cormption - the abuse of power - is one of those problems. 
I have no faith whatsoever that the great gods of our societies - technology, 
materialism, and domination by the right of strength - will come to our rescue 
other than with a sophisticated but doomed band-aid. We have to change, and 
that means education - of ourselves primarily, and of others. And that does not 
mean finding out more and more about less and less. It means trying to get a hold 
of the big picture, seeing things in context and, most importantly, a quest for self-
knowledge - a hard road to follow. And it means not imposing our ideas but 
offering them, and not to the converted alone. For the police force - and 
community alike, educafion is the only tool that will permanently break down the 
defensive walls and build bridges. 
I suppose what I am saying is that I have come to believe in the shining light 
of life and of humanity. There are many ways we can obscure and try to blow this 
out and deny it but it will eventually come through to restore balance. Idealistic? 
I have seen many cormpt men and women. I have yet to see a tmly happy one. I 
have seen many who strive earnestly to improve our society; I have yet to see a 
truly happy one. I have seen few who tmly seek self-knowledge; they have a light 
in their eyes. I believe that the big problems of our society, and cormption is one 
of those big problems, are eventually going to get so large that we will have to 
change. Nature will restore its balance. We can all play our own part. 
Being a child of the fifties and sbcties, I took the tide of this essay from the 
famous Bob Dylan peace song, not as you may have thought in any sense of 
pessimism, but in a sense that nature and its force is inevitable. I really do think 
the answer is "blowin' in the wind". 
Notes 
Mr Noel Newnham was appointed in 1987 as the new Queensland Police 
Commissioner. 
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The Police Culture — Implications for 
the Reform Process 
Jill Bolen 
Commissioner G.E. Fitzgerald QC, dedicated a chapter of his Report to "Police 
Culture" and associated issues. For the purpose of this chapter, I will use the term 
"culture" to mean: "the prevailing pattern of values, myths, beliefs, assumpfions, 
and norms; and their embodiment in language, symbols, and artifacts, including 
technology, in management goals and practices, and in participant sentiments, 
attitudes, activifies and interactions".! 
I would agree with many of the assertions about the negative aspects of 
police culture made by Commissioner Fitzgerald in his Report. I note, however, 
that litfie evidence was presented of the positive aspects of the police culture, 
although the observation was made that "many officers retain their integrity and 
provide meritorious and usually unrecognised service".2 In this paper, I will outline 
some explanations for, and facets of, the police culture. 
Cormption is one form of misconduct; it can be part of the values, myths, 
assumptions and norms that prevail in a police department. It does particular 
damage in a number of ways that will be explored in this paper. At this stage there 
has been no meaningful examination of culture or measure of the organisational 
climate within the Queensland Police Department against which changes can be 
gauged. The reform process can be hindered or helped by the culture existing 
when change is being implemented. 
As noted in the Report, community values can be reflected in the police 
culture. Therefore, it is to be hoped that meaningful change will occur both in the 
police force and in the community. 
Explanations for Police Culture 
Much has been written in recent years about police culture. Some observers 
believe that the personality traits of police officers are significantly different from 
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other members of the public even before they join the police force.3 I would also 
argue that the occupational socialisation of police actually begins prior to their 
entry to a police force. 
By the time recmits enter a training establishment, many of the values, 
myths, beliefs and assumptions about the job have been internalised from sources 
such as the media, films, and possibly their own interacfions with police. Many of 
the views portrayed on television are more figments of the script writers' 
imaginations than reality. The amplification that is given to an event and the 
police role in it may lead to the misconcepfion that such behaviour is the "norm". 
Perhaps the best example of this is the misconcepfion that the major role of police 
is to "fight crime". 
Research shows that less than forty per cent of police time is taken up with 
crime and related matters, though this observation would not apply to specialist 
areas such as the Criminal Investigation Branch (CIB). In general, police perform 
a "service" rather than a crime-fighting role; suggestions have been made that the 
various police departments be renamed the "Police Service" rather than the "Police 
Force"." 
Another view suggests that the attitudinal and value differences of police, 
compared with members of the public, can be traced to the socialisation of police 
once in the job.s This hypothesis also suggests that pohce are not more 
authoritarian in their attitudes or value systems than the general population from 
which police are drawn. 
The third view is that, depending on a number of factors such as 
intelligence, personality, motivation etc, the job will affect police officers.6 Police, 
I believe, do have their own view of reality which they attempt to impose on those 
with whom they work. This is particularly so in relation to the values and attitudes 
which it takes to succeed within the police organisation. 
Because of the myths surrounding the police role, the set of values and 
attitudes may vary among geographical areas, branches, and even gender. To be 
sure, the values and attitudes of the urban police will be vasfiy different, in many 
instances, from those of police who choose to serve in mral areas - particularly in 
one and two per.son stations. The sub-culture of the Traffic Branch differs from 
that of the CIB; also, within the CIB there may be a difference of attitudes and 
values between members of various squads. 
There are also differences between the culture of police performing clerical 
and administrative duties, and those with operational duties. I also consider that 
differences between policemen and policewomen can be identified. While no 
specific study has been completed on the attitudes of policemen to policewomen in 
Queensland, linking my reading of the literature from elsewhere to the experiences 
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of myself and some of my colleagues, I would assert that there are no significant 
differences between the local attitudes and the situation overseas. 
Part of the reason for the bias against policewomen by policemen is 
attributable to the myth of what police actually do. Almost universally, negative 
attitudes towards policewomen by policemen have been found - to a larger or 
lesser degree.? As a result, women police may either modify their values and 
attitudes to fit the prevailing male-dominated organisational culture or resign.s 
Fortunately, it has been my experience to find that overt and covert forms of 
discrimination have been reduced, but not eradicated, over recent years. 
Some Facets of Police Culture 
Although they are generalisations, it is worthwhile to explore some of the values, 
myths, beliefs, assumpfions and norms that make up the police culture. The 
following summary has been taken from a report prepared by Harrison, 
Hohenhaus and Pitman for the Queensland Police Department in relafion to the 
Fitzgerald Inquiry.9 
1. Characteristics which support the notion of "solidarity through secrecy" 
include: 
Police protect the actions of their comrades and see little in them 
that is bad. 
a. The vehicle of self-protection is the mle of silence-secrecy. The 
vehicle of attack is the emphasis on the maintenance of respect for 
the police. 
The "dog" (or "whistleblower") is an outcast among the police. 
Secrecy is loyalty. Secrecy is solidarity. 
Secrecy constitutes one of the most important definifions and is 
represented in the mle of silence. Law enforcement is subordinate 
to the ends of the group. 
* Police conceive of violence as an instmment to be used for the 
support of personal goals, and only incidentally as a restricted source 
of power given to them to facilitate their legal function. 
The use of violence is willingly used illegally to force respect and to 
elicit information, and the group endorses this procedure. There is 
also a willingness to abrogate it to achieve other ends, as evidenced 
by the withdrawal of protection. 
There is a willingness of police officers to cease enforcing the law if 
the Chief of Police indicates such a desire. 
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Apprehension of the criminal appears as a major value of the police 
and is the major source of satisfaction that police gain in the 
occupation. 
The mle that "the end justifies the means" in the apprehension of the 
criminal is demonstrated as an occupational norm of the police in its 
utilisation as a basis for legitimafing violence. 
The police officer conceptualises a criminal as a person who has 
abrogated his basic rights as a citizen, and as a personal challenge to 
the officer. 
Police consider themselves to be persons without particular worth 
and to be failures when they state they don't want their sons to 
become policemen, that they want them to become successes.io 
2. Punch analyses cormption scandals in various cities and has made the 
following observations: 
The police organisation is not a harmonious integrated entity with a 
comforting consensus, but is rather characterised by a deeply divided 
pattern of semi-autonomous and often conflicting units. 
The occupational culture defines the norm surtounding work in 
terms of "real" police work, based on action and excitement, and of 
the incompatibility between legal and administrative requirements 
on one hand and the reality of working the streets on the other. 
Police work is a matter of negotiation based on contextually relevant 
meanings where the law is used as a resource for solving practical, 
situational dilemmas. In practice, an array of evidence indicates that 
the demands made on the police are so diffuse and contradictory 
that the police task is unworkable and this leads to an atmosphere of 
"duplicity and hypocrisy" and of methods bordering on "trickery and 
stealth".!! 
3. Police tend to be cynical.i2 Faced with the duty of keeping people in line 
and believing that most people are out to break the law and do them harm 
if possible, they always look for the selfish motive.is 
4. Cynicism also stems from the police perception of the use and abuse of 
power by some other segments of the social order, in particular, politicians 
and members of the legal fraternity. In this regard, no other "working class" 
group has a wider or deeper access to social power stmctures. 
5. Isolation and segregation from the community are evident in police life.i" 
6. Police officers are volunteers who have offered their services by choice. 
This action can be motivated by a sense of community service, a desire for 
adventure, sometimes by a sense of patriofism or for job security. 
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7. Police officers will accept discipline and display loyalty provided they can 
tmst the leaders. The standards, performance and keenness of police 
officers will be directly related to the standard of leadership under which 
they operate. 
8. For the most part, loyalty is directed primarily to the work group. 
9. Police officers have pride in the force as well as personal integrity. 
However, these qualities tend to be belitfled. 
10. Police officers have a good sense of humour (some would say they must 
have it), although it is often regarded by the community as callousness. It is 
used to relieve tension when the going is tough. 
11. With the volume of work to be completed, there is a tendency to take short 
cuts in the performance of various dufies. 
12. Police officers have difficulty in admitting weakness and they tend to blame 
the system or others. 
13. During periods of fmstration, there can be a tendency to sabotage resources 
or the organisational image as a way of getting back at the system. 
Despite these generalisafions, it is not difficult to discern why the police 
culture is what it is. Some examples can be useful. In protecting individual rights 
secrecy can be considered an integral part of integrity. Also, in order to charge a 
person with a criminal offence, police must have a reasonable belief that the 
suspect committed the crime. 
Police who only suspected their peers of offences may have been fearful of 
repercussions, parficularly when no mechanisms were available to piece together 
the evidence of various officers about the activities of a "crooked cop". 
Misconduct and Corruption 
Goldstein has asserted that police misconduct falls into three categories - legalistic, 
moralistic, and professional.is Using that model, with legalistic misconduct 
equated with cormption, it has been argued that cormption does particular 
damage in the following ways: 
it undermines the confidence of the public; 
it destroys respect for the law; 
it undermines departmental discipline; and 
it harms police morale.i6 
Policing depends on the support of the community. This is made obvious in 
the case of information given by the public in order to apprehend criminals or 
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when community based policing is the major policing strategy. Public confidence 
can be lost in both the police and public authority generally as a result of the 
exposure of cormption. Respect for the law is vital, both from the public and the 
police - it can make the difference between anarchy and democracy. If police hold 
the law in contempt, members of the public may question why they should obey it. 
The third point is particularly relevant if supervisors are cormpt (or 
believed to be cormpt), they will lack the moral authority to compel obedience. 
Morale will decline after a major cormption scandal unfolds. "The honest officers 
will be angered by those whose involvement has brought disrespect on all police 
because many people often assume that more police are involved than the ones 
who are caught. Distmst is common between those who are attempfing to do their 
jobs well and those who are in any way cormpt. 
Policing after Fitzgerald 
So what are the prospects for policing in Queensland after Fitzgerald? The 
purpose of the Fitzgerald Inquiry was clearly set out. Many honest police feel let 
down by some aspects of the Report. They ask why all the bad things about the 
organisation and the police? I do not consider the Fitzgerald Inquiry had a charter 
to review the positives of policing. It was established to review, inter alia, the 
wrongs in the department. Some innocent police got hurt in the process and that 
hurt was felt by the family of the officer - "police family", as well as parents, wives 
and children. 
Some police may therefore be defensive about the positives of the job and 
the people in it. With recent criticisms about the cost of the Inquiry, it could have 
been alleged that writings of the positives would represent a whitewash and a 
waste of dollars. The police are already starting to use the recommendations of 
the Fitzgerald Report as a means of changing parts of the system which they 
themselves saw as defective. They will use the Report as an innovative vehicle that 
will have positive results for the communities they serve, the organisation, and 
themselves. Police are rising, like a phoenbc from the ashes, to the challenge to 
upgrade their professionalism and enhance their image. 
Balch asserts that "attracting better people to the same old job is not 
necessarily an improvement".!? Fortunately, the reforms recommended by 
Fitzgerald encompass stmcture and a switch to the primary strategy of community-
based policing. It is to be hoped that the new culture that emerges, albeit directed 
in some instances, will mean that recmits attracted to the police force will not be 
going to the "same old job". 
The new human resource management strategy proposed by Sergeant 
Denise Burke will have a major impact.i8 Perhaps it could be argued that with 
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promotion by merit, police will be more inclined to report the breaches of law and 
unethical behaviour (including breaches of discipline) of their colleagues. The 
decentralisation of authority and responsibility for decision-making has the 
propensity to minimise the scale of any misconduct. Participation by the 
community in the evaluation of policing will also assist. But through this process, 
no-one should seek to destroy the positive aspects of the police culture. 
Part of it, for example, involves "sticking by your mate". When applied to 
misconduct this becomes a negative trait, but when the call goes out over the 
police radio "officer in trouble", the culture dictates that anyone who can respond, 
does respond. Hence, at the untimely death of P.C. Brett Handran, two young 
police put themselves in danger to "stick by their mate". Yes, some members of 
the community also put themselves at risk that day, and I guess that is what 
community-based policing is about - caring for each other. 
With the advent of community policing, and bearing in mind the comment 
that police officers can reflect the community standards, it will be vital to "set in 
stone" some definifion of ethical behaviour. Public confidence in the police may 
be eroded if ethical conduct is not practised by police; but it is also important to 
have a high standard of morality and ethics within the community at large. 
At his recent swearing-in. Commissioner Newnham publicly subscribed to a 
Code of Ethics. The suggestion that all police reaffirm their Oath of Office or 
publicly subscribe to the new Code of Ethics, was supported by members of 
workshops established to train personnel to be change agents in the reform 
process. 
I have appended the Code of Ethics subscribed to by Commissioner 
Newnham. It should be noted that the application of a code of ethics is relevant to 
both the personal and professional lives of police. Pressures for reform are being 
brought to bear on police from a multiplicity of directions; many of the police are 
wanting change as much as anyone else in the community. 
Overall, however, the process will not be rapid or without its problems and, 
as we know, the journey of 1,000 miles begins with the first step. Professor 
Harmon outlined three forms of responsibility that are relevant to members of my 
department. They are, political, professional, and personal and Harmon examined 
the tensions that can develop among police that have to be regulated.!9 He 
asserted that each of the various forms can develop or exhibit certain pathologies 
requiring an appropriate response.20 Some of the tensions will be relieved by 
strong leadership, or applying sanctions to those who abrogate or use unwisely, the 
responsibilities placed on them. The new Criminal Justice Commission may also 
assist. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have set forth some theorefical explanations for the police 
culture, some facets of it, the impact of misconduct, and my perception of the 
prospects for reform. Many police were angered by the comments by Fitzgerald 
on the police culture. Whether that is a function of their naivety or the fact that 
precious little credence was given to the positive aspects of it, is a moot point. 
What has been said, or left unsaid, cannot be changed. 
Perhaps one of the most positive experiences for me in my sixteen plus 
years of police service was to participate, as a facilitator, in the workshops to train 
police as change agents for the forthcoming reforms. Let me assure you that the 
quality of the outputs from police and public servants at the workshops has been 
extremely encouraging. 
As a participant in the change process, as a tertiary student, and as a 
member of the broader community, I am optimistic for the future of policing in 
this State. There is a Hindi proverb which says, "The lotus blossoms out of the 
mud". Commissioner Newnham has gained the support of members in the 
department committed to change, and it is hoped will gain the respect and 
confidence of the community at large. 
I tmst that it will not be too long before the Queensland Police 
Department, like the lotus "blossoms out of the mud" and that we make it an 
ethical, effective and efficient police service. But the reform process needs the 
support and encouragement of all Queenslanders, not just police, if it is to succeed. 
We must become involved, where possible, and bring to heel those who impede 
the process, irrespective of their status or profession. 
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CODE OF ETHICS 
by Commissioner Newnham 
As a member of the Queensland Police Force, I have a duty to: 
Protect life and property; 
Preserve the peace; 
Prevent offences; 
Detect and apprehend offenders; and 
Help those in need of assistance. 
At all times, 
I will carry out my dufies without fear or favour, malice or ill will; 
I will act honestly and with the utmost integrity; 
I will make every effort to respect and uphold the rights of all people 
in the community regardless of race, social status or religion; 
I will strive for excellence and endeavour to improve my knowledge 
and professionalism; 
I will keep confidential all matters which I may learn in my official 
capacity, except as necessary in the course of my duties; 
I will practice self-discipline in word and deed both on and off duty; 
I will resist the temptation to participate in any activity which is 
improper or which can be constmed as being improper; 
I will not misuse my office for personal gain; 
I will accept responsibility for my own actions and for acts which I 
may order; 
I accept the desirability of these ethics as an integral part of my 
personal and professional life. 
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professionalism, disciplinary hearings, fairness of rales and regulations, and, 
sensitivity of police officers. This has implications for the application of 
overseas research data to the Queensland setting, although it is my opinion 
that the differences are minimal. 
13. Westley, Violence and the Police, p. 111. 
14. This alienation or isolafion results in the us (police) versus them (the 
community) mentality, and is particularly prevalent when police are called 
on to enforce unpopular laws or laws to which the community itself pays 
scant regard. 
15. H. Goldstein, Police Cormption: A Perspective on its Nature and Control 
(Washington DC: The Police Foundation, 1975). Legalistic misconduct is 
commonly called cormption; moralistic misconduct concerns attitudes of 
the police officers and whether they deliver impartial service to the law; 
professional misconduct may range from verbal to physical abuse of a 
member of the public. 
16. P.V. Murphy, "Cormptive Influences", in B.L. Gamire, ed.. Local 
Govemment Police Management, (Washington DC: Local Government 
Police Management, 1977). 
17. R.W. Balch, 'The Police Personality: Fact or Fiction?" The Joumal of 
Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, vol. 63, no. 1, (1972): pp. 106-
19. 
18. D. Burke, Police Career Management: Whose Responsibility! (Brisbane: 
Police Departmental Printer, 1988). Sergeant Burke's work is visionary and 
has been accepted in various police departments as an effective model for 
human resource planning and management. 
19. Quoted in I. Thynne and J. Goldring, Accountability and Control • 
Govemment Officiab and the Exercise of Power (North Ryde: Law Book 
Company, 1987), p. 215. 
20. Ibid. Harmon's works also addresses the effectiveness of codes of 
conduct/ethics. He asserts that the potentially negative effects of the 
standards and values encompassed in a code not be overlooked. 
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Community Policing — Gently Does It 
JeffJarratt 
For much of this century policing has been premised on three basic strategies -
random patrol, rapid response, and retrospective investigation. In the 1970s, 
researchers, particularly in the United States, began to question the effectiveness 
of these strategies.! In the 1980s a number of police departments began to 
recognise the limitations of these strategies in reducing crime, lessening fear of 
crime, and providing community satisfaction. 
Numbered among those departments is the New South Wales Police 
Service, which in 1987, began to move to community-based policing to involve the 
community in its own problem-solving, protection and fear reduction. This 
strategy is simply recognition that there are limited private and public resources to 
devote to the provision of a safe environment, be it road safety, personal safety, 
family safety or property safety. 
The strategy behind the change in New South Wales was threefold; attack 
corruption first, then build an accountable cormption-resistant management team 
and organisation and focus on the community-sensitive responsive service as the 
keystone of policing in the State.2 
The vehicle used in the shift to a community-based strategy is a 
decentralised, multi-skilled, service delivery model. This has involved a major 
restructuring known as regionalisation. Two years after its commencement, some 
significant inroads have been made in its implementation, but there remains much 
to be done. However, to appreciate fully where New South Wales is in policing 
today, it is necessary to look at where it has come from. This involves highlighting 
some of the forces which have influenced the course the organisation has taken in 
the past decade or so. 
In the 1970s, the New South Wales Police Force relied heavily on its 
reputation as Australia's premier operational police agency. However, accusations 
of cormption and malpractice in the form of "verbals" abounded. As well, the 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
144 JeffJarratt 
administration and management of the organisation were said to be a century 
behind the times.3 For a period, this situation was compounded by open conflict 
between the cliques at the senior levels of the organisation. 
The resignation of Commissioner Wood in 1979, following accusations of 
conspiracy to pervert the course of justice with the now disgraced former Chief 
Magistrate, Murray Farquhar, began a series of events which changed the course 
of policing in New South Wales. First of all, at that time, the Wran Government 
commissioned the Lusher Inquiry into the stmcture, organisation and management 
policies of the police force. The 1981 Lusher Report provided the impetus for 
much of the change which was to follow.-* Change, however, is said to come when 
preparation and opportunity meet. The opportunity had arisen, but there was no 
one in a position to provide the leadership required. Still further leverage was 
needed to get the organisation moving. 
During this time. Deputy Commissioner Bill Allen, who was being groomed 
to be Wood's replacement as Commissioner, was to go before the Police Tribunal 
on serious departmental charges relating to cormpt activities. Allen was found 
guilty, de-commissioned by the Governor-in-Council, reduced to the rank of 
Sergeant First Class, and dismissed. 
Fmstrated by the intransigence of the police on reform and shocked by the 
circumstances of Allen's decline. Premier Wran invoked a recommendation of 
Lusher to create a Police Board. In the Police Board Act 1983, Pariiament took up 
the essence of the Lusher ideas, requiring the board: 
1. to promote the improvement of the police force and to ensure the 
maintenance of an efficient and effective police service; 
2. to formulate plans for the provision of a comprehensive, balanced and 
coordinated police service; 
3. to make recommendations to the minister on policy matters, financial 
resources, property management, priorities and allocation of finances; 
4. to ensure the development of modern personnel practices; 
5. to initiate research into new police methods and other research related to 
law enforcement generally; 
6. to consider applications and make recommendations to the minister in 
relation to all appointments of persons to the rank of superintendent and 
higher positions; 
7. to make a recommendation to the minister in relation to each appointment 
to the rank of inspector; and 
8. to make recommendations in relation to all transfers at the rank of 
superintendent.5 
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The Commissioner retains responsibility for the superintendence of the 
police force, its operational command and day-to-day management. The 
Commissioner is required to implement, by exercise of his/her functions in 
accordance with law, decisions of the Board. 
Commissioner Abbot, who was the New South Wales Police Commissioner 
from 1981, felt the Board was an imposition and retired on his sixtieth birthday in 
August 1984. The Board sought a successor who in the words of Sir Gordon 
Jackson "was incormptible and who could manage change."6 It recommended as 
Commissioner, John Keith Avery, MA DipCrim, who was three years younger than 
Abbot. 
Avery brought with him a philosophy of policing developed in the eariy 
1970s. His book. Police Force or Service sets out a notion of policing with 
community consent and involvement - community based policing became the 
principal operational strategy.? However, while Avery had done the preparation, 
the opportunity had now passed to bring about major reform. 
In 1984, the organisation was inward-looking and seemingly operated on 
the premise of competent men and women of action knowing what they were 
about, being fmstrated by an unknowing bureaucracy and public. This attitude was 
based on myths which, in essence, held that input from people other than police 
was interference from lesser mortals, be they politicians, lawyers, minority groups 
or ordinary citizens. As well as requiring community input into policing, Avery 
sought to secure a place in the organisation for creative, thoughtful people, who 
were not slaves to routine and the status quo, but who were ready to seek out new 
and better ways of doing things.8 
Before embarking on any reform, it was essential to remove the stigma of 
cormption. The first step was to admit that cormption was an issue, and to set 
about its eradication. In confronting the issue, Avery began by asking people to 
reflect on the nature of the problem. No forms of cormpfion were ignored, but 
initial emphasis was necessarily on those more ingrained aspects, the type 
identified by Lusher three years earlier.9 
The Police Board was and is, instmmental in Avery's continued thmst 
against all forms of cormption. At the same time, the Board recognises that 
corruption is not peculiar to police.io Avery focused on some particularly 
notorious officers, with little or no support from the majority of police. Many of 
the senior officers he inherited were openly opposed to his stance, not necessarily 
based on tolerance of cormption, but largely because of ignorance aided by natural 
resistance to change. 
The approaches taken to reduce and, if possible, eliminate the cormption 
included: 
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tough, fair investigations and sanctions; 
creation of a high profile Internal Affairs and Internal Security; 
actions intended to be an object lesson to others; 
creation of professional role models; 
improved training at the Academy; and 
support for the role of the Ombudsman. 
The outright attack on cormption tended to polarise certain internal 
elements. The Board and Avery took the view that, if it was hurfing then it must 
be doing some good. At the same time, by adopting a tough stance in relation to 
cormption issues, Avery saw public confidence grow in the capacity of police to 
operate within the law. 
Aware that not all the senior administration were disciples, Avery quickly 
moved in coalition with the Board and Labor Police Minister, Peter Anderson to 
introduce a merit-based promotion system for officers of commissioned rank, from 
1 October 1984. The limited introduction of the changed promotion system was 
critical to Avery's chances of getting people of integrity and capacity into positions 
of influence relatively quickly to sustain the momentum which he and the Board 
were seeking to generate. 
He quickly learned to value those who joined the cause early, though some 
of them were possible misfits.n In the interim, he established a small cadre of 
relatively junior people which was termed the Commissioner's Policy Unit to think 
about and work on many of the changes which he wished to introduce. Avery has 
an innate capacity to be tender to those who try, even if they are incompetent. He 
treasures each one who is competent and loyal.12 
The next step was to get the organisation ready for major stmctural change. 
From the outset, the NSW Police Force had been highly centralised, militaristic 
and hierarchical in structure. Emphasis had been on many supervisory layers and 
central control to limit cormption. Avery's view was that the existing management 
structure took little account of the needs of the clients, the citizens of the state, and 
certainly had limited success, if any, in containing or removing cormpfion. 
Initial reaction to many of Avery's reforms was reserved, if not negative, 
based on the premise that he would only be around for a couple of years and then 
"the good old days" would return. There was much to support this view, because 
since Norman Allan, there had been four commissioners in twelve years. There 
was no particular reason to expect Avery to be different. However, there was a 
difference - the Police Board. The Board provided enormous moral support to 
Avery at a time when there was quite significant opposifion coming from within, 
particularly elements of the Criminal Investigations Branch (CIB) which was the 
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focus of much of the attention on cormption, and headquarters elements which 
had established "comfort zones". 
Tlie .^very approach, which many police officers at all levels found very 
hard to accept, was to remove the insularity which had so dominated and restricted 
the growth of the organisation for so long. He astounded long-serving police 
officers by openly admitting he did not have the answer to their every question.i3 
Instead, he adopted a multi-disciplinary approach and asked that the community, 
other departments and, heaven forbid, junior officers be consulted in developing 
solutions to problems which aro.se. This notion is highlighted by Eddison when he 
refers to the "need to increasingly shift departments of State away from performing 
the role of safe havens where particular professions can indulge themselves, 
constantly feeding on their owm mythology, towards the notion of a 
multi-disciplinary policy development, implementation and review role".!" 
The intransigence and the relationship of corruption to the disabling nature 
of the stmcture was there to be seen.is Dual lines of accountability pervaded the 
organisation. To achieve the "regionalisation" (which involved a shift from a 
functional stmcture to a geographic base) and make accountability unequivocal, 
four assistant commissioner positions were recast from crime, traffic, general and 
state emergency services to four region commanders. The deputy commissioner 
(administration) position was disestablished and the deputy commissioner 
(operations) position became the State Commander. Eight districts were created 
while two were disestablished, leaving a total of twenty-six districts. 
Each of the four regions occupy about a quarter of the State and are seen to 
be similar in a number of respects, such that valid comparisons can be made on 
performance. The regional commands are designed to be a microcosm of the 
Commissioner's job, while being limited to implementing policy laid down by the 
Commissioner, on advice. Otherwise, they are largely autonomous. Each region 
has either six or seven districts. 
A significant step in the restmcturing was to follow when the century-old 
CIB ceased to exist and the detectives were divided among the four regions, 
responsible directly to the region commanders. Although there have been claims 
of a conspiracy to undermine Avery's position, detectives have gradually accepted 
the first phase of the restmcture.i* The next phase will involve moves to make 
detectives really "community-based", while retaining a core of experts at region 
level. 
The restmcturing halved the number of levels in the organisation, but at a 
ministerial planning meeting in May 1988, it was agreed to further reduce the 
number to a total of five - from commissioner to constable. This involved the 
creation of some 182 patrols, which are the community based strategic business 
units of the service, in place of the old divisions and sub-stations. The patrols are 
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the centre-piece of the organisation's operations - the strategic business units of 
the corporation. 
In terms of strategy, the NSW Police Force was little different from many 
other western police departments. The normal operating position was premised 
on responding to daily incidents and occurrences. The reactive orientation is 
probably natural, because police have been required to respond rapidly to a 
changing operational environment, without particular reference to or direction 
from the people, through the elected government. It follows then that their 
strategies and planning would reflect such a standard.i? However, Avery 
recognised that if police were to deal with disorder to reduce fear and crime, they 
must have the consent of the community for legitimacy and to get the assistance 
required to perform effectively.is 
To gain an appreciation of the realisation that Avery had come to in trying 
to redirect the strategy of the NSW Police, it is necessary to explore the standard 
operating strategies which have hitherto applied. From the 1960s to 1980s policing 
emphasised rapid response, random patrol and retrospective investigation.!9 
Rapid response strategies have been strongly supported, if not encouraged, 
by changes in technology.20 This is particularly so in regard to motor vehicles, 
portable radios and computers. With computer aided dispatch, portable radios 
and fast cars, police have been able to lower response times to about two to three 
minutes in urban centres, such as Chicago in the United States.21 
The significant thing about rapid response is that a substantial body of 
research now suggests that people seeking police help (including victims) do not 
contact police for up to half an hour after an incident.22 In fact, in most case, 
victims contact at least one friend or relative before making contact with police. 
The widely held belief that rapid response leads to arrest of more offenders 
and thus greater community satisfaction is not empirically supported.23 Also of 
interest, is the view of long term operational police who, while scepfical of such a 
notion, generally concede that to catch a person "in the act" is rare. 
Extensive police resources are devoted to rapid response. Yet citizens 
seeking police assistance often contend that they are dissatisfied with the service 
received upon arrival of police. Community-based policing focuses on satisfying 
community demands and needs, rather than simply the speed of response. A 
recent survey of citizen attitudes in New South Wales showed about twenty per 
cent of citizens were dissatisfied with the police service received.2" The majority 
said police "not caring" or "not taking them seriously" vvas the reason for their 
dissatisfaction. 
A police promise to attend "as soon as possible" (which can be a few 
minutes to a few hours) leaves many citizens fmstrated and wondering. Many 
times the attending officer meets an irate customer who is more upset about the 
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delayed response than the original reason for the call. The fmstrated customer 
then often seeks ombudsman intervention in the issue, which generates a huge 
bureaucratic procedure and further obscures the original issue. Keeping the caller 
informed can remove much of the problem. 
Herman Goldstein, noted American researcher, has been a significant 
contributor to the discussion of the use of police fime.zs His argument is 
essentially that police should be problem solvers rather than incident reactors. 
That is, police tend to return to similar incidents at the same locations, time after 
time, and treat them as separate incidents, not as a continuing problem.26 George 
KeUing of Harvard and North-Eastern Universities, notes that "beat officers ... 
have known intuitively what researchers ... have confirmed - fewer than ten per 
cent of locations calling for police service generate over sixty per cent of the total 
calls for service during any given year".2? 
In summary, police are rapidly responding to seemingly unconnected 
incidents, quickly (and sometimes inadequately) dealing with each of them and 
moving on to the next. The result is citizen dissatisfaction with the level or lack of 
personal service and police dissatisfacfion with the ricocheting style. Random 
patrol by car was thought to create a sense of police omnipresence, making bicycle 
and foot patrol or beat police obsolete.28 The real effect has been to build a 
barrier between police officers and citizens. Police "putting a few miles on the 
clock" by driving in an undirected fashion provide no sense of security or feeling of 
safety for citizens, nor any feelings of achievement for police. 
Again, research in the United States and United Kingdom suggests that 
citizens are largely unaware of variations in the level of police patrols. In the 
Kansas City experiment conducted by Kelling, three types of patrolling were 
trialed over a whole year - random, saturation and directed.29 Random is the old 
strategy of undirected driving around; saturation has three times the number of 
police in the area; and directed has the usual number, but waiting in the statfon 
until called and immediately returning to the station upon completion of the job. 
Police believed that random and saturation patrolling would leave citizens 
feeling more secure, impressed by the high police profile and noticing lower crime 
levels in designated areas. In the three trial areas in Kansas City, no difference 
was reported in crime levels, citizen fear levels or percepfions of police presence. 
Nor was there any in the other cities in the United States where the experiment 
was replicated. 
Of note to police commanders is that directed response required far fewer 
officers to achieve the same result. That is, directed patrol maintains the same 
level of citizen confidence with much lower resource commitment. Noted police 
tactician and Research Fellow in the Program of Criminal Justice at Harvard 
University, Robert Wasserman, commented that "every shred of evidence is that 
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rapid response and patrolling in cars doesn't reduce crime, increase citizen 
satisfaction, or reduce fear.-3o 
Notwithstanding, it is important to maintain a rapid response capacity for 
emergency circumstances. However, there is no requirement to build the whole 
police response on the odd emergency call. In New South Wales, emergency calls 
for service constitute less than one per cent of all calls, according to figures from 
the NSW Police Radio Operations Centre. Thus, split level response, 
encompassing a combination of quality reactive and community-based police 
response, is the ideal for which New South Wales is striving. 
In terms of retrospective investigation, television detective shows depict 
criminals being apprehended following brilliant investigation. Empirical reality 
has it that police mainly arrest and convict criminals on evidence of citizens. That 
is, forensic and crime scene evidence, dogged investigation and clever 
interrogation of suspects provide valuable corroborating evidence, but in a 
significant majority of instances, criminals are convicted primarily on the evidence 
of citizen witnesses.3! 
There has been, and always will be, need for highly skilled investigators, 
interrogators and analysts to gather and piece together the many parts of a 
criminal investigation for presentation to a court. It is, however, critical to keep an 
open line to the main sources of information on criminal activity, the citizens, and 
to have the means of converting that informafion into intelligence and then into 
admissible evidence. This latter aspect has been somewhat neglected in New 
South Wales. 
Confronted with overwhelming evidence that current operational practices 
were at least to be seriously questioned, Avery made a choice of strategy which is 
built around the professional community-based police officer working with the 
particular community of his or her beat to solve (or contribute to the solution of) 
local problems. The beat constable in New South Wales is offered much freedom 
to work with his or her community on a whole range of problems. Almost the 
whole of the remainder of the department has as its role support of the "general 
practitioner" in everyday contact with the community. 
Just as medical general practitioners developed a preventive model which 
addresses the health of the whole person, rather than a specific illness, it is 
intended that the police "general practitioners" will work in the preventive way in 
their communities to generate feelings of citizen personal safety, improve security 
and decrease crime. Expert support is still required from detectives, crime scene 
analysts, intelligence analysts, highway patroUers, fingerprint analysts, traffic 
researchers, helicopter crews, dog handlers, tactical response and special weapons 
operators, radio operators, prosecutors, accident investigators and so on. 
Community based approaches are, however, limited because these "scarce" 
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resources are often effectively unavailable to patrols. This, and the development 
of broad skills by general duty police officers, provides a future challenge for the 
Avery administration. 
Notwithstanding this challenge, it is expected, based on overseas experience 
- particularly Flint, Michigan - that such beat police will lower community fear and 
apprehension.32 As well, locally-based beat police are expected to raise the level 
of information fed to police for analysis by intelligence units. The role of 
intelligence in police planning and operations is increasing. A network of police 
with skills in analytical and logical techniques is being built throughout commands 
to give early warning of issues and problems, as well as provide information which 
can be converted into admissible evidenced. 
The net effect of the rational reallocations of resources is increased 
community satisfaction and improved police performance. The Police minister has 
indicated that one thousand police will be working beats in New South Wales by 
1992. Currently, there are fifty-seven. 
While the majority of NSW Police resources are being directed to 
community-based policing activity, organised crime must also be combated. The 
efforts to reduce this insidious influence are based on a multi-disciplined task force 
approach. Each task force incorporates intelligence assessment and allocation of 
specific resources to pursue the principal criminals to conviction. Management 
and leadership of these task forces is critical, regardless of the particular type of 
organised criminal activity. 
On the subject of leadership, in Avery, the Police Board chose a leader 
whose values are old-fashioned as well as modern; who adheres to old-fashioned 
ideas of honesty and duty as well as to modern ideas of policing as a service. He is 
steadily winning acceptance by police of those values.33 To give life to those 
values, Avery has publicised and widely circulated a statement of values as a gauge 
forjudging police performance and behaviour. 
The values are that each member of the NSW Police Service acts in a 
manner which: 
upholds the mle of law; 
preserves the individual's rights and freedoms; 
places integrity above all; 
seeks to improve quality of life by community involvement in policing; 
strives for citizen and police personal satisfaction; 
strives to capitalise on the wealth of human resources; and 
husbands public resources - both money and authority. 
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Integrity above all is the theme, but unequivocal professional standing in 
the community is the objective. Efforts to change the operafing culture of the 
police service, in the short term, have met with public scepficism and internal 
cynicism. It is well recognised that such a standing will not come quickly or easily. 
The Avery administration, however, is seeking to imbue every member with a 
value based outlook while simultaneously making the whole organisation value 
driven. 
Steadily the values are being accepted but only fime and leadership will see 
them unanimously regarded as more than a document on the wall or items to be 
included in a plan or an application. 
Finally, a large lesson from the New South Wales experience is that reform 
takes much longer than you think. Change in the law and other events must be 
supported by processes sustained over a long period. Appropriate forces must be 
arranged against inevitable resistance to change. Opportunifies must be 
recognised and acted upon.34 As Paterson so wisely put it - "it can be a long and 
costly process, but change by osmosis, by absorption of environmental influences, 
appears to be overwhelmingly the predominant source of organisafional reform".35 
In other words, gently does it. 
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In some circles it is becoming fashionable to belittle the contribution made by 
Tony Fitzgerald QC, to Queensland public life. I, for one, do not subscribe to this 
trend. To be sure, there are deficiencies in certain aspects of Mr Fitzgerald's 
recommendations. It is also vitally important that the Report itself is subject to the 
closest scmtiny. 
Yet those who do feel genuine disappointment with the Fitzgerald Report 
(as opposed to those who are threatened by its recommendations and are 
therefore hostile anyway) should also reflect on the changes which have taken 
place in Queensland over the last two years. For such reflection will make plain 
the extent of Fitzgerald's impact as an agent of change. What started out as a 
limited probe into allegations of police misconduct became, in effect, a wide-
ranging investigation into the way the business of government has been conducted 
in Queensland over a long period. 
One of the more important of Mr Fitzgerald's findings was the link between 
Queensland's electoral system and the spread of cormption. Although some 
contest such a link, it is a reality that for many years, Queensland's zonal electoral 
stmcture provided the State Government with a buffer against the possibility of 
political defeat. This was understood by those working within or close to the 
Government and engendered a view of the relative invulnerability of the position 
of the mling party. In turn, the effect was to reinforce longstanding values about 
what were supposedly the important elements in Queensland politics. In 
particular, it underlined the already longheld disregard for the fate of those 
institutions, such as the pariiament, the public service, the police force, and the 
judiciary - whose role it is to ensure that government operates with a measure of 
efficiency, accountability and regard for the public interest. 
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Worse, these institutional stmctures increasingly came to be regarded by 
successive governments not so much as vehicles for protecting the public interest, 
but rather, as impediments to progress and development. In that context, it is 
perhaps not so surprising that governments sought to neutralise the impact of these 
institutions. 
Apart from factors common to other We.stminster-derived systems (for 
example, the development of the party system) the erosion of Parliament's 
authority in Queensland was hastened over the years by several indigenous factors. 
These include the absence, since 1922, of a Legislative Council. The major effect 
of this absence was not so much the removal of legislative scmtiny and review (the 
Legislative Council's performance in those terms had been very poor) but rather, 
the discernible effect of the Council's absence on Queensland's political character. 
Specifically, the absence of the Upper House worked to discourage the notion of 
political compromise, in particular, any sense that there were limitations to the 
authority of parliament or government. 
Queensland's raw political style also influenced very significantly the 
shaping of Parliament's role and, especially, relationships between the Executive 
and the Legislature. For most of this century Queensland politics were dominated 
by long periods of stable and unbroken mle, and by a series of strong, sometimes 
authoritarian, political leaders. A tradition thus developed whereby Queensland's 
political life has been, and still remains, dominated by party leadership and the 
cult of personality. As a result, the Parliament did not develop as a focus of 
political authority, except in those unusual circumstances where a complete party 
breakdown occurred. 
There is also little doubt that institutionalised misunderstandings of the 
roles of government and parliament contributed significantly to the malaise of the 
Pariiament's position. As a consequence, the distinctions between "party" and 
"government", and between "parliament" and "government", became badly blurred, 
if not lost altogether. 
Over the years, too, the Queensland Public Service became polificised. 
Apart from anything else, public servants were aware that the protecfion afforded 
to the Government by the State's electoral arrangements meant, in effect, that the 
mling party (parties) represented "the only game in town". There was no prospect 
of a change in government and changes in administrative practice were not 
encouraged becau.se they could threaten the longstanding cosiness of arrangements 
between the government and its administrative advisers. The politicisation of the 
public service, then, was not so much in a directly partisan sense (though in recent 
years there has been some incidence of the beneficial effects of possessing a "green 
and gold" [party membership] pass) but rather in the way the Public Service as an 
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institufion came to share the "values" of its political masters, and the "benefits" of 
office, as well as the threat potentially posed by government defeat at the polls. 
The enduring benefit of the Fitzgerald Inquiry will be in convincing 
ordinary people that issues such as these, which for a long time were treated as 
worthless, are important for maintaining a healthy community fabric. Perhaps, 
too, the Inquiry has helped people appreciate that cronyism and cormption do 
have a cost, a cost against society as well as direct economic cost against the 
community. 
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Immorality May Lead to Greatness: 
Ethics in Government 
Michael Jackson 
When a government is perceived to be cormpt it loses legitimacy in the eyes of the 
governed. Cormption can take many forms, ranging from malfeasance to the 
unethical. Current developments in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and China 
are partly a response to perceived cormption. 
If all societies are subject to cormption, Alexis de Tocqueville, that 
profound observer of early American democracy, drew the conclusion that 
democracies are susceptible to a particularly virulent form of cormption. He put it 
this way: "the corruption of men who have casually risen to power by birth has 
little affect on the wider society ... What is to be feared is not so much the 
immorality of the great as the fact that immorality may lead to greatness."i 
He goes on to explain that in a democracy, private citizens see a person of 
their own rank rise from obscurity to power and riches. This spectacle excites 
surprise and envy. To attribute the rise of such a person to merit would be 
implicitly to acknowledge that one lacks such merit. It is far easier to impute the 
success of others to their vices rather than to their virtues. This imputation is 
latent in democracy and it grows when it is vindicated, as it all too often is. When 
vindicated, this cynicism causes in some observers the desire to imitate it. In 
Tocqueville's words, "to pillage the public purse and to sell the favours of the state 
are arts that the meanest villain can understand and hope to practice in his turn".2 
The misdeeds of the great are incomprehensible to the ordinary person, but 
the misdeeds of someone who has asked for our vote are easy enough to fathom. 
Australian political culture has long prided itself on "lopping tall poppies" in the 
name of egalitarianism. In so doing, the public agenda as expressed by the media 
addresses the misdeeds of the great. In a migrant society without a traditional 
aristocracy, greatness is defined by and large by wealth and income. Of course, 
once office has been achieved, elected and appointed office holders are often 
exposed to a similar pmrient interest. The media will lavish attention on the salary 
and benefits of the director of the opera or the prime minister, but will not delve 
very far either into the capacities of the person selected or how the job is 
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exercised. A variety of excuses can be given for this fbcation from "it's what viewers 
want" to "defamation laws leave little alternative".3 The recent attempt to deflect 
attention from the evidence of the Fitzgerald Report to the income Mr Fitzgerald 
derived from his labours, found a responsive audience. 
If immorality is a means to greatness, it goes a long way to encouraging the 
rest of us to act in the same way. Social (ethical) mles are inherently vague, and 
when our leaders act to blur them still more, we are on the slippery slope. Stuart 
Henry's study of the black economy in Britain makes clear the elaborate 
justifications people offer for unethical and illegal actions. Henry found that those 
who acted on the borderline offered mitigating circumstances: low wages; special 
need, if only for the moment; retribution for the tricks of business or government; 
and the assertion that "everyone else does it" or would do it in the same situation. 
In addition, Henry found a number of equivocations that neutralise formal 
standards of behaviour. Someone selling stolen videos would never describe them 
as stolen. Rather they "fell off the back of a tmck" or are "bulk purchases". These 
neutralisations explain the low price of the goods offered.i 
Almost no one ever will admit to acting unethically, or illegally. It was in 
this vein that Donald Frederick Lane (a former National Party minister) explained 
to the Fitzgerald Inquiry that "his wealth was [the result of using his] Ministerial 
privileges to gain personal financial benefit." Lane went on to say that "his 
activities accorded with the custom of his Ministerial colleagues".5 We inevitably 
seek to jusfify our actions. 
Ethics and Politics 
It is this desire to justify our actions that makes us ethical.6 Ethics is finally the 
"desire to be able to justify [our] actions to others on grounds they could not 
reasonably reject".? The boundaries within which we justify our actions constitute 
the political community. In Aristotle's Athens, where a distinction between the 
public and private was less clear than it is in our society, little distinction was made 
between ethics and politics. Political life was but one sphere in which the ethics of 
a people was expressed. 
It is worth noting that Aristotle also said that "some think that we are made 
good by nature, others by habituation, others by teaching". These three remain the 
conventional explanations for ethical and unethical actions. Aristotle went on to 
claim that "it is hard, if not impossible, to remove by argument the traits that have 
long since been incorporated in the character". He supposed that habit and 
teaching, being within our control, must be where we concentrate our efforts. Ever 
the realist, he concluded that even where all three conditions favour virtue "we 
must be content if ... we get some tincture of virtue".8 Aristotle wisely warns 
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against setting impossible standards. The best is the enemy of the good, and good 
is enough. 
The popular doctrine held outside of Queensland is that it is the exception 
to the Australian norm. But, it is not obvious that Queensland is at odds with the 
other States or the Commonwealth as a whole in possessing the characteristics that 
made cormption possible. The news of the day brings stories of findings of the 
Independent Commission Against Crime (ICAC) in New South Wales, wheeling 
and dealing in Western Australia, and betrayals of confidence in the 
Commonwealth Government.9 
We deny ourselves of the full teaching of the Fitzgerald Report if we do not 
use it as an opportunity to reflect on the whole society. If we are content to see it 
as confirming our fears about Queensland exceptionalism, we will have forsaken a 
rare opportunity. 
I have argued that ethics is inherently a part of the political life of a 
community at a general level. It should be clear that I am using the word 
"political" and its derivatives, not to refer to the sound and fury of partisan conflict, 
but rather to refer to the form and nature of the consfitufion of the society, the way 
in which it is constituted. I prefer the definition of politics given by Jacques 
Maritain, as "the process by which a civil society achieves its common good through 
the agency of the state".!o 
There is a more specific connection between ethics and politics that arises 
in the light of the Fitzgerald Report, and that concerns the public service, standing 
between the partisan fray and the constitution of the society. Discretion is 
inevitable in any complex institution. Government is certainly one such institution. 
Kenneth Davis lists twelve instances of discretionary judgments within the 
administrative process." They include plea bargaining, eviction from public 
housing for being "undesirable", delayed legal proceedings to allow a cooling off 
period, a warning to a traffic violator rather than a ticket, procurement 
negotiations in which it is suggested that a contract might be won if the bidder took 
a salary reduction for the duration of the contract, a social worker refrains from 
reporting that an ineligible client is receiving a benefit, a trade practices 
commissioner grants a merger approval to two corporations without a publicly 
stated reason, and so on. 
As the scope of government has grown, so has administrative discretion. If 
that part of the argument is commonplace, perhaps it is less common to suggest 
that even if the size of government stops growing, administrative discretion may 
well continue to grow. If the climate of the times in the public service is "to let 
managers manage", I would expect ever more discretion to be passed down the 
hierarchy. 
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The history of regulation reflects this expansion of discretion. Legislation 
introducing regulation, persistently speaks in terms of "appropriate", "advisable", 
'beneficial", "equitable", "reasonable", "sufficient", and their negations. I expect 
more of this. The irony is that just as legislation is increasingly drafted in such 
terms, the term "the public interest" is fading from use. It does not, for example, 
figure in the Commonwealth Government's Guidelines on Official Conduct of 
Commonwealth Public Servants 1987.^2 
Insofar as administrative discretion is a part of public service, John Rohr 
has argued that "bureaucrats participate in the governing process of our society".13 
He goes on to say that to govern in a democratic society without a mandate from 
the electorate raises serious ethical questions. This is a problem that inheres in 
democratic politics, as we shall see. It admits of no solution; it must be managed, 
not solved. Emphasising the role of public servants as individuals, emphasises the 
importance of personnel politics, a point to which later reference will be made. 
Whatever may be unclear about administrative discretion, one thing is 
clear. When asked, citizens impose a higher standard of conduct on public 
officials, elected or appointed, than on ordinary persons. Research on corruption 
in the United States brings this point home. John Peters and Susan Welch 
surveyed several hundred members of state legislatures, finding that one factor 
that influenced their judgment of an hypothetical act was who did it. An instance 
of a petty crime, say stealing ten dollars, was judged less harshly if done by a 
citizen than if done by a public official, say in using stationery worth ten dollars.i^ 
Judges were found to have the highest standards set for them. 
About a decade later, Michael Johnston made a similar finding in a survey 
of voters. He used twenty hypothetical situations, ten in private life and ten in 
public life. He found the mean response on a scale of 0 to 3 for the public 
examples to be 2.314, while for the private cases, it was 1.580.15 This difference 
was statistically significant. 
Other interesting findings emerged from both of these studies. Both the 
elite sample of legislators and the mass sample of voters made fine grained 
distinctions in their judgments. They took into account not only the deed, but the 
doer, and the beneficiary. In some cases perfectly legal acts were judged cormpt, 
while in other cases clearly illegal acts were deemed not to be cormpt. These are 
examples of what I referred to earlier in passing as relative judgments. Although 
in the jurisdiction in which Johnston polled, the provision of free food or drink to 
police officers on duty was a criminal offence, respondents did not judge it to be 
cormpt. On the other hand, respondents did think it cormpt when a public official 
uses the office telephone for private business, though this was perfectly legal. 
That judgments are relative should not lead to the conclusion that all 
ethical judgments are irrational. Far from it, for in both of these studies and in 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
164 Michael Jackson 
many others, respondents show a strong pattern in their judgments. There is a 
moral coherence to the world than we sometimes fail to realise. 
What is Ethics? 
I have used the word "ethics" a good deal in the preceding remarks. Though I 
ventured to define "politics", I did not try to define "ethics". I did so in part 
because I did not wish to turn this discussion into an argument about definitions at 
the expense of substance. 
Trying to define ethics is like trying to define life; it is impossible, but we 
are alive. Whatever the difficulties of defining ethics, we do act ethically and we 
do value ethical conduct. The most eloquent testimony to this fact is the kind of 
rationalisations put upon unethical acts to justify them. For the moment it suffices 
to say something about what ethics is not, and later to make a more positive 
statement. 
For many people the word "ethics", and even more the word "morality", 
conjures up images or puritanical self-righteousness of the order of New South 
Wales Parliamentarian extraordinaire Fred Nile. Such stereotypes are fuelled by 
such pronouncements as were made by former United States President Ronald 
Reagan, who opined that his was an administration of a high moral standard, as a 
former premier of Queensland might have said on occasion. At the time Reagan 
made that claim, more than one hundred senior officials of his administration, who 
had been appointed on his authority, were facing serious charges of illegal or 
unethical conduct. What President Reagan must have had in mind when he made 
that statement, was that his was an administration which, for example, opposed 
abortion.i6 Similarly, a tabloid headline on our declining moral standards almost 
surely heralds another diatribe on homosexuality, dmgs, or divorce. It is unlikely 
to signal an account of corporate malfeasance, official nonfeasance, sexism, or the 
like. 
When we hear the words "ethics" and "morality" we tend to think of one 
particular moral point of view, conflate that to the whole of morality, and react to 
that, negatively.!? Larger, more encompassing notions of ethics and morality are 
consequently pre-empted: 
1. Ethics is not mainly concerned with sex, even if we are. The ethics of sexual 
practices are subject to the general considerations that apply to all practices 
and decisions, namely, pmdence, rationality, candour, sincerity, honesty, to 
name but a few. 
2. Ethics is not an ideal system apart from reality. Ethics to be ethics must be 
rooted in our ethos, in us. Ethical injunctions are generalisations about our 
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intentions and arrangements. The search for justice through the courts is 
one example of trying to put flesh on the bones of the ethics of justice. 
When we discover that our pracfices do not measure up to the standards we 
accept, it is time to consider changing either the practices or the standards. 
Those who rationalise their illegal or unethical acfions do neither. They 
pay lip service to the standards while abusing them. This is the tribute that 
vice pays to virtue. 
3. Ethics is not limited to religion. There is virtue beyond religion, just as 
there is vice within religion. By the same token, as we have seen above, 
ethics is not exhausted by the legal. What is legal may be unethical; what is 
ethical may be illegal. If these preliminaries suffice for the moment, a more 
positive statement about ethics will be made later. 
In the complexity of modern government, operating under daily pressure, 
the problem is that ethically good people will not always make ethically good 
decisions. This contention is best understood by an analogy. A technically 
competent team of engineers will not necessarily make technically competent 
decisions. To make technically competent decisions, team members must 
consciously and systematically follow a strategy that brings to bear their expertise 
to its best advantage. The same follows for the ethical aspects of decision making. 
Decision-makers must self-consciously and systematically consider the ethical 
aspects of their decisions by following a strategy that highlights these aspects and 
forces attention to them. 
It is partly for this reason that ethics is increasingly taught in Master of 
Business Administration programs, as well as in Master of Public Policy programs, 
as well as in executive development units. The aim of this instmction is not to 
teach people how to be ethical, but to encourage them to take stock of their ethics 
and to explore ways for ethics to be built into the management stmcture of an 
organisation on the assumption that good ethics is good business. In this important 
sense, ethics can be taught. 
This instmction may seem a momentary fashion to some. Such sceptics will 
suppose that ethics cannot be taught. After all, it is nothing but common sense and 
the integrity that we learn at the parental knee, if anywhere. 
It is instmctive to recall that exactly such scepticism greeted the earliest 
attempts to make business management into a profession. Through the nineteenth 
century, businesses were mn by individuals who were unselfconscious of their 
actions. It was only at the turn of the century that an effort was made to analyse 
management and to distil its components. Business schools emerged to document 
examples of successful and unsuccessful management. In time, the case study 
method evolved to allow for the development of the experiences of the 
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participants. Sceptics scoffed at these schools, claiming that business was just 
common sense and get-up-and-go, which some people had and others did not. 
Each time new subjects were introduced into business schools, these 
sceptics derided them. So, for example, when accounting was introduced, there 
were those who scorned it. Book-keeping, after all, was a simple matter of carefiil 
record keeping and good arithmetic. When industrial relations came along, h was 
greeted in much the same way. The same goes for advertising, strategic planning, 
and executive health and stress management and all the other courses that are now 
standard fare in business schools.!8 
The same problem bedevils schools of public affairs where public policy 
and administration are taught. There is still a substantial body of opinion 
according to which effective public service requires nothing more than common 
sense. As one observer has noted: 
One of the difficult problems of schools of public affairs is to overcome the 
old fashioned belief - still held by many otherwise sophisticated people -
that the skills of management are simply the applicafion of "common sense" 
by any intelligent and broadly educated person to the management 
problems which are presented to him. It is demonstrable that many 
intelligent and broadly educated people who are generally credited with a 
good deal of "common sense" make very poor managers. The skills of 
effective management require a good deal of uncommon sense and 
uncommon knowledge.i9 
This same scepticism no doubt applies even more to teaching ethics either 
in degree programs or in executive development courses. Yet it is clear that ethics 
is necessary and that in the sense outlined above, ethics can be taught. 
The world is made of words. What we understand of the world, what we 
learn of the world, what we accomplish in the world - these are alone made real in 
words. Words are much more than bullets, in Bill Hayden's memorable quip. 
Words are the very stuff of the world. Ethics is one of the languages of the worid. 
To be ethical we must use that language. If we do not, we risk losing it. Like 
learning effectively to use any language from French to Basic, learning to speak 
ethics takes time and practice. 
Administrative Ethics 
Eariier, I referred to the importance of personnel practices in the public service. It 
has been argued that "there are ... few men who can for any great length of time 
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enjoy office and power without being more or less under the influence of feelings 
unfavourable to the discharge of their public duties." 
The same speaker went on to say that those who are secure in office are apt 
to look upon the public interest with indifference and tolerate conduct which an 
outsider would not countenance. In such a situation, public office has become a 
species of property rather than a public tmst. He then declaimed: "The duties of 
public officers are or at least admit of being made, so plain and simple that men of 
intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their performance and I can not but 
believe that more is lost by the long continuance of men in office than is generally 
to be gained by their experience." 
He then went on to propose that all in government employment be limited 
to four years in office. The result would be a rotation of public officials. Rotation 
was deemed consistent with the democratic principles of government in that it 
allowed all citizens to hope for the opportunity to have a turn in public office. This 
experience, it was also argued, would be a school of citizenship which would bring 
out the best in each of us. 
Moreover, such rotation of office was argued to be consistent with 
democracy in another way. The fbced tenure of office of officials meant that any 
new regime would have the opportunity to appoint its own choices to any and all 
offices. In this way, the incoming government could give expression to its electoral 
mandate by staffing the government with those committed to its program. 
Though these arguments may sound familiar, they are not contemporary. 
Rather they come from the United States in 1829, from President Andrew 
Jackson's explanation of his preference for the rotation of government offices.20 It 
was a system that Jeremy Bentham praised.21 Six years after Jackson's system had 
been introduced, Tocqueville wrote of the attentive and considerate nature of 
American public officials.22 
Rotation in office was soon known by another name, the spoils system. As 
one of its defenders put it: "to the victor goes the spoils". That is, to the electoral 
victor goes the spoils of office. By 1867, the battle opened to reform the public 
service again, this time by making examinations the basis for recmitment.23 This 
battle went on for two decades. To those who had grown up in it, the patronage 
system seemed perfectly natural. To those who were aware of the cormption it 
produced, it was anathema. 
Faltering steps were made at reform, but no progress was made until the 
passage of the Pendleton Act 1883. Only after President John Garfield had been 
assassinated by a disappointed office seeker, was it possible to secure bi-partisan 
agreement that a change was necessary. The Pendleton Act was the first step in 
securing for the United States, a public service marked by merit recmitment, 
tenure, salaried, provided with pensions, and promoted on seniority. The purpose 
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of these reforms was moral reform - to end cormpfion. As an added benefit, such 
changes were also thought to effect a more efficient discharge of the public 
business.24 
Passage of the legislation alone did not signal success. It allowed positions 
to be classified as public service. Those unclassified remained within the gift of the 
President. Over the next two generafions, the stmggle went on to increase the 
number of classified positions. Characteristically, incumbent governments strove 
to expand classification near the end of their term to secure the employment of 
those whom they had appointed. Opponents who hoped to win the forthcoming 
presidential elections mobilised resistance to expansion in Congress. One key 
factor in the successful expansion of classification, was the emergence of civil 
service reform associations throughout the country. These associations agitated 
tirelessly for reform, acting as much like schools of citizenship as government 
service was supposed to have done. Given that the Australian Constitution is a 
hybrid grown partly from American institutions, the American experience is 
resonant. 
That the professional public service cannot be an effective barrier to 
corruption, seems to be the conclusion of the Queensland experience. Professional 
competence alone is not enough to equip public servants to defend the public 
interest. I make this remark without intending to cast doubt on the personal 
probity of any member of the Queensland Public Service. At the same time, I 
cannot help but suppose that many members of the public service were well aware 
of the misdeeds chronicled in the Fitzgerald Report. Many hundreds, even 
thousands of public servants work for and with the police for a start. Others were 
aware of the kinds of conduct that Donald Frederick Lane revealed. These people 
bore the heavy ethical office of witness to the less than ethical acts of others, often 
their superiors. 
I have also argued with participants in degree programs and executive 
development training modules about the traditional conditions of employment for 
public servants. I have contended that these conditions of employment were 
intended to secure an ethical as well as a professionally competent servicers 
Invariably my interlocutors plead that these conditions of employment are not 
sufficient to allow them to withstand their political masters, even on the most 
serious of issues. Such an attitude is hardly surprising when one considers that 
even the Guidelines on Official Conduct of the Commonwealth Public Service 
offers a Faustian bargain: allowing public servants to participate in partisan 
politics and in return requiring their absolute commitment to the hierarchy, 
neglecting to mention even in passing, the public interest. 
In the Fitzgerald Report it is said that: "There is a natural human 
inclination for a subordinate to seek to give effect to the wishes of a superior." 
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Coupled with this fact, is a system in which Executive government has control over 
the careers of public officials. The result is a public service that is compliant.26 
If the traditional conditions of employment are insufficient, perhaps then it 
is time to do away with them. At this suggestion, my interlocutors usually demur. 
They advocate retention of these conditions of employment, but the grounds for 
retention are not made clear. At best, they might be that some conditions of 
employment secure competence. Selection by examination, for example, meets 
this need. But as the American survey data cited above show, the public wants 
more than competence from public officials. 
The public expects administrative ethics of a high order. The term 
"administrative ethics" refers to the ethical issues that occur within administration 
where discretion occurs.2? The development of a professional career public service 
was for the purpose of creating the condition in which civil servants could 
discharge their duties within the bounds of ethics. The conditions of employment 
that marked that professional development included merit selection and 
promotion, tenure, payment of a fixed salary, and superannuation. These 
conditions of employment were designed with the aim of insulating public servants 
from their political masters such as to allow for their uncorrupted service. The aim 
was to allow public servants to safeguard the public interest. 
In the package of developments called the new public management, one 
implication is that the traditional conditions of employment have lost their 
usefulness at least at the higher reaches of the public service. Long gone are the 
days when it was not permitted by convention for a minister to appoint the 
permanent head of the department.28 
What potential does the new public management hold for ethics in 
government? Contract employment at senior positions is intended to provide for 
flexibility in employment. It may also put those employed on contract in the 
position to offer more independent advice since they will not be risking an 
otherwise tenured and secure employment if they fall out of favour. On the other 
hand, those on contract employment may find that the incentives are even greater 
to win favour with those who hold the sway, in the hope of securing a renewal of 
contract. Certainly, experience to date with the employment of consultants by 
government does not indicate any general willingness on the part of incumbent 
governments to seek uncongenial advice or for it to be given. A more dubious 
practice is the New South Wales Government's recent notice that it will assist 
senior managers employed on contracts in minimising their tax obligation. This 
hardly seems a blow for public ethics in a time when the beleaguered tax system29 
is confronted by public indifference. 
In the tradifional public service, many public servants saw themselves as 
servants of the public interest that transcends the partisan conflicts of the day. 
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And, no doubt, a good many of them were. After long periods of mle by one party, 
which is, by the way, the norm in democrafic political systems, the public service 
has always begun to take on the hue of the dominant party. New governments 
have correspondingly been fmstrated by the perceived reluctance of the existing 
bureaucracy to embrace a new agenda. Each party has always blamed its 
predecessors and opponents for stacking the public service to create this situation. 
More recently it has been argued that the public system itself creates the problem, 
in that it is primarily concerned with its own stake rather than in defending the 
public interest. On this view, claims to defending the public interest are nothing 
more than subterfuges which an astute polifician will have to see through, treating 
the public service like any other interest group in the lobbying process.s" 
Once the privileged position of the public service as defenders of the public 
interest is stripped, that title can pass only to the parliament. In an age when 
Executive government dominates parliament, the claim to sovereignty is acquired 
by the parliamentary leadership. The form of the argument is usually to fasten on 
to the two undeniable facts that bureaucrats do participate in government, as I 
argued above, regarding discretion, and that they are unelected. Elecfion confers 
the only title of legitimacy in a democratic polity, or so it is assumed. (Such 
arguments spend little attention either on royal representatives or judges who 
enjoy no such status.) From this argument it is deduced that bureaucrats should 
conform themselves to the wishes of the government of the day. 
What this argument fails to appreciate is, that no one elects the government 
of the day. In fact, what is elected is parliament. Unfortunately, over the years, 
the Executive in most parliamentary systems has established a dominance over 
parliament that would be the envy of any American president. As the Australian 
Constitution is a hybrid of Washington and Westminster, so is our polifical culture, 
for we now have presidential-style elections joined to a parliamentary system with 
one result being that parliament is almost completely excluded from the governing 
process. Australian parliaments do not control their own agendas, they do not set 
their own budgets, and most ministers regard their parliamentary dufies with the 
distaste that most university lecturers regard their teaching - it is at best a duty to 
be done but not one's own work. Consequently, one of the chief values of the 
parliamentary system that ministers and the government of the day sit in the 
parliament and are accountable to it, has been lost. Those who have had the 
pleasure of sitting through some parliamentary debate or question time in any 
Australian capital city will appreciate these observations. 
All members of parliament are elected, so if election is the sign of 
sovereignty, then it is parliament as a whole that is sovereign and not merely that 
portion of it that constitutes the government of the day. If opposition 
parliamentarians could interest themselves in the business of the government of 
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the day more and spend less time waiting for the great day when it is their turn to 
govern, improvements might be wrought. If parliamentarians on the treasury 
benches interested themselves more in the business of government and less in 
waiting for the great day when the chance to become a minister comes, more 
improvements could result. As long as ministers treat parliament with contempt 
there will be a leadership vacuum for the public service, for if their ministers treat 
the People's House with contempt, will not public servants follow suit? 
One tonic to this erosion of Parliament is the development of estimates and 
public accounts committees. The role of these committees in probing the 
administration of policy, assessing the appropriateness of expenditures, offers 
some hope for parliamentary resurgence.3! 
Of course, these committees pose serious difficulties for the public servants 
called to testify before them. It is their role to explain and defend the government 
of the day in detail, often on highly unfavourable terms. The inevitable result of 
this will be to place the political spotlight on individual public servants in a way 
that has never occurred before in this country. 
Conclusion 
Eariier, I cited Aristotle's dictum that we learn to be ethical in three ways: we are 
born good, we learn to become good, and we are taught to be good. These three 
paths to ethics correspond to the three ways in which we have tried to combat 
cormption. The three conventional approaches to cormption are; one, to identify 
susceptible individuals; two, to arrange institutional incentives; and three, to 
promote public attitudes. 
While we may agree with Aristotle that some people are born good, it does 
not follow that some people are born bad. To assume that cormption is produced 
only by "rotten apples" is, as the Fitzgerald Report says, much too simple.32 There 
may certainly be bad apples who do unethical things, but the kinds of problems 
revealed by the Fitzgerald Report, the Costigan Report, the current investigations 
of the ICAC in New South Wales, and a host of other investigations goes well 
beyond that explanation. Reviewing this litany is one reason why I do not regard 
Queensland as exceptional, but rather as a caricature of general Australian 
practice. Australians pride themselves on being cynical about government, the 
Fitzgerald Report says.33 But Australians are, in fact, quite tolerant of official 
misconduct and misdeeds, and that toleration contributes to the perpetuation of 
such malfeasance. This toleration may spring from a deeper feature of the 
Australian political culture and that is the spirit of etatism of preferring 
government action to private acfion in some many spheres of life.34 Malfeasance is 
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accepted as the price of government intervention. If government intervention was 
once regarded as the lesser evil, it no longer is. 
Obviously screening out individuals who are prone to go bad, would be 
highly desirable if it were possible. But even if it were possible and it were done, I 
would still expect the same problems to remain. 
Far more significant to cormption and the toleration of cormption that 
makes it possible, are institutional incentives and public attitudes. Public attitudes 
shape the habits of mind that determine most of what we do and shape the 
expectations of those who become public servants. 
Ministers must make it a priority to install insfitufional incentives for 
ethical conduct. Here is a place where public enterprise might well learn from 
private enterprise. Around the world many large corporations have appointed 
angel's advocates to the board of directors charged with the task of defending the 
public interest, acting like a corporate conscience whenever there is a danger of a 
slip. Many corporations have also devoted considerable resources to staff training 
to cope with demanding jobs. One gets the impression that the drive to let 
managers manage in the Commonwealth Public Service has not been accompanied 
by any systematic effort to train those now called managers to do the myriad of 
tasks that have now fallen to them. The result is that one is tempted to draw the 
cynical conclusion that the exercise has consisted mainly of the effort to push 
responsibility down the chain of command. 
Most important of all is the role of public opinion in shaping a political 
culture in which unethical conduct is unacceptable. For those concerned about the 
health of the Australian political culture, the 1983 Intemational Values Survey 
offered precious little solace. In the Australian sample, less than half of the 
respondents were prepared to express confidence in either the Commonwealth 
Parliament or the Commonwealth Public Service. This was an extremely carefully 
conducted survey aimed at underlying attitudes and not ephemeral responses to 
issues of the day. 
It is hardly surprising that such measures of legitimacy as admitted 
confidence in the principal organs of government are so low. During the Costigan 
Royal Commission, the Australian Tax Office admitted that it had not bothered to 
pursue the Painters and Dockers Union out of fear of reprisals, a rather breath-
taking example of administrative discretion that hardly seems ethical.35 The 
inability of various branches of government to come to terms with the bottom of 
the harbour schemes was another blow to public confidence. 
If we want good government, we have to mobilise the community for it in 
the way that environmentalists have mobilised community opinion. We need good 
government associations to publicise and galvanise attention. 
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With the current drive to make government operate like business, a number 
of possibilities are opened. We may end up with a public service ethics of the 
bottom line. As managers manage, all that will count is the profit accmed; the 
means used will be neglected, at least until the polifical pressure mounts. In the 
course of many of these arguments, I have heard it said that putting government 
upon a business footing will clarify its operations. Why is this? Because in 
business, the market determines success and failure. And it is easy to see if a firm 
is succeeding or failing. Those who make such arguments obviously did not spend 
much time on the economics of the firm. A cursory glance at the research firms 
shows that there are no simple measures of success or failure. Dividends, rates of 
return on investment, profit, market share, all of these and more are used to assess 
businesses. There is no simple measure of success in business. But the belief that 
there is now seems contagious in government with what results we have to wait and 
see. 
While on the subject of similarities and differences between government 
and business, another point needs to be made. Advocates of making government 
mn like business usually cite unusual individuals like Lee lacocca, who have never 
served in government.36 They do not cite individuals like Donald Regan who did, 
and who, despite his enormous success in business, was a frustrated failure in 
government in his own telling.3? These same people recoiled in horror when John 
Brown, as Minister of Tourism, ignored the advice and constraints of his 
subordinates in the manner that one can imagine our business heroes doing.38 
When business leaders who have served in government compare their 
government experience with their business experience, they say that public 
management is more difficult than private management. Consider the reflections 
of the Americans, George Schultz, Donald Rumsfield, Michael Blumenthal, Roy 
Ash, Lyman Hamilton, and George Romeny.39 
The Fitzgerald Report's account of its dealing with banks does not inspire 
confidence in the determination of central social institutions that operate under an 
implicit social contract to do anything to check the growth of corruption.4o The 
Australian Bankers Association refused to become involved as a professional 
association. It deflected attention on to individual banks. Individual banks in turn 
sought an excuse for not cooperating and when finally left with no alternative 
pushed responsibility both for cooperating and for accepting the responsibility for 
anything uncovered down the hierarchy to local managers, individuals who were 
not trained in dealing with suspect deposits and who may not have been confident 
of support from the higher echelons had they brought such transactions to notice. 
Perhaps O.P. Dwivedi is right. To have an administrative ethic it is 
necessary to have an administrative theology. In his view, such a theology would 
consist of four testaments. "The first and foremost condition of a public 
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bureaucracy in a democracy ought to be that public servants view the 
governmental process as a moral endeavour." 
The second is that public servants resolve to serve all citizens. (Though 
Dwivedi says citizens, I do not suppose he means that term to exclude long term 
resident aliens, for, as John Rohr has pointed out, these people are usually 
accorded most of the rights and privileges of citizenship.)'" 
Third, public servants must exhibit a personal commitment to serve society. 
And to this I would add, in a moment of evangelical fervour, the requirement that 
public servants show some knowledge of the Constitution and the nature and 
purpose of government rather in the way that cameralism in middle Europe in the 
eighteenth century required of state servants. 
Fourth, that in a conflict between democratic values and the government of 
the day that the public servant must prefer the democratic values. While I am not 
sure what such a preference would require in particular cases, I will close with a 
suggestion. The Royal Australian Institute of Public Administration (RAIPA) 
might consider the creation of the Vivian Creighton Awards to be awarded 
periodically to the public servant who has done the most to preserve the public 
interest. Since RAIPA is organised federally, this award would be best 
inaugurated in Queensland, named as it is, after a Queensland public servant from 
an earlier epoch who tried to serve the public interest to his considerable personal 
cost. 
In conclusion, if the traditional conditions of employment of the public 
service have failed to secure such an administrative theology, the quesfion now is 
whether the conditions of employment bmited by the new public management will 
do so. 
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Freedom of Information: How 
Queensland Could Do Better than the 
Commonwealth, Victorian and New 
South Wales FOI Schemes 
Paul Chadwick 
In 1822, United States President James Madison said: 'Popular govemment, without 
popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce, or a 
tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance, and a people who 
mean to be their own govemors must arm themselves with the power knowledge 
gives. "I 
In 1978, Malcolm Fraser declared that "too much secrecy inhibits people's 
capacity to judge the govemment's performance''.^ 
In 1982, John Cain added that "when people are informed about govemment 
policies, they are more likely to become involved in policy making and in govemment 
itself'.i 
And in 1989 Fitzgerald chimed in, "the ultimate check on public 
maladministration is public opinion, which can only be tmly effective if there are 
stmctures and systems designed to ensure that it is property informed".* 
Aims of Freedom of Information 
One of the stmctures Fitzgerald recommends to promote an informed 
public is a Freedom of Information Act (FOI). 
Expression in the Australian context of the aims of FOI has been generally: 
to make more accessible the processes of government to the public affected 
by its actions; 
to improve the accountability of government to the electorate; 
to improve participation in government by the public. 
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These aims are pursued by a legislative scheme which: 
1. Compels government agencies to publish information, including 
descripfions of their functions and powers, lists of reports held, and the 
internal guidelines used to administer published statutes (so-called "secret 
law"). 
This part of FOI schemes has been credited with improving the records of 
management of agencies, and would have relevance for Fitzgerald's 
discussion of police information systems.s 
2. Extends to every person a right to seek access to unpublished documents, 
subject only to exceptions and exemptions necessary to protect essential 
public and private interests. "Document" is broadly defined to include, for 
instance, maps, graphs, computer data and photographs. As may be 
expected, the hottest area of debate is the definition of exactly what 
"excepfions and exemptions" are necessary, both in the abstract and in 
particular circumstances. 
3. Grants a right to seek amendment to one's personal file where it is 
incorrect, out-of-date or misleading. Where an applicant fails to have a 
record amended, he or she may nevertheless insist that a notation be added 
to the file explaining his or her claim. 
Justiflcation for FOI 
Proponents of FOI have used three main arguments in support of the reform. 
First, they point to the divergence of the modern practice of government from the 
theory of the Westminster model. The increased power of the executive and the 
rigidity of the party system have reduced the capacity of parliament to be an 
adequate fomm in which the executive may be held accountable. The sheer size 
and complexity of government mean that ministers cannot be responsible to 
parliament in a realistic sense.6 
Secondly, FOI advocates recognise the need to improve avenues for public 
participafion in government. As Fitzgerald observed: "No Government will have 
all the ideas, expertise and insight on a particular topic"? 
Participation requires not just a willingness by government to consider the 
views of outsiders. It requires that the information gathered by government on 
given issues be made available before decisions are made by government on the 
basis of it. Only when outsiders share the basic data which is influencing 
government's mind, can they make informed and relevant comment. My favourite 
summary of this FOI principle comes from am American commentator who called 
it the need to let the public in on the take-offs as well as the crash landings. 
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The third justification, and this relates to the right of access and of 
amendment to one's personal file, is that the growth of data held by government 
about each of us, combined with technological developments, requires that 
individuals have the ability to check such data, ensure accuracy and, if necessary, 
challenge and have it corrected or at least notated. 
To Fitzgerald's explicit arguments for freedom of information, we can add 
findings which implicitly support the first argument of proponents, namely, that the 
Westminster model does not work as it should. Already lacking an upper house, 
Queensland's Parliament was dominated by the Executive, and on top of that. 
Cabinet did much detailed administrative decision-making. "Discussion within 
Parliament has been stifled by the wide use of the subjudice convention in relation 
to current litigation",* said Fitzgerald, and "defamation writs have been used to 
silence critics of public administration outside Parliament."9 
Development of FOI Laws in Australia 
Commonwealth 
In the 1972 election campaign Gough Whitlam promised a freedom of information 
act along the lines of the American Act of 1966.io His Cabinet referred it to the 
then Attorney-General, Lionel Murphy, and the proposal fell into the hands of an 
interdepartmental committee where it languished. 
In 1976, a member of the Coombs Royal Commission into Australian 
Government Administration, Paul Munro, gave FOI a boost by including a draft 
bill in a minority report. The new Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser, adopted FOI 
and another interdepartmental committee reported, with predictable lack of 
enthusiasm. 
The first bill reached Parliament in 1978 and excited enough controversy to 
ensure it the usual fate of such legislafion: referral to a committee. In the Senate 
Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, under the enthusiastic 
guidance of the late Liberal Senator Alan Missen and Labor Senator Gareth 
Evans, among others, much valuable research was undertaken and the revised 
legislation which emerged sfill represents in some ways, the highwater mark of FOI 
schemes in Australia. The Committee's deliberations were affected by the fact 
that the High Court at the same time made its landmark decision in Sankey v. 
Whitlam, narrowing significantly the scope for governments to withhold 
information under a claim of Crown privilege and not have such claims reviewed." 
The Fraser Government and the senior bureaucracy balked at 
implementing all the Committee's proposals; the Labor Opposifion promised still 
greater openness if it were to be elected; the legislation was finally passed in 
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Febmary 1982. Further bureaucratic stalling delayed its operation until 1 
December 1982. 
In 1983, the new Hawke Government, with Senator Evans now Attorney-
General, implemented only some of Labor's long-promised improvements. In 
1985, in a climate of increasing hostility towards FOI within government, an 
attempt to increase by regulation, the fees for access by up to 150 per cent was 
disallowed in the Senate after Alan Missen organised resistance. FOI remained 
relatively unknown among the general public and surprisingly neglected by the 
media - with honourable exceptions such as the Canberra Times and Melbourne 
Age. In 1986, the Commonwealth Government succeeded in increasing fees 
substantially by designating them a budget measure, which the Opposition had 
pledged not to block in the Senate. 
In 1987, the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs completed its first review of the operation of FOI.12 Although some of its 
recommendations would improve the scheme if enacted, the report on the whole 
was disappointing, in that the committee did not apparently see itself as one of the 
few counterweights to the strong push against FOI from the Executive. 
Debate about FOI in the Commonwealth sphere has been skewed by a 
rather obsessive concentration on costs, a matter dealt with below. Costs have 
been the preoccupafion of the bureaucracy and some ministers, all of whom have 
cause to downplay the positives of the legislation. 
The positives may outweigh the costs. As one submission to the Senate 
committee observed: "It is not unlikely ... that FOI pays for itself many times over 
in that it prevents wrong decisions being made by agencies."i3 
The Senate Committee summarised the benefits of FOI, of which two 
examples give an indicafion both of its potential to offset its cost, and to irritate the 
Executive: 
1. The Australian Taxation Office informed the committee: "Perhaps the 
greatest benefit flowing from the impact of the FOI legislation on the 
operations of the Australian Taxation Office has been the introduction of 
the taxation mling system. The benefits of this system have accmed to 
taxpayers and their advisers, to commercial publishing houses and to 
Taxafion Office personnel...[It] has led to greater efficiencies in the 
Taxation Office and has provided the office with a better public image.-!4 
2. When the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence examined the 
Defence Department's aborted plan to acquire land for army training 
purposes in the Bathurst-Orange region in 1986, it reported that: 
'Throughout the inquiry, material obtained from the Department under the 
Freedom Of Information (FOI) Act by interest groups opposing the 
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proposals repeatedly contradicted or undermined evidence presented to the 
Committee by Departmental witnesses.'is 
Victoria 
The Freedom of Information Aci was passed by the Cain Government in December 
1982 and has operated from 5 July 1983. In several respects more liberal than the 
Commonwealth legislation, the Victorian statute has provoked significant hostility 
from the Cain Government. 
New South Wales 
The Greiner Government passed a Freedom of Information Act less liberal than 
Victoria's in cmcial respects such as appeals. In some respects, it is better than 
Victoria's; for instance, local government is partially covered by the legislation. It 
began operafing in 1989; it is too early to chart trends. 
Western Australia 
A cautious approach by the Burke then Dowding governments produced no 
legislation. The Liberal Opposifion leader released a private member's bill based 
on the Victorian Act on 20 September 1989. 
South Australia 
The public stance is to watch Victoria's experience. There is no legislation yet. 
Tasmania 
Commitment to FOI is a clause in Labor's 1989 election policy which was written 
into the Green-Labor Accord under which the Field government attained power 
with support of five Green independents. However, lack of government initiative 
has prompted the Greens to prepare their own bill which is yet to be released. 
Queensland 
Successive coalition and National Party governments have been hosfile to FOI, not 
merely rejecting it for the State, but threatening to withdraw cooperation from 
various Commonwealth government agencies if documents supplied by 
Queensland or relating to Queensland, were to be disclosed under the 
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Commonwealth Freedom of Information Act. When the Senate Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs conducted its first review of FOI in 
operation, the only recommendation for repeal of the legislation came from the 
then Queensland government. The lone dissenter on the Committee to many of its 
recommended improvements to the FOI scheme, was the Queensland Senator, 
John Stone, who in earlier years as Secretary to Treasury was a fierce critic of FOI. 
The Queensland Labor Party under Wayne Goss has committed itself to 
implementing Fitzgerald's recommendations, among them FOI. But there is a lot 
of room for a government to move. Fitzgerald is surprisingly vague about the type 
of FOI scheme he favours. He recommends that the Electoral and Administrative 
Review Commission (EARC) consider as a matter of priority, the "need for FOI 
legislation". 16 Recommendation A. 11 a. (i) and (ii) require EARC to consider and 
make recommendations for electoral and administrative reform, including 
preparation and enactment of legislation on FOI and administrative appeals. 
The lack of detail is surprising because FOI has arguably the greatest 
potential of all the proposed reforms to improve the situation described. It 
transforms a presumption of secrecy into one of openness, grants a legally 
enforceable right of access to every person, and can remove from the hands of the 
executive and give to the judiciary, the ultimate power to decide whether 
documents will be released. A consistent theme of the Report is that many ills can 
be traced to secrecy, tight control of information and its manipulation, and lack of 
outiets for debate. 
Experience has shown that the details of FOI schemes may dilute what are 
regarded as basic reforms. For example, under the Commonwealth Freedom of 
Information Act, in certain circumstances, the final say on disclosure still lies with 
the minister. 
Recommendation A.3 says, "specialist consultants" should be used by 
EARC in preparing its proposals. In the FOI context, this is an important 
recommendation because it should ensure that the FOI debate is not distorted 
from the outset. The record of the Commonwealth bureaucracy in the preparation 
and, with exceptions, the administration of FOI does not inspire confidence that 
the eventual FOI scheme for Queensland would be adequate if advice about its 
formulafion were to be sought exclusively from the public service. The public 
service is one of the targets for changes intended by FOI, and some of those 
changes, especially increased accountability, are discomforting. The natural 
response of the bureaucracy, particularly at senior levels, is hostile or, at best, 
wary. Outside consultants should be able to provide advice which will act as a 
counterweight to advice from the public service about FOI. 
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A Note About Timing 
One of the tmisms of FOI is that it is a cause for oppositions, not governments. 
When Gareth Evans became Attorney-General in 1983, he said he would have to 
convince his Hawke Cabinet colleagues of the merits of his promised strengthening 
of FOI quickly, before they developed their own secrets. (In several key areas he 
failed, and the amendments were diluted.) 
Whitlam's advocacy of FOI came after Labor had been in Opposifion for 
twenty three years. The Victorian Premier, John Cain, prepared his FOI 
legislation during the final stages of Labor's long period in opposition. Twenty 
seven years of fmstration at being substantially shut out of government 
information flows acted as a kind of spur to Cain, the new Premier and Attorney-
General, his ministers and their staffs. They began the FOI reform process at one 
of the first Cabinet meetings after Cain's elecfion in April 1982 and the Act was 
passed nine months later. 
In the current climate of antipathy within the Cain government towards 
FOI, it is sobering to speculate about whether FOI would now exist in Victoria had 
its introduction been delayed and Labor had settled into the habits of power, with 
memories of being an outsider dulled and a few skeletons of its own to hide. 
The lesson here is not that expectations should be lowered but that pressure 
should be heightened. Opportunities for the enactment of sound FOI schemes, 
which require support from a government they will inevitably irritate are extremely 
rare. The post-Fitzgerald atmosphere is such an opportunity. 
The Usual Arguments Against FOI and How to Respond 
The introduction of FOI in the Commonwealth and Victorian jurisdicfions met 
predictable resistance. Three main arguments raised against the reform, which 
continue to be raised to some extent and are likely to occur in Queensland, are 
discussed below. 
Argument I - "FOI and the Westminster System are incompatible". 
The 1979 Senate Committee devoted a chapter to addressing this argument and 
concluded that: 
A great deal of the talk about the Westminster system and how it would be 
altered by freedom of information legislation has been obscure and 
misleading. To a great extent, the term "Westminster system" has been 
used as a smokescreen behind which to hide, and with which to cover up 
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existing practices of unnecessary secrecy. Very often people have alleged 
that the Westminster system is under attack by freedom of information 
legislation when what is actually under attack is their own traditional and 
convenient way of doing things, immune from public gaze and scmtiny. We 
are indeed seeking to put an end to that. 
What matters is not the inconvenience of Ministers or public 
servants, but what contributes to better government. The only feature of 
the Westminster system which cannot be in any way modified without 
fundamentally subverting that system is the need to ensure that members of 
the Executive Government are part of, and drawn from, the Legislature. 
Freedom of information legislation does not alter this one iota.i? 
It is important to recognise at the outset, that FOI is, in part, an 
acknowledgement that the Westminster model does not work well enough. It is 
intended to change it, to some extent, to match modern needs. 
In Victoria, the Premier has been engaged in a long battle to establish that 
the courts may not go behind a decision of the government to attach a conclusive 
certificate to a document which it asserts is a Cabinet document. A conclusive 
certificate is exempt from disclosure. The County and Supreme courts in Victoria, 
and the High Court, have mled against the Premier.i8 
The Victorian Parliament's Legal and Constitutional Committee, in its 
recent report, assessed the government's argument and concluded that a decision 
by the courts about the status of a document under the Freedom of Information Act 
was a legal matter properly to be determined by the courts. The Committee 
pointed out that existing government stmctures were not as simple as the classic 
Westminster model of a premier and cabinet responsible to parliament, advised by 
a neutral public service and accountable to the electorate through regular 
elections. (This understatement is still more tme of Queensland, as shown by 
Fitzgerald's analysis of the concentration of power with the Premier and Cabinet, 
the weakness of Pariiament, politicisation of the public service, and an unfair 
electoral system.) 
The Committee's chief justification for its view that court review, even of 
Cabinet documents, was proper, was the doctrine of the separation of powers. It 
pointed out that the "Westminster system describes only partially the interaction 
between key components of the Constitutional framework."!9 Under a system in 
which the legislature makes the law, the executive administers it and the courts 
interpret it according to the rule of law, any dispute under the FOI Act was a legal 
dispute properly the subject of interpretation and determination by the courts. 
The committee said "the Executive is responsible to Parliament with respect to 
formulation of government policy and its implementation. At the same time, it is 
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responsible to the courts for ensuring that its actions are taken within legal 
parameters set down by the constitution and conferred by the legislature."2o 
Such arguments can be both arcane and unnecessarily diverting. Perhaps 
the best answer to this argument, when it is raised against FOI, is to point out the 
lack of any evidence that Westminster-style government in Australia and Canada 
has been made unworkable by seven years' of FOI. 
Argument 2: "FOI imperils the quality of public service advice. Bureaucrats become 
less frank and candid and the process of govemment is harmed by their unwillingness 
to commit themselves on paper" 
Part of Fitzgerald's case is that open debate is healthy, suppression unhealthy. The 
greater the amount of information available, and the more easily it is released, the 
less significant will seem the morsels which have up till now been gleaned or 
leaked. As the London Sunday Times once observed in an editorial: "When all the 
doors are clo.sed, the smallest chink of light seems very revealing. Yet it probably 
distorts the truth more than illuminating it."2! 
Anecdotal evidence from the Victorian Public Service suggests that some 
ministerial staff and bureaucrats have sometimes avoided the creation of 
documents that might be damaging to themselves or the government. They prefer 
instead, either to rely on oral decision-making and the memories of participants or 
to write potentially controversial parts of documents on yellow sticky-backed 
notepaper, so that such material might be peeled from a document if it becomes 
the subject of a Freedom of Information Act request. The extent of such evasion 
tactics is impossible to quantify or to eliminate. There will always be evasion, 
particularly in the eariy years of FOI, when the old regime of automatic secrecy 
has yet to be broken down. It was Peter Wilenski, former head of the 
Commonwealth Public Service Board, now Australia's ambassador to the United 
Nations, who once observed that "in Australia we tend to get the backlash before 
the reform." 
In Queensland, it should not be a persuasive argument that government 
"unwillingness to write things down" is a reason for not having FOI. The problem 
already exists. Fitzgerald explains how, during his investigation of the Cabinet 
decision to provide public funding for ministers' defamation actions, "search of 
Cabinet records has failed to reveal any written submission or any formal record 
which explains the basis for the adoption of such a policy."22 
The prospect that some bureaucrats will try to evade FOI cannot be a 
sound basis for rejecting FOI. That would be akin to repealing parts of the 
taxation law because some people try to evade or avoid them. The cry that the 
bureaucracy will come to a standstill and that officials will be driven by fear of FOI 
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to abandon the written word is plainly unrealistic. Government cannot work 
unless details are committed to paper. Words and memories are inevitably used 
for some highly sensitive matters (just as they always have been), but for the bulk 
of public service work a failure to keep adequate files is bad management and self-
defeating. Key personnel move on to other positions and their successors must 
have records. Lapses of memory or absence of documentation can breed suspicion 
more damaging than the material originally omitted from a document. 
When it is realised that the exemptions in FOI work well in keeping secret 
that which ought properly to be withheld (and more besides, given the breadth of 
the exemptions and the caution shown by appeal bodies), the tendency to be more 
circumspect, or to be less frank and candid, or deliberately to falsify records, will 
diminish. 
Public service resistance to FOI must be expected, not mainly because the 
bureaucracy has something to fear, but for the rather banal reason that FOI does 
something bureaucracies tend to dislike. In Justice Michael Kirby's words, it 
"upsets settled ways of doing things". Fitzgerald touches on this aspect when he 
says: "People who seek to enter the walls of the forbidden city, where politicians 
and bureaucrats live in harmonious control, are resented and treated as 
impertinent outsiders." The context in which Fitzgerald made this comment is of 
particular relevance to the issue of public service reaction to FOI. Fitzgerald was 
discussing the adverse effect on the quality of public service advice of having the 
same government in power for many years. He suggests the process becomes 
incestuous and advice to government is not independent or impartial, but tends to 
be tailored to fit predetermined policies.23 
The need for ventilation of such advice through FOI is obvious. But it is 
equally arguable that if a long-serving opposition were to be elected, with its 
unavoidably inexperienced minister, inevitably dependent on public service advice, 
FOI would also have a vital role in exposing that advice to wide and independent 
scmtiny. 
Disclosure of public service advice is arguably a force for better public 
administration, not worse. Annual reports have repeatedly noted that agencies 
have found an improvement in both the quality and expression of advice since FOI 
was introduced because bureaucrats know that now their advice might one day be 
disclosed, perhaps to the subject affected by it. 
Justice Mason (later Chief Justice) found in Sankey v. Whitlam, referred to 
above, that the risk that premature disclosure of internal documents would result 
in want of candour in future, was so slight that it may be ignored. Instead, he 
thought potential disclosure would deter "advice which is specious or expedient." 
After Sankey v. Whitlam, thought the Federal Court in one FOI case, it is doubtful 
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that the argument that "candour may be tempered with a concern for appearances" 
any longer carries weight as a basis for withholding.24 
The blunt argument against secrecy based on the claim that potenfial 
disclosure will make public servants become less frank or candid, is that they are 
paid to provide frank and candid advice and the advent of FOI will not change 
that. If it is poor advice, it ought to be disclosed so that standards can be improved 
and action based on it averted. 
If it is good advice it will withstand scmfiny. 
Argument 3: "FOI costs govemment too much". 
One of the misleading assumptions which has become entrenched in FOI debate in 
Australia, is that FOI is unreasonably expensive for government to mn. Naturally, 
the reasonableness of expense will be in the eye of the beholder. The following 
table shows the cost to the Commonwealth and Victorian governments. 
Table 1 : Cost to government of FOI ($) 
82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87 87-88 
Federal 
Total 7.5m 15.1m 16.5m 15.7m 13.3m 11.5m 
Average cost per 
request 1323 785 496 430 446 419 
Victoria 
Totals - 2.7m 2.3m 2.9m n/a n/a 
The Victorian estimates are extremely vague and may be understatements. 
The Public Service Board, in the annual report on FOI has worried aloud about 
the imprecise methods of calculating the cost and has recommended in the last 
three successive years that a better system be considered. None has been devised, 
yet the alleged cost burden is a common complaint from government about FOI. 
The reality is that no one knows how much FOI costs the Victorian 
Government, nor what proportion of these costs would be incurred anyway as part 
of non-FOI information and public relations practices, nor how much any costs are 
offset by the improvements in efficiency attributed to FOI. 
The reliability of government claims that Commonwealth FOI costs too 
much, may be treated warily following the revelation that costs had been 
artificially inflated by about $5.5million in the first two and a half years of 
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operafion. This was the result of calculating staff on-cost as eighty-eight per cent 
of salary instead of the more usual sbcty per cent. An interdepartmental committee 
on FOI costs, found there had been double counfing of some items in calculation 
of costs for early annual reports. In effect, agencies had been "blaming FOI" for 
costs they would have incurred despite the Act. 
The manner in which this overstatement of FOI costs was disclosed, is itself 
instmctive. Dedicated readers of the 1985-86 annual report could find details in 
footnote two, page seventy-five. 
Whatever the details about how governments calculate FOI costs, it is 
strategically important not to be drawn into narrow debate on this issue. The onus 
should be on those claiming high costs to show how the price of FOI is, in fact, so 
onerous that it cannot be justified. FOI proponents might usefully emphasise 
several points: 
1. Considering the principles it embodies, FOI is cheap. It is intended to do 
no less than improve the quality of democratic government. 
To import the "user pays" principle into FOI would be to ignore or 
understate the several important aspects of FOI which have nothing in 
common with other government activities for which users pay, such as 
electricity or water. FOI aims to improve accountability and participation, 
objectives which deserve substantial investment of public funds. Requesters 
provide the grist for the scheme, but they are not the only beneficiaries of it 
when it works successfully. 
2. FOI ought to receive substantial resources on the basis that it is, in part, an 
investment in more efficient government. 
It is expected to produce a return to the taxpayer from its benefits from 
public administrafion. The Commonwealth and Victoria FOI annual 
reports and the annual reports of specific agencies, subject to FOI, cite 
benefits which may be summarised as including: 
better records management; 
improved internal communications, assessments and decision-
making; 
productive changes in personnel practices and other streamlining of 
administrative practices; 
better communications between agencies and the public they serve; 
greater public awareness of the role of agencies and the constraints 
under which agencies may work; and 
greater accountability. 
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If charges are too high, the result for government may in a sense be a net 
loss. The Commonwealth experience of a hefty increase in fees has been a 
drop in FOI use. If the legislation is not given life by requesters, the 
benefits for government which it has spurred may also decline. 
3. Any assessment of the costs of supplying information which the public has 
actually asked for under FOI, should consider the far greater amount spent 
on disseminating unsolicited information which the government wants the 
public to have. Benefits like those listed above do not necessarily result 
from many propaganda functions of government. The term "propaganda" is 
not used here pejoratively; such funcfions have their place, as Fitzgerald 
observed. He also suggests: "Considerafion should be given to establishing 
an all-party Pariiamentary committee to monitor the cost and workings of 
ministerial and departmental media activities, including press secretaries, 
media units and paid advertising. This committee could analyse whether 
the money is being spent on informing the public, or distributing 
propaganda for political gain.'is 
4. FOI will add little to public administration if the only requests which are 
deemed affordable are simple routine disclosures of mainly non-
controversial personal records. These should be freely available outside 
FOI as a matter of sound administrative practice. 
It is useful to put the "cost of FOI debate" in the context of demand. When 
Commonwealth FOI was being planned, one assertion from within the 
bureaucracy was that agencies would be swamped with requests, building up 
the costs of FOI and diverting resources from other tasks. The Department 
of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, for example, told the 1979 Senate 
Committee on FOI that it estimated it would receive 100,000 requests or 
more annually. In fact, in the first full year of FOI (1983-84), the 
department received a total of 1,063 requests. The Australian Electoral 
Office warned of a "flood" of 86,000 requests a year. In the first full year, it 
got nineteen.26 
Across the Commonweahh and Victorian governments, FOI has not 
resulted in a flood of requests, as "table 2" shows. There is no reason to 
expect that the chief tasks of the Queensland bureaucracy would be 
overwhelmed by the dufies connected with FOI, especially after the initial 
introductory phase and burst of "novelty demand". 
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Table 2: Number of FOI requests received 
Federal 
Victoria 
82-83 
(7mths) 
5669 
n/a 
83-84 
19,227 
4,285 
84-85 
32,956 
4,702 
85-86 
36,512 
9,031 
86-87 
29,880 
9,401 
87-88 
27,429 
9,662 
Note: Victoria recorded a ten per cent increase in total requests in 1988-89. 
Making the Queensland FOI Legislation Better Than Existing Models 
Experience in other jurisdictions provides several pointers for a State considering 
the introduction of FOI, either because of what has worked well or what has failed 
to work. 
To my mind, Queensland's FOI scheme would, in several vital areas be 
better than those in the Commonwealth, Victorian and NSW spheres, if the 
following were considered: 
Objectives 
A clear objectives section is required. This should make plain Parliament's 
intention to improve the functioning of democratic government by the disclosure 
of information and be limited only by exceptions and exemptions necessary to 
protect essential public and private interests. 
Discretion should be exercised so as to facilitate and promote, promptly 
and at the lowest reasonable cost to requesters, maximum disclosure. This would 
make the rationale for FOI, as well as the way the scheme pursues that rationale, 
perfectly plain. The wording would be very similar to that of Commonwealth and 
Victoria sections 3. 
Exceptions and Exemptions 
Unlike existing FOI acts, no Queensland government agency or minister should be 
granted a total or partial immunity from the obligations of FOI. This includes the 
EARC and Criminal Justice Commission (CJC). All watchers need watching. The 
exemptions should be the only standards by which competing interests in secrecy 
and openness are balanced. The onus should always be on those who would 
withhold to make their case. 
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Simply copying the Commonwealth, Victorian or NSW models in the 
cmcial area of exemption categories, and perhaps refining them to take account of 
various tribunal and court decisions, is by no means the most desirable approach. 
Queensland's advantage will be that it can plan fresh FOI legislation with the 
benefit of experience that the architects of the Commonwealth and Victorian 
models lacked. Examined afresh, the list of "usual exemptions" is unimpressive. 
The unnecessary nature of some has been revealed by the extent to which 
agencies have neglected them. Some exemption categories have been broadened 
either by judicial interpretation or legislative means. For example, in the 
Commonwealth Act, Section 40, "documents concerning certain operations of 
agencies", was added in the 1983 amendments, clause (d), allowing agencies to 
withhold documents when they thought disclosure might "have a substantial 
adverse affect on the proper and efficient conduct of the operafions of an agency". 
The government never attempted to justify the insertion of what seemed a 
dangerously broad category that would be vulnerable to abuse. The following 
year, 1984-85, thirty per cent of all exemption claims cited section 40, and in 1985-
86 the proportion rose to fifty two per cent. Of the total of 11,836 secfion 40 
claims, 3,097 or twenty-six per cent relied on clause (d).2? 
In deciding whether to import various exemption categories from other 
legislation, it seems to be desirable to keep uppermost in mind these questions: 
How would the documents described in this exemption section harm an 
essential public or private interest? 
Would another exemption, as it is or with modifications, do the job? 
How could the balance between openness and legitimate withholding be 
better struck? 
The focus of any discussion over whether to exempt material should always 
be the content of documents, not where they were created, who wrote them or who 
received them. Victoria's long-mnning controversy over cabinet documents stems 
from the attempt to classify what actually is a cabinet document. This is necessary 
because the exemption says a document can be withheld merely by being in the 
class "cabinet documents" and regardless of its content. 
It is worth considering whether an independently operating public interest 
test should be included in every exemption, so that maximum flexibility in favour 
of disclosure is built in. Existing acts have public interest tests in some exemptions 
but not others. 
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Fees 
The fees which agencies may charge requesters can be a potent weapon in the 
hands of agencies which want to evade or obstmct FOI. This was the American 
experience immediately after its FOI law began operating in 1966. In Australia, 
some Commonwealth agencies appear to recognise the value of the tactic. In one 
case, the Australian Customs Service advised me that a single request could attract 
fees of more than $13,000. 
The capacity of fees to undermine effective FOI was clearly demonstrated 
after late 1986, when the Commonwealth government introduced substantial fee 
increases for FOI and new charges for the making of appeals to the Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal (AAT) and the Federal Court, the FOI avenues of appeal. 
These are now $240 for the AAT and $360 for the Federal Court. 
The effect of the fee increases was dramatic. The number of FOI requests 
dropped eighteen per cent in 1986-87 and a further eight per cent in 1987-88. 
Meanwhile, receipts from charges levied roughly doubled in both those years, from 
$75,464 to $161,490 (1986-87) then to $312,870 (1987-88). 
Certainly, a requester can attempt to negotiate to reduce the potential cost, 
but in the end all the cards are held by the agency. It determines the extent of 
search time (at $15 an hour), and of decision-making time ($20) an hour). If the 
agency is inefficient or overly cautious or slow, the requester's bill grows. 
It is not necessary to rely on the "worst-case scenario" to reject the idea of 
high charges. FOI ought to be within the reach of ordinary members of the 
community, not just the "information-rich" such as MPs, lobbyists and journalists 
employed by the main media companies. 
The 1987 Senate Committee felt that "too much emphasis has been placed 
on economic factors such as cost recovery at the expense of the admittedly 
unquantifiable social and political benefits."28 Yet the committee proposed that a 
person may be charged up to $540 for a request involving non-personal 
documents.29 This is beyond most people, particularly when they cannot know in 
advance how much useful informafion will result from their investment. The fact 
that the Senate Committee found itself recommending such an unrealistic "limit" 
indicates the extent to which the debate over FOI costs has been distorted. 
Existing legislation allows for fees to be waived where an applicant is 
"impecunious" or the intended use of the documents is "a use of general public 
interest or benefit". Agencies are not liberal in applying the "public interest" 
reason for waivers. In Victoria, in 1987-88, this factor was cited to support only 
150 of the 3,818 separate decisions to waive fees.3o However, agencies do often 
waive fees when personal files are sought, especially in cases where the cost of 
collecting fees would probably outweigh the amount received. 
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The 1979 Senate Committee thought the "public interest" waiver power is 
"likely to have a particular utility for community interest organisations and groups, 
working in such areas as enviroimient protection, education, social welfare and 
civil liberties, who operate on shoestring budgets yet are intimately concerned with 
the kind of policy formulation in the public interest, that it is one of the basic 
objectives of any freedom of information legislation to promote."3i The draft FOI 
bill and memorandum in the minority report of the Royal Conunission on 
Australian Government Administration said its fee waiver power "covers the case 
of a newspaper or a public interest research group which is seeking information."32 
Since experience shows that agencies are extremely reluctant to give effect 
to these intentions, and that fees have proved to be a significant barrier in 
Commonwealth FOI, there is a case to include an explicit statement along the lines 
included in a revision of the United States Freedom of Information Act in 1986 that 
would require agencies and ministers to waive fees where the applicant is a 
representative of the news media or non-profit group, and the intended use of the 
document is not primarily for a commercial use or the benefit of the applicant 
personally. For these purposes, it was made clear that FOI requests by a "for-
profit" media organisation was not a commercial use. 
Fees in Victoria have not been increased with the same destmctive effect as 
in the Commonwealth sphere, nor applied with particular severity, although 
attitudes are toughening. The 1987-88 charges calculated for processing requests 
were $136,528, of which $81,504 or 59.7 per cent, was waived and the rest 
collected. In 1986-87 the percentage waived was 75.5. Agencies have noted that 
the administrative procedures required to calculate, levy, process and provide 
receipts for charges can exceed those charges - especially for agencies with little 
"client contact". To this extent the pursuit of FOI fees can be a net cost to 
government. 
But there is little doubt that the single most important factor in preventing 
fees being used in Victorian FOI to deter requests, as they have been used under 
the Commonwealth law, has been the $100 statutory maximum (Vic. S.22(l)j). 
The Cain Government recently argued before a Parliamentary committee 
that the $100 "cap" be removed; the committee was not persuaded. It 
recommended retention, with automatic increases in line with the Consumer Price 
Index. Nor did the committee approve the government's wish to introduce a new 
application fee of $15 per request (half the Commonwealth application fee). The 
committee said it "believes that the introduction of an application fee may 
encourage government agencies to treat all requests for access to information as 
FOI requests. The FOI annual reports indicate that, as a result of greater 
openness in government, there is a trend towards making more information 
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routinely available to the public outside the FOI system. The committee is of the 
view that this trend should be encouraged".33 
Secrecy Provisions in Other Enactments 
Both the Commonwealth and Victorian Acts have an exemption provision. This 
allows the many secrecy clauses in acts which pre-date FOI to be revived to hinder, 
or to raise questions of consistency with the new standard of openness/secrecy 
which FOI aims to set. A document which may not be covered by any other 
exemption may nevertheless be withheld if it fits a secrecy clause in any other 
enactment. The exemption was ominously popular with Commonwealth Agencies 
until the Federal Court restricted its reach. Its popularity in Victorian FOI has 
recently grown markedly. 
If it is thought desirable to retain some specific secrecy clauses, for 
example, the adoption law might be a special case, it is preferable to use the 
Canadian method. TTiat country's Access to Information Act requires a review of 
all secrecy provisions and the addition of a schedule to the FOI Act containing 
only those secrecy provisions which will have force in the future if triggered.34 
Appeals Stmcture 
It is vital that any FOI scheme includes provision for an independent, properly 
resourced, cheap (for applicants) and informal appeals system. Fitzgerald 
recognises that FOI is part of the administrative law reform package and also 
wants the EARC to recommend the shape of an AAT. The predictable reaction 
against FOI disclosure by some ministers and parts of the bureaucracy means that 
requesters' recourse to an independent appeals body in the early stages of FOI is 
crucial to its longer term value. Unless the exemptions are subject to independent 
interpretation quickly, their use may become habitual and/or excessive and 
disenchanted requesters will stop using FOI in those relatively few but important 
cases where it is the most appropriate tool to enforce accountability. 
How FOI Has Worked 
Annual reports indicate that the bulk of FOI users are individuals seeking their 
personal files. The Commonwealth per centage is between seventy per cent and 
eighty per cent of all users. In Victoria, the proportion is around sixty per cent. 
Those seeking policy documents, or non-personal data, include MPs, 
journalists and activists such as conservationists or prison reform advocates whose 
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intended use of the material might be termed, in a broad sense, "political". 
Another substantial category is the "commercial" user, such as the solicitors who 
use FOI to try to obtain from government agencies information which may be 
useful in litigation, and insurance companies which seek the fire reports kept by 
the Melbourne Metropolitan Fire Brigade. 
"Table 3" shows the success/failure rates in Commonwealth and Victorian 
FOI use. 
Table 3: Results of access requests (% of total) 
Granted in full -
Commonwealth 
Victoria 
Granted in part -
Commonwealth 
Victoria 
Denied in full -
Commonwealth 
Victoria 
82-83 
62 
n/a 
24.8 
n/a 
13.2 
n/a 
83-84 
68.7 
51.4 
24.7 
21.1 
6.6 
27.5 
84-85 
68.7 
58.7 
25.1 
22.1 
6.2 
19.2 
85-86 
66.8 
63.8 
28.0 
25.2 
5.2 
11.0 
86-87 
69.6 
62.9 
25.7 
24.8 
4.6 
12.3 
87-88 
76.5 
61.5 
20.4 
25.1 
3.1 
13.4 
It is important to bear in mind several factors when considering these 
figures. First, the relatively high proportion of requests granted in full reflects the 
high proportion of total requests which seek non-controversial personal files. It is 
arguable that these sorts of requests should now be met outside of FOI procedures 
and granted as a matter of course and of sound administrative practice. If they 
were to be sifted out of the success/failure figures, and it became possible to 
compile a separate success/failure rate for applications for non-personal 
documents, then the "granted in full" and "granted in part" totals would almost 
certainly be less than the combined figures indicate. 
The description "granted in part" can be misleading because it is used to 
describe agency responses in which almost all the material sought has been 
declared exempt. The material which has been released - that is, "granted in part" 
- may be simply the sections of documents containing informafion already pubhc or 
even such useless material as addressee's name and the salutafions of letters with 
all the rest blacked out. 
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How FOI Has Been Used Successfully 
In providing examples of successful use of FOI, I have concentrated on the 
accountability role of FOI. My selection naturally reflects my own experience as a 
journalist. 
Shedding light on the public actions of govemment officiab. 
In 1985, a by-election for the Victorian Legislative Council seat of Nunawading 
offered Labor the prospect of a majority in that House for the first time since it 
had been elected in 1982. The by-election was necessary because in the election, 
the Labor and Liberal candidates had fied. In such circumstances, the preferences 
of minor parties would obviously be cmcial. The Nuclear Disarmament Party 
decided not to recommend preferences on its how-to-vote card, but instead to 
leave the order of preference to its supporters' discretion. After the poll, which the 
Liberals won, the Nuclear Disarmament Party complained to the Chief Electoral 
Officer that on the day of voting, some people had distributed to voters entering 
the polling stations, a how-to-vote card headed "Voters for Nuclear Disarmament". 
Unlike the official NDP card, this other card did indicate how preferences should 
be distributed by the voter and the method shown favoured Labor. 
The Chief Electoral Officer requested a police investigation which found 
that certain Labor Party members, including ministerial staff and the State 
Secretary of the ALP, had been involved in the prinfing and distribution of the 
"Voters for Nuclear Disarmament" card. The Chief Electoral Officer had sole 
discretion to decide whether to prosecute under the Electoral Act. After he 
announced his decision not to prosecute, I sought access under the Freedom of 
Information Act to the legal advice upon which he had relied. 
The request was denied, with the government relying mainly on the 
exemption covering "legal professional privilege", but this decision was 
substantially overturned by the President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. 
The documents thus forced into the open by the FOI process disclosed that the 
Chief Electoral Officer had sought nine legal opinions from sbt different lawyers. 
All but one opinion advised that there existed prima facie evidence of a breach of 
the law. The majority view included opinions from the Director of Public 
Prosecutions. Only the advice from the Solicitor-General was firmly of the view 
that there was no basis for a prosecution. 
In his decision, the AAT President, Judge Rowlands, said in part: "Disquiet 
has arisen because of uncertainties in the electoral law, the asserted but by no 
means clear 'independent position' of the Chief Electoral Officer, the number of 
opinions sought, the circumstances in which they were sought, and the decision not 
to prosecute against the apparent weight of advice. These matters have persuaded 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
198 Paul Chadwick 
me that the total picture the documents for release provide should be available for 
scmtiny."35 
Potential disclosure through FOI a spur to change 
1, A journalist at the Age was ripped off about a long-mnning episode of 
apparent administrative neglect at the Melbourne General Cemetery. He 
requested relevant material under FOI and received from the Health 
Department a large file showing various investigations and 
recommendations for action spread over many years. But there was no 
record of action having been taken. The most recent memorandum in the 
file was from a senior bureaucrat to the then minister advising him that 
action should be taken urgently "because the Age has made a Freedom Of 
Information Act request for the file". 
2, Another Age journalist was interested in the amount of rent the State 
Government received from the Royal Australasian College of Surgeons for 
use of a government-owned prime city site. Refused an answer, she applied 
under FOI but her request was strongly opposed on grounds of commercial 
confidentiality. A change of personnel at the relevant government 
department however, led to a reversal of the decision and a copy of the 
lease was disclosed. Dating from last century, it showed that the 
government was still charging the college one pound per annum. The figure 
had been adjusted since decimal currency to one dollar a year. Following 
publication of this fact on page one of the Age, the responsible minister 
quickly announced that negotiations had begun with the college about 
payment of a more substantial rent. 
FOI disclosure as an adjunct to traditional accountability measures 
During the long-mnning dispute over contracts for the Expo at Brisbane, the then 
Commonwealth Tourism Minister, John Brown, made various answers in 
Parliament to questions from the Opposition. The Liberal backbencher, Neil 
Brown, at the same time, made FOI requests about the issue. By citing 
departmental documents disclosed under the Freedom of Information Act, Neil 
Brown was able to demonstrate that the minister had mislead Pariiament. John 
Brown resigned, maintaining that he had not deliberately misled the House. 
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Role of the Media in Development of Effective FOI 
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the media in freedom of information. 
Both as individual professionals and as organisations, journalists to my mind have 
a responsibility to educate themselves and the community they serve about FOI. 
Their role goes far beyond merely using FOI. In case exhortations about 
responsibilities seem pompous, let me try an appeal to self-interest. At almost 
every point that the law intersects with journalism in Australia, journalism is 
weakened. Defamation, contempt of court, contempt of Parliament, suppression-
of-evidence orders - the operation (as distinct sometimes from the intent) of these 
areas of law usually constrains or punishes journalists. In FOI they actually would 
have a law which assists disclosure and is aimed at making the public better 
informed about government. To the extent that journalists fail to seize the 
opportunity to try to turn the force of the law toward openness, not suppression, 
they let themselves down as well as the public. 
Some of the potential roles for the media in FOI are: 
* as constmctive critics during enactment of FOI, reporting closely the 
attitudes of the politicians and independently researching experience 
elsewhere so that the debate feeds on more than the sometimes incomplete 
or selective material offered by official inquiries; 
* as educators of the public in the importance and use of FOI. The details -
even the concept - of FOI will be new to Queenslanders, yet the success of 
the scheme will eventually depend on the vigour with which the public uses 
it. Disuse and ignorance of FOI by the voters will make easier the 
inevitable governmental backlash against FOI; 
<» as scmtineers of how FOI is working and how it could be improved; 
* as FOI Act users. Not only will active, organised use of FOI enrich the 
amount, quality and credibility of media reporting of government, it will 
increasingly educate journalists about the process of government. 
Sometimes this will assist those in government, because their critics will 
better understand the pressures under which government agencies operate; 
•^  as litigants with both the motive and resources to ensure that government 
use of FOI exemptions is tested and the Act is exposed early in its life to 
interpretation by higher courts where necessary. 
Conclusion 
Fitzgerald, by recommending FOI as part of the response to the ills of government 
m Queensland which he uncovered, has provided a marvellous opportunity. FOI is 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
200 Paul Chadwick 
not just a measure which will assist the immediate reform process. If it works, FOI 
will enrich Queensland public life in many areas and over the long term. 
But the challenge goes beyond the enactment of better FOI legislafion than 
that of the Commonwealth, Victoria or NSW. Spigelman put it well in 1972: 
No statute or simple set of decisions will alter generations of received 
tradition. A new tradifion of open government will emerge only through 
the practice of open government itself. 
The adjustment of the political sub-culture of the Public Service will 
inevitably be gradual. The very questioning of every example of secrecy is 
the beginning of such a process of change. 
The cumulative experience of ministers accepting the irrelevance of 
traditional concepts of responsibility; the exercise by public servants of 
whatever rights to freedom of speech may be recognised; the continued 
pressure of Parliamentary review of official secrecy; the use that may be 
made of whatever rights of access to information that may be created; the 
cumulative impact of the release of information which has traditionally 
been withheld; the effect on the Public Service of more rigid procedural 
requirements for (secrecy) classification - it is through processes such as 
these that a new tradition of open government will emerge.36 
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Legal Protection of Whistleblowers 
John McMillan 
The Fitzgerald Proposals 
The kind of cormption now known to have flourished in the Queensland 
government was not exceptional, not by Australian nor by international 
comparisons. Revelations of cormption occurring elsewhere during the last 
decade illustrate graphically that it riddles political systems as diverse as tho,se in 
Tokyo, Washington, Sydney, Panama, Manila, Bonn, Beijing and Bucharest. As 
that international dimension illustrates, cormption will not be stopped simply by 
prosecuting those directly responsible. Reforms that touch deeply on the 
framework of government are clearly necessary to establish a more permanent 
barrier to periodic cormption. 
The Fitzgerald Report reflects that insight, in the very diverse range of 
recommendations for reform which it makes. The list includes revitalising 
pariiamentary scmtiny of administrative activity, reforming the electoral system, 
creating administrative law review mechanisms such as an Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal (AAT) and a freedom of information regime, establishing new 
government agencies like the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) and the 
Electoral and Administrative Review Commission (EARC), enacting new criminal 
offences to punish cormption and to compel its disclosure and investigation, and 
restmcturing the police force. 
Another novel and seemingly radical recommendation is to create legal 
protection for "whistleblowers". Specifically, Fitzgerald recommended that the 
proposed EARC should prepare legislation "for protecting any person making 
public statements bona fide about misconduct, inefficiency or other problems 
within public instmmentalities, and providing penalties against knowingly making 
false public statements".! The recommendafion has substantially been 
implemented in the Electoral and Administrative Review Act 1989 (Qld), which lists 
the following item among the matters which the new commission is to investigate: 
"16. Protection from victimization of persons because of statements made in good 
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faith concerning dishonesty, misconduct, inefficiency, or other deficiency in public 
administration, and penalizing persons who make wilfully false statements 
concerning such matters." 
In explaining its recommendation, the Fitzgerald Report referred to the 
recent enactment of similar legislation in the United States - the Whistleblower 
Protection Act 1989 - and commented that there was an "urgent need' for similar 
legislation in Queensland.2 The following brief argument was given in support of 
this recommendation: 
Honest public officials are the major potential source of the information 
needed to reduce public maladministration and misconduct. They will 
continue to be unwilling to come forward until they are confident that they 
will not be prejudiced. 
It is enormously frustrating and demoralizing for conscientious and 
honest public servants to work in a department or instmmentality in which 
maladministration or misconduct is present or even tolerated or 
encouraged. It is extremely difficult for such officers to report their 
knowledge to those in authority ... 
If either senior officers and/or polificians, are involved in 
misconduct or corruption, the task of exposure becomes impossible for all 
but the exceptionally courageous or reckless, particularly after indications 
that such disclosures are not only unwelcome but attract retribufion.3 
The interesting point about the Fitzgerald recommendation is that it went 
beyond suggesting that employees with knowledge of internal fraud or cormpfion 
should be encouraged to report their knowledge to the law enforcement 
authorities. Fitzgerald recommended that such a person should be protected as 
well if he or she makes a bona fide public statement - or, as it is popularly called, 
blows the whistle. 
The practice of whistleblowing is one that has attracted great popular 
interest, partly because of the spectacle of a person publicly being disloyal to the 
organisation to which he or she belongs, and partly too because whistieblowers 
have often focused public attention on a hidden membrane of cormpt behaviour. 
Their moral courage in confronting those forces has bestowed international fame 
on many whistleblowers.4 Among the more famous are Daniel Ellsberg, who 
released US government documents that reported how the public had been misled 
over the Vietnam War; Clive Pointing, a British civil servant who gave to an 
Opposition member of Pariiament information showing that the government had 
misled Parliament about the sinking of the Argentinian ship. General Belgrano; 
Frank Serpico, who testified to the Knapp Commission that his New York police 
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colleagues had been cormpted into crime; Stanley Adams, who exposed that his 
employer was illegally fbdng prices in the European Economic Community; Karen 
Silkwood, who was killed in a puzzling car accident on her way to provide to a 
journalist evidence of falsified nuclear safety records by her employer, Kerr-
Mcgee; Ernest Fitzgerald, a US Defence employee who gave testimony to a US 
Congressional committee of a $2 bilhon cost overran on the Lockheed c-5A 
transport plane; in Australia, Phillip Arantz, who was sacked from the New South 
Wales police force after disclosing the deliberate inaccuracy in published 
government statistics on crime clean-up success; and, as a general case, the 
growing band of former security intelligence officers who have disclosed the extent 
of unlawful domestic surveillance and wire-tapping that intelligence agencies have 
carried on within their own countries. 
A point underlying the Fitzgerald recommendation is that whisteblowers, 
unless they are given formal legal protection, will suffer reprisal from the 
organisation to which the whistleblower belongs. As one writer has put it, 
"employees learn that to confront authority is to invite retaliation".5 The means 
available to many employers to punish or intimidate a disloyal employee are 
numerous. The organisation has commonly responded with personnel disciplinary 
action, such as a reprimand, transfer, demotion, or even dismissal; with legal 
action, like a private law action for defamation or breach of confidence, or in the 
case of government whistieblowers, a criminal prosecution for unlawful disclosure 
or possession of government documents; or, most likely, with an informal 
response, such as systematic aversion or subtle abuse in the workplace by 
management and other employees, exacting scratiny of time sheets and other work 
records, demanding orders, referral for psychiatric assessment or treatment, and 
repeated threats of demotion or dismissal for some unrelated misdemeanour. 
The fate of whistleblowers was graphically illustrated by the experiences of 
a group of 233 whistleblowers studied in the United States: 
90% lost their jobs or were demoted 
27% faced lawsuits 
26% faced psychiatric or medical referral 
25% admitted alcohol abuse 
17% lost their homes 
15% were subsequently divorced 
10% attempted suicide 
8% went bankrapt.6 
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Obstacles to Legal Protection of Whistleblowers 
The case for respecting or admiring the public spirit and achievements of 
whistleblowers is reasonably clear. The more difficult challenge is to jusfify the 
enactment of whistleblower protection legislation. There are obstacles in point of 
theory and of practice. 
It would be odd, in an insfitufional sense, for a government to legislate to 
protect those employees who have been publicly disloyal to the government 
organisation. Governments like all large organisations, operate more effectively 
when the internal lines of authority and responsibility are respected, and when 
employees display qualities such as loyalty and confidentiality towards the 
organisation. It defies that experience, the argument rans, to bestow on individual 
employees the right unilaterally to gauge the merits of their own complaint and to 
choose when public discussion of the issue is appropriate. For a parliament to 
bestow that right on government employees would seemingly constitute a 
recognition that the system of government had such potential for irrational or 
uncontrollable behaviour that its salvation lay ultimately in individuals defying the 
body politic. 
A difficult practical problem may be to distinguish the genuine 
whistleblower from the malcontents and the pretenders within an organisation. It 
is already a problem for many organisations that people who are disaffected with 
its ideals or discipline will claim to have been victimised for pursuing the tmth. 
Introduce legislation which offers formal protection for any person who is 
classified as a "whistieblower" and there is a danger of encouraging internal 
dissension that will achieve little besides destroying internal harmony and 
efficiency. 
It must be doubtful too, whether it is possible to design a workable 
administrative or legislative scheme that can protect whistleblowers. They are, by 
definition, people who are in conflict with their own organisations. As stated 
above, many organisations have a limitless capacity to isolate those who have 
defied it, can draw on many subtle techniques to tarnish or intimidate the internal 
dissident. Proving a causal relationship between the whistleblowing disclosure and 
the organisational retaliation could pose many legal difficulfies. That internal 
conflict may be apparent too in its effect on the whistleblower's emotional or 
psychological balance. Isolating the whistleblowing behaviour and treating it as an 
acfivity warranting separate protection will pose difficulties once again. 
The conclusion favoured by some is to protect whistieblowers by some 
means other than a formal legislative scheme. Options for reform might include 
the development of internal codes of ethics that tolerate dissension and encourage 
oversight, creation of fraud hotlines within an organisafion, strengthening internal 
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grievance procedures, vigilance by unions and professional societies to support 
beleaguered members, and increased reliance on existing legal doctrines to protect 
employees against unjust dismissal. 
The United States Whistleblower Protection Model 
Belief in the efficacy of whistleblower protection schemes exists most strongly in 
the United States.? The US has led the way, with the Congress and as many as 
thirteen States enacting legislafion that formally protects public employees who 
blow the whistie. Private as well as public sector employees are also protected by 
as many as thirty different statutes that protect employees who disclose potential 
violations of laws in areas as diverse as environmental protection, mine safety, 
labour regulation, health and safety standards, transport safety, and civil rights. 
The most interesting US model, and the one to which the Fitzgerald Report 
made specific reference, is the federally-enacted Whistleblower Protection Act 1989. 
A whistleblower is described for the purpose of the act as a present or former 
federal employee who discloses information "which the employee reasonably 
believes evidences a violation of any law, rale, or regulation, or gross 
mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and 
specific danger to public health or safety". There are three principal themes or 
objectives that are dealt with in the act: it ensures that allegations of illegality, 
mismanagement or wastage against federal agencies or officials are properly 
investigated; it provides protection for the employees who make those allegations; 
and it ensures punishment of any official who victimises another for making such 
an allegation. Those objectives are achieved mainly through a statutory agency, 
the Office of Special Counsel (OSC). 
As to the first objective, the OSC operates as an early warning and 
detection system, by receiving complaints from employees against agencies, and 
ordering the agencies to investigate the complaints which appear to have some 
merit. Very rigid fime constraints and reporting requirements are set down within 
which the OSC must decide whether to refer an allegation to an agency, and an 
agency must investigate and report back. Allegations or findings may also be 
referred in special circumstances to other institutions, such as the Attorney-
General, the President, and the Congress. 
The OSC's function of protecting whistleblowers is discharged, in the first 
instance, by making a preliminary determination as to whether a federal official 
has been the subject of adverse personnel action by reason of having complained 
or disclosed evidence of illegality, mismanagement or wastage. If an agency fails 
to take suitable corrective action, the OSC may file (and pursue) a complaint with 
another agency, the Merit Systems Protection Board. An aggrieved official may 
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also approach the Board directiy in some circumstances. The function of the 
Board is to determine, after a hearing at which the OSC may appear, whether the 
whistleblowing disclosure was "a contributing factor" that the agency would have 
taken that adverse action in the absence of the disclosure. If a complaint is 
substantiated, the Board may order such corrective action as it considers 
appropriate. A range of other specific protections for whistleblowers is also 
created by the Act - among them, the Board is authorised to make an order to 
protect a person from harassment, or to stay the implementafion of adverse 
personnel action; the Act ensures that the OSC will protect the confidentiality of 
whistleblowers, in some circumstances even from the agency in which a person is 
employed; and the Act ensures that whistleblowers may be given a limited right or 
preference to be transferred to some other job in the federal bureaucracy. 
Lastly, the OSC may refer to the Board a preliminary finding that an official 
has wrongly taken personnel acfion against a whistleblower. After a hearing, the 
Board may impose disciplinary action, including demotion, dismissal, or a fine of 
$1,000 or less. 
The Case for Legal Protection 
The concept of whistleblower protection should not be dismissed too readily as 
another fashionable American device that is inappropriate for transportation to 
the different political and cultural context in Australia. Many comparable kinds of 
protection exist here already. There are, for example, common law doctrines that 
may protect an employee against disciplinary reprisal or dismissal on account of 
disclosing some crime or civil wrong of the employer.8 There are many statutes 
too that protect a person against prosecution or victimisation by reason of having 
reported corraption to a royal commission, to an anti-corraption body like the New 
South Wales Independent Commission Against Corraption, the Inspector-General 
of Security, or the National Crimes Authority. Probably the most far-reaching 
expression of that protection is section 2.25 of Queensland's Electoral and 
Administrative Review Act 1989. Where it appears to the Commission that a person 
may suffer disadvantage after disclosing information to the Commission, the 
Commission is under a statutory duty to "make such arrangements and take such 
steps as are necessary and open to the Commission to avoid the occurrence of such 
prejudice, intimidation or harassment". 
Nor is the notion of "dobbing in" a cultural anathema. Government-
sponsored schemes like "Operation Noah" and "Neighbourhood Watch", and 
government taxation and welfare agencies urge people to embrace the philosophy 
that reporting the illegal activities of others (even of friends and colleagues) is a 
form of behaviour that strengthens rather than undermines the public interest. 
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WTiat we do lack in Australia, however, is the specially designed scheme of 
the kind which Fitzgerald had in mind, which can more suitably adjust the complex 
legal, administrative, behavioural and sociological factors that can potentially arise 
in any conflict between a whistleblower and his or her employer. The mutual 
accommodation of those interests may be complex, and best undertaken by 
legislation. 
On one side of the balance are the interests of the employer - being 
protected, for example, against malevolent and reckless attacks, and being shielded 
from an internal workplace ethic of suspicion and mistmst. Those risks are real, 
but can probably be minimised by an appropriately drawn scheme. That was the 
conclusion of a Canadian Law Reform Commission which undertook an extensive 
study of the issue, recommending the adoption of a modified form of the US 
model for a governmental system that is not dissimilar to our own.9 It should be 
remembered too that a central feature of the US model is that it confines 
complaints initially to a private and confidential channel, and to that extent, 
protects an organisation from potentially damaging and premature public 
disclosure of fraud allegations. Relevant here too, is the Fitzgerald 
recommendation that a whistleblower protection scheme should include penalties 
for those who wilfully make false allegations. 
Part of the balance, so far as an employer or government agency is 
concerned, must also be its interest in detecting and containing corrupt behaviour. 
A whistieblower protection scheme makes it possible for an employee to report 
cormpfion without being stifled by superiors who have a greater interest either to 
deflect controversy or to conceal cormption from which they or their colleagues 
will benefit. That is, whistleblowers can be an important strategy in the fight 
against crime. Those working within an organisation will often be the first - and 
sometimes the only ones - to know of any illegal or cormpt practice committed by 
or within the organisation. It is likely too, that an organisation will be less prone to 
internal wrongdoing if it is known that an effective mechanism exists by which 
other employees can report the activity without fear of retaliation. 
Another advantage for an organisation could be a strengthening in morale 
and confidence, born of the knowledge that the employer's ethical and 
organisational standards will be protected. Here again it was the view expressed in 
the Fitzgerald Report that debilitation of an organisation is more likely to occur 
when employees perceive that corraption and misconduct will thrive, and honesty 
and courage will be punished. 
The other major line of argument in favour of whistleblower protection 
schemes focuses on the rights and interests of the whistieblower. The genuine 
whistleblower will usually be a person who has made an ethical or conscientious 
choice to regard their obligations to the society as superior to their loyalty to an 
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employing organisation. Most, in addifion, are people who have rejected the 
anonymous leak, choosing instead to give their complaint the support of their 
conviction. Telling the trath should be neither difficult nor costly. Employment in 
an organisation should not require that a person accepts complicity in all activifies 
which the employer has decided to pursue or to conceal. To accept that employees 
can be persecuted for honesty, loyalty, or upholding the public trast undermines 
some of the legal and moral principles on which a society is necessarily based. 
Common are the legal dictums which emphasise that organisations have an 
unqualified duty to obey the law, that individuals cannot escape criminal liability 
by claiming to have acted under superior orders, and that people have a 
conscientious duty to defy inhumane laws. 
The point on which this chapter began is also the point on which to end. 
When cormption has flourished to the point that it has become a driving force in a 
system of government, and when an organisation has lost its capacity or energy to 
distinguish in any civilised way between what is proper and what is illegal, 
conventional solutions can be ineffective. Exceptional measures that defy 
orthodox theory may be the solution. Allowing a person to blow the whistle on a 
cormpt organisation might sound the signal that will attract the sterilising gaze of 
public attention. 
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Reform of the Bureaucracy — An 
Overview 
John Nethercote 
My focus in this chapter is to address the government and public administration 
aspects of the Fitzgerald Report. In the main these are embraced in chapter three 
of the Report, inadequately and in some respects misleadingly entifled "The 
Political Context".! 
What Fitzgerald is on about here is parliament, the executive, electoral 
laws, administrative review, the administration, financial controls, financial 
interests, law reform, the media, criticism and dissent, and electoral and 
administrative reform. It is a confused, rambling chapter embracing a range of 
issues tangential in varying degrees to the main themes of the Report; police and 
the criminal law. 
Most public reports have such a chapter though not usually so prominently 
located. These chapters are more often than not weak, superficial, and under-
researched. This is particularly so with this catch-all chapter of the Fitzgerald 
Report. 
It might not in ordinary circumstances be necessary to disclose such a 
reaction to a tangential component of a report except that in this case the chapter 
has an heir in the form of what Fitzgerald chose to call the Electoral and 
Administrative Review Commission (EARC): choice of the word "review" rather 
than "reform" is not uninstractive. This body has enormous scope, from 
parliamentary, ministerial and electoral matters; through administrative tribunals, 
freedom of information, public service appointments and promotions, and 
whistleblower legislation; to judicial administration, the role and resources of the 
Auditor-General, the Law Reform Commission and the Parliamentary Counsel, 
pecuniary interests of office-holders, and the law relating to public 
demonstrations.2 
Fitzgerald himself is conscious of the disparate character of the body whose 
creation he has recommended. The commissioners, except for the chairman, are 
not to be employed full-time. It seems that he envisages that the Commission's 
work will be done by consultants, directed and viewed by commissioners. 
More to the point, the omnibus character of this Commission seems to have 
concerned Opposition Leader Wayne Goss for in his "Public Sector Reform" 
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document, he posits creation of a Pubhc Sector Management Commission (PSMC) 
whose task will be to complement the work of the EARC in the public sector 
management field. Goss is absolutely right to be concerned. The macro-
constitutional issues to be addressed by the EARC hold enormous public interest 
and almost certainly will be the subject of intense scmtiny and controversy. They 
wdll fully absorb the energies and the attention of the EARC. They are the 
prestige issues. They are in many respects substanfially distinct from the 
administrative issues. There are few people in Australia whose range of expertise 
is sufficient to encompass the full scope of the mandate, or anything like it. 
Moreover, if the EARC and PSMC cooperate, they will largely duplicate 
each other's work; if they do not, they may well negate and nullify each other's 
endeavours. 
Goss, therefore, should not be frightened of his analysis. He should split 
the EARC. Those responsibilities relating to the institutions of government and 
representative democracy including especially the principles of electoral 
representation; the location of the judicature in the government structure; and 
the expression of public opinion, should be assigned to one body. The proposed 
PSMC should assume responsibility for all other matters in the public 
administration field. 
Goss, it might be added, is optimisfic in his belief that the proposed PSMC 
will be able to work without significant increases in the resources of the Office of 
Public Service Personnel Management which it is to replace. Especially in the first 
couple of years of government the load on this organisation will be enormous; 
what Premier Goss should do is ration not its staff but the time it has to do the job. 
The situation created by Fitzgerald is, accordingly, far from irretrievable, 
and there can be no doubt that even in this rambling chapter he furnishes a check 
list of issues calling for considered attention in what could amount to the 
reconstmcfion of democratic representative and responsible parliamentary 
government in Queensland. This is not a task from which any government should 
resile. Over the past half decade Queensland government has had, as they say, a 
bad press. Few governments can prosper when their reputations are as sullied as 
Queensland's has been of late. At the very least there is a major task of 
reftirbishment if not reform to be undertaken. 
In confronting this task it would be wise to keep a clear head about the 
context. Fraud and cormption are not by any means unique to Queensland. Only 
a few years ago we frequently heard as much talk of the McCabe-Lafranchi and 
the several reports from the Costigan Royal Commission to the Painters and 
Dockers Union, as we now hear of Fitzgerald. And followers of New South Wales 
politics will be only too well aware of the current proceedings of the Independent 
Commission Against Cormption (ICAC) in that State. The traditions of the Rum 
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Corps are indeed alive and well down south. The Commonwealth itself has major 
problems with fraud of various types. At least some of the deficiencies in 
Queensland Government, therefore, find their counterparts elsewhere. 
In the world of modern government "integrity" in many guises is becoming 
an active issue which ministers and their advisers ignore at their peril. Fitzgerald 
has brought this home very forcefully to the Queensland public, but it is a message 
which others have been learning perhaps for more than a decade. 
For many years, perhaps generations, Westminster-based governments took 
a not-so-quiet pride in the probity and fairness with which administrafion was 
conducted. Absence of corruption was seen as one of the many happy contrasts 
which could be drawn between the Westminster-style and that of the rival 
Washington approach. It bred a complacency which cannot be justified in terms of 
experience in the 1980s. 
A second consideration which is not unimportant is the relatively confined 
limits of criticism in the Fitzgerald Report. It is of some interest that the police 
aside, it is a small number of ministers whose conduct is most criticised. The 
State's corps of administrators are relatively untouched and I have heard only a 
little hearsay commentary that this represented a major omission on Fitzgerald's 
part. It would probably be foolish to imagine that all is rosy in the public service 
garden, but it would seem that the foundations for better government may be 
available to build upon. In the business of government and administrative reform 
it is well to build on available strengths and it does seem that this is a distinct 
prospect for Queensland as it enters the final decade of this century. 
These contextual considerations lie at the heart of further disappointments 
with chapter three of the Fitzgerald Report. It should have been a cogent, 
coherent exposition of the basic framework of the Queensland polity and 
principles according to which it ought to operate. Instead, what the Commissioner 
provides is a batch of jottings, not always logically connected to each other, on 
different aspects. Those familiar with issues of government and its institutions will 
be struck by the formal and often quaint, even archaic, character of those jottings. 
I suspect that those for whom government issues are not a daily concern will find 
the chapter hard to follow. 
Not at any stage does the Commissioner expound the underlying doctrines 
of the Westminster method of government, clarify the meaning of the separation of 
powers for the initiated as well as the uninitiated, nor explain the various 
connections between the parts of the machinery of government - pariiament, 
cabinet, ministers, the public service, departments, tribunals, corporations and, of 
course, the courts. His Report was the essential place for doing so for it is unlikely 
that the reports of EARC will have the public standing or the publicity to 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Reform of the Bureaucracy 215 
communicate these ideas to the public in general. It was, hence, a lost opportunity, 
given the Commissioner's decision to move into these broader fields. 
More seriously, the Commissioner was unduly formal in what he had to say. 
His treatment of parliament furnishes but one example of this failing. In seeking 
to support, strengthen and protect parliament from an over-mighty ministry 
Fitzgerald calls for an "impartial Speaker". The Speaker, according to the Report: 
"cannot afford to adopt a partisan role, either voluntarily, or in order to retain the 
confidence and support of the Government party. If the Speaker enters the arena, 
there is a risk that Parliament will not be able to make the Government 
accountable".3 
These are views which most observers of government would support. But in 
Australia, presiding officers with the exception in some degree of the President of 
the Senate, are very much party figures (usually of a second order). It is hard to 
see how, in one of Australia's weakest legislatures, the Speakership can be so 
strengthened that it will become a bulwark able to defend a restored parliamentary 
democracy which Fitzgerald sees as a condition of enduring reform. It is likely to 
proceed in reverse order: the Queensland Parliament once strengthened may be 
able to offer support to a greater measure of independence for the Speaker. 
Likewise, most will endorse his exposition of the opposition role in 
parliament. The members of the opposifion are, he writes with a nice turn of 
phrase, "the constitutional critics of public affairs".-* But no Australian parliament 
has ever made much progress in entrenching opposition rights and prerogatives in 
its procedures (and certainly not to the extent that the House of Commons has 
done). 
In the past decade Australia has witnessed the curtailing of such rights for 
specious reasons in the New South Wales Legislative Assembly by the Wran 
Government. And the Commonwealth House of Representatives in the life of the 
present Parliament has seen a substanfial deterioration in Question Time at the 
expense of the Opposition as well as relatively easy diminution of the 
parliamentary role by the simple expedient of minimising meetings of the House. 
Deputy Opposition Leader in the House, Wal Fife, has made some effort to get 
these unhappy developments before public notice through letters to newspapers 
but the impact has been negligible. Parliaments in Australia are weak bodies. If 
the Queensland Legislative Assembly is to claim for itself a place in what is not a 
very bright sun, then something more than a few platitudes was needed. 
Both Greg Vickerys and Peter Coaldrake6 have made reference to the 
procedural weaknesses of the Queensland Parliament and the way that absence of 
a second chamber further weakens the law-making process. The Commissioner, 
given that he had ventured into these fields, might usefully have suggested 
provisions of a constitutional character to ensure that, as an invariable matter of 
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course, there is at least in formal terms, a little more to legislating than simply 
wielding the rabber stamp. At the very least Fitzgerald should have contemplated 
the capacity of the Queensland Pariiament to fulfil the role he envisaged for it. He 
should also have pondered whether a pariiament which places its own 
revitalisation in the hands of an outside body, however eminent its members, has 
started from the right place: the whole technique smacks of the autocrat ordering 
subjects to be free. 
Fitzgerald's analysis of cabinet practice, including cabinet's role in the 
awarding of contracts, is likewise meandering. He is clearly concerned about 
contract procedures,? but seems unable to formulate the point he is trying to make. 
The drift - it is little more than that - of his analysis seems to point to the 
desirability of an autonomous contracts board separate from cabinet and removing 
such matters from direct cabinet/ministerial control. But the exposition is 
decidedly confused and where it leads to, indeterminate. He places some faith in 
the parliamentary Public Works Committee but the links are not drawn. 
His discourses on administration and personnel practice are likewise 
vacillating.8 He gives some praise to the 1988 public service legislation but has a 
few quibbles, mostly detailed and possibly of minor significance.9 These relate to 
exemptions to an obligation to advertise vacancies, extensions of appeal rights, and 
the determination of appeals. 
He spends some time supporting the new system of contract employment 
for senior officials. He is quite unconvincing in the claim that: "contract 
employment, rather than permanent tenure, does not make political interference 
or bureaucratic partiality any more likely, nor does it decrease the chances of 
public servants reporting misconduct."!o 
He makes other claims which are at best problematical: "If the wrong 
people are appointed for the wrong reasons they will only be there for limited 
periods."!! I frankly find that view optimistic. And he chooses to ignore the fate of 
the right people appointed for the right reasons who also find themselves in situ for 
a limited period only. Similarly, his assertion that a contract system will reduce 
"opportunities for the bureaucracy to be politicized to a degree which is difficult, it 
not impossible, to reverse"i2 needs some empirical testing. Nor is it at all easy to 
have much confidence in the statement that "contract employment may well lead 
to greater independence for public officials."!3 These views, to me, portend not an 
unpoliticised public service but, rather, one which may be wide open to 
appointments on a spoils basis. 
In general, his treatment of a contract system would have been more 
convincing if he had tackled the question of higher level pay in public services and 
the detailed terms of contracts. Certain types of contracts may have the effects he 
envisages; others may have the reverse effect. Just what he was trying to achieve 
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by the glib overview in Section 3.5.3 is very obscure indeed.i-i And writing off 
tenure as he does may make some sense from the perspective of a practicing 
barrister but those familiar with public administration are unlikely to be 
particularly reassured. Tenure still has its place in public administration (as in 
judicial administration) and it would have been well for Fitzgerald to give some 
weight to the traditional approach at least as a balance for his enthusiasm for 
contracts. Some of the reasons for tenure in public administration are comparable 
to those used to justify judicial tenure. 
In his approach to administration Fitzgerald does not always distinguish 
clearly between measures designed to maintain integrity and those aimed at 
promoting efficiency or better performance. His half page treatment of "Ethical 
Considerations", for example, ends up with a paragraph (one out of six in all) on 
monitoring "the effectiveness of an individual employee's effort or the impact of 
departmental performance."!5 
This really confirms a broad impression that Fitzgerald only has a tenuous 
grasp of the nature of public administration and its place in the machinery of 
government. His treatment betrays little sign that he has any significant concept of 
the respective roles of ministers and officials; the functions of cabinet, ministers 
and departments in decision-making and management; nor of appropriate 
administrative and personnel practices which could promote the values of ethics, 
integrity and fairness in government. These are all matters which he seems 
content to leave to EARC and its consultants. 
For a report with so pronounced a moral orientation, his handling of ethics 
and integrity in public office is frighteningly discursive. He seems reluctant to 
provide a strong lead. One such important example comes in the section on 
induction training for police: 
Organisational and management changes and the introduction of 
professional staff management may partially overcome the problem of 
police misconduct. 
Additionally, training must include an ethical component as an 
integrated aspect of all matters taught. Case studies and practical exercises 
in which ethical decisions have to be made are now an integral part of the 
training of many professionals (for example, medical students) and play an 
important part in introducing people to ethical dilemmas and choices.!6 
Queensland's recent experiences apart from anything else illustrate just how 
fragile the quality of integrity can be in public office. And it is very naive to 
believe that a remedy is to be found in "organisational and management changes", 
"introduction of professional staff management",!? and training with an ethical 
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component. It is also naive to believe that people will be good except when led 
into temptation. 
Some of his measures would help to create an environment which might 
foster and reinforce honest and fair behaviour. These include freedom of 
information and administrative review procedures. 
The lead needs to come from the Premier in both word and deed. 
Fitzgerald is concerned about pecuniary interests and that is reasonable enough. 
Attention needs also to be given to post-employment activities of former office-
holders and government employees particularly given keenness for using contracts 
at higher levels. 
Selection practices are certainly critical. Much as the stress on merit is to 
be welcomed, weight also needs to be given to qualities of character and even in 
some cases reputation. The constitution of selection boards is therefore a key 
issue. 
The ideal of service is long overdue for resurrection in the guiding 
philosophies of Australia's public services. Not the least depressing aspect of 
current preoccupations with pay and remuneration in our public sectors, and the 
relentless rhetoric on performance, is the virtual disappearance of notions of 
dedication and public interest. Getting value for the tax dollar is rightly a high 
priority these days. But the stress which has been laid on this goal has brought 
severe dysfunctions with it. It has brought an ethic in which dollar judgments too 
easily hold sway, an ethic in which acquisition of wealth has become the sole test of 
worth whether on an individual or a policy basis. So pronounced has this ethos 
become, not least under Labor governments, that it is a puzzle to comprehend why 
many of the protagonists remain in public administration at all. Queensland's 
experience as revealed by Fitzgerald has been profoundly disturbing but, again, it 
would be wrong to believe that the problems here are distinctive. 
One of the more interesting and more encouraging aspects of Australian 
government in the 1970s and 1980s has been the active campaign of the Australian 
Taxation Office (ATO) to safeguard the integrity of the national tax system. It is 
undoubtedly vulnerable to all manner of pressure, fraud and corraption. And yet 
the ATO has been insistent in its endeavours to encourage legality and discourage 
illegality and sharp practice. It is not beyond criticism, some of it fair; there are 
even dangers in the zeal which it brings to the task. But pro tem it furnishes an 
important example of con.scientious management determined to maintain an 
administration which is honest, fair, even if often firm. A study of ATO practices 
in the 1970s and 1980s will be of great value to all interested in maintaining the 
integrity of public administration in Australia. 
No-one should envy the task ahead of those in leadership in Queensland in 
the next decade. Whether at the parliamentary, ministerial or administrative level. 
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they confront a situation in which survival with reputation intact will be the test of 
success, every bit as much as achievement. And it is upon their shoulders that the 
burdens rest. On the broader scene they do not get much help from Fitzgerald, 
save maybe from the fortitude he brought to the accomplishment of a miserable 
assignment. They are not likely to get much assistance from the EARC either. 
Which brings me to my conclusion. Public sectors are not islands unto 
themselves. They are part of the communities they are constituted to serve. If the 
community is not interested in integrity, promoting fair play and cutting down 
rackets, there is no need to expect miracles or even palliatives from government. 
Fitzgerald, in his chapter on "The Political Context", does not mention political 
parfies. They are rarely exemplary bodies but they are the blood of democracy. 
Electoral law reform, if it is enlightened, will apply itself to issues of how they can 
be prompted to contribute to democracy. Reforming government without 
moulding a constractive role for the parties will not have a promising future. Party 
attitudes will, of course, be a critical element in the revitalisation of parliament. 
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The Senior Executive Service: A Model 
for Reform From the Top? 
Andrew Hede 
The Senior Executive Service (SES) is a concept borrowed from the United States 
where it was introduced as part of a major reform of the Civil Service in 1979. 
Essentially, an SES is a group of public sector executives with high level 
management skills who are both responsible for and accountable for the 
implementation of Government policies. The SES was introduced into Australia 
in 1982 by Victoria, followed by the Commonwealth (1984), Western Australia 
(1988), and New South Wales (1989). New Zealand has also introduced an SES 
(1988). There is considerable variation in the different SES models that have been 
implemented, but in all cases, the SES was introduced to reform the public service 
by improving managerial competence and accountability. 
The Queensland Labor Party's 1989 election campaign was based on a 
reformist platform which included the introduction of an SES.i However, the 
Queensland Public Service underwent major reform in 1988 with the 
implementation of the Public Service Management and Employment Act 1988. This 
Act which has been generally endorsed in the Fitzgerald Report, did not provide 
for an SES, so is there a case for introducing one now? 
Senior Management in the Queensland Public Service 
Savage Report 
The Public Service Management and Employment Act incorporated almost all of the 
recommendations of the Public Sector Review Committee chaired by Sir Ernest 
Savage in 1987. The Savage Report devotes all of four sentences to an evaluation 
of the SES concept!2 
The Savage Committee had received a submission from the Public Service 
Board recommending the introduction of an SES, and a submission from a unit in 
the Treasury recommending against an SES. The only argument the Savage 
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Report gives for recommending against a formal SES is that it "could be seen as an 
elite corps, and to ambitious officers who did not reach its ranks, it could act as a 
disincentive".3 This disincentive notion is based on a lack of understanding of the 
nature of human work motivation. There is evidence that Australian managers 
strive to reach goals which increase their sense of achievement and their self-
esteem.'* Far from decreasing their motivation, the SES would act as a strong 
incentive for the high-achievers in the non-executive ranks. Low-achievers would 
be unaffected rather than de-motivated by an SES. 
The other aspect of the Savage argument against an SES is elitism. 
However, the anfi-elitist argument against the SES is not compelling. Although 
most Austrahans would tend to value egalitarianism, there is wide acceptance 
throughout the workforce of differences in rewards for those at different levels of 
skill and responsibility. The elitism argument seems based on the notion that it is 
alright to pay senior managers more, and even to give them bigger offices and 
other perquisites, but that attention should not be drawn to this by giving them 
membership of a special group. Of course it is possible to operate an SES as an 
inequitable elite, a group of privileged people who are given special status and 
conditions not necessarily because of their merit or responsibility. But it is also 
possible for senior executives to regard themselves as an elite "higher class" 
without having membership of a formal SES. Those who are disposed to behave in 
an elitist manner are likely to do so when they reach the coveted 1-15 classification 
in the Queensland Public Service. 
The Savage Report also notes that the existing Australian SES schemes 
were "still in the experimental stages".5 Although no thorough assessment had 
been made of an Australian SES at the time of the review in early 1987, it is 
hardly appropriate to describe the Victorian and Commonwealth SESs as 
"experimental", given they had been in operation for several years, or to reject the 
concept on such grounds. 
Finally, the Savage Report asserts that the aims of the SES can be achieved 
without establishing a separate formal stracture. To assess this claim, the features 
of Queensland's senior management can be compared with those of the SES 
schemes in other public services. Such a comparison indicates that Queensland's 
current senior bureaucracy could be classed as a de facto SES which has features 
comparable with other SES models, particularly that in New South Wales6. Before 
addressing the question of whether Queensland should introduce a formal SES, let 
us consider the current nature of its public administration. 
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Politicisation and Cronyism 
"The Public Service is not politicised. It's just that few, if any, of us sem'or public 
servants have ever worked for a non-conservative Government." This is how the 
Bjelke-Petersen appointed chief executive of a statutory authority recently 
attempted to justify in an "off-the-record" interview, the cosy relationship that has 
developed over a long period between the bureaucracy and the National Party 
Government in Queensland. 
The Fitzgerald Report points out that under a Westminster-based system, it 
is easy to blur the distinction between the government's creation of policy in which 
political considerations are legitimate, and the Public Service's implementation of 
that policy in a manner which is supposed to be apolitical. After thirty-two years 
without a change of government, Queensland has developed a cadre of senior 
administrators and policy advisers who are adept at giving what Commissioner 
Fitzgerald calls "politically palatable advice", rather than the fearless impartial 
advice the Westminster system is meant to foster.? The blinkered view of 
politicised policy advisers prevents them from canvassing the full range of options 
required for effective decision-making. 
As Whitton elegantly puts it, the Fitzgerald Report gives us only "a fleeting 
glimpse of the nexus between politicians and bureaucrats".8 However, Coaldrake 
discusses a number of practices that illustrate the politicisation of the Queensland 
Public Service:9 
Accelerated promotion to senior public service ranks for former ministerial 
staff; 
Personal and political scmtiny by cabinet of contenders for senior posts; 
Public service appointments for former government politicians, and for 
relatives and friends of ministers; 
Victimisation of public servants who have privately opposed the 
government; 
Collusion between politicians and public servants in rorting the expenses 
system; 
Code of silence by senior public servants over abuses of ministerial 
expenses. 
Coaldrake concludes his discussion of politicisation with the observation 
that: "the public service as an institution came to share the Values' of its political 
masters. It thus became politicised, not so much in a directly partisan sense but by 
way of sharing the benefits of office and the threats posed by government defeat at 
the polls".!o 
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Wiltshire argues that politicisation of the Queensland public service 
increased with the denial of appeal rights against appointments. He notes that this 
practice began in the 1960s and has become "a trend that has particularly insidious 
overtones", adding that "such a practice can open the door to political and 
administrative patronage".!! Patronage or cronyism occurs when senior 
appointments are made on the basis of political or social allegiance rather than on 
merit. It is likely that the cronyism has been a factor in many senior appointments 
in Queensland over a long period.12 
As in other public services which have had a system of 'Jobs for the boys", 
the Queensland Public Service has few female executives. Even without blatant 
and deliberate discrimination, cronyism can be manifested in the subtle cloning 
process which influences much of public service staff selection. Cloning occurs 
when an individual who does not share the same ideological values as the top 
echelon of the public service is passed over for a more "compatible" person who 
has weaker credentials for the job. After so long without a change of government, 
cloning has no doubt contributed to the Queensland senior bureaucracy's being 
almost exclusively male and predominantly politically conservative. 
One way to limit politicisation and cronyism in the public service is to have 
an independent review of senior appointments and promotions. At present, this 
review is carried out by Cabinet. Far from prevenfing politicisation and cronyism, 
such a process serves only to institutionalise these practices. 
Termination of employment is another way in which politicisation and 
cronyism may be manifested. If senior public servants in Queensland prove not to 
fit the established mould or persist in giving unpalatable advice, there is nothing to 
prevent a chief executive from terminating their contracts without explanation. 
There is no appeal in such cases, although an individual may submit a response via 
Cabinet to the Governor-in-Council. Again, this process does not adequately 
protect from politically-based action against senior public servants. 
The Fitzgerald Report and Public Sector Reform 
The Fitzgerald Report assesses the 1988 Savage-inspired reforms of the 
Queensland Public Service as follows: "All the reforms are consistent with modern 
theories of public administration: the reduction in the role of central agencies such 
as the Public Service Board, the increase in responsibility for efficient 
administration by chief executives, the employment of people by contract, the 
creation of a redeployment/redundancy scheme, and promotion by merit alone."i3 
I would argue that the first three of the above reforms endorsed by 
Commissioner Fitzgerald have the effect of entrenching rather than eradicating 
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politicisation and cronyism in Queensland. Let us briefly examine these 
questionable reforms. 
Reduction in central agency control 
Public service boards in Australian public services have long been the subject of 
complaint by both bureaucrats and politicians. As the central persoimel agency, 
the boards typically exercised a high degree of control over the whole public 
service. They usually interpreted their role as one of policing the implementation 
of rigid rales governing every aspect of public sector employment. They certainly 
placed severe restrictions on the discretion of chief executives. Not surprisingly, 
most boards have been disestablished. The Victorian Public Service Board has 
managed to survive only by adopting more of a consultancy and monitoring role 
rather than a policing role. 
The Queensland Public Service Board also was widely criticised, and was 
abolished in 1988 on the recommendation of the Savage Committee. It is notable 
that Cabinet rejected the Savage recommendation for a part-time board, but 
implemented the recommendation to establish the Office of Public Service 
Personnel Management. Under the Act, the main functions of the Office are to 
recmit basegrade clerks, to redeploy redundant officers, to develop personnel 
guidelines, and to advise on personnel practices.!'' Importantly, the guidelines are 
merely advisory - the Office has no monitoring role. Thus, personnel policies and 
practices in the Queensland Public Service have no form of effective ongoing 
control. 
It is relevant that the Commonwealth replaced its Public Service Board with 
a Public Service Commission. Although the current Commission is less rigid and 
restrictive than the former board, it still exercises considerable control and closely 
monitors the implementation of personnel policies which it has statutory 
responsibility to develop. In particular, the Commission plays the primary role in 
appointing senior executives and in overseeing the operation of the SES. The 
rationale for this role is clear from a recent statement by the Public Service 
Commissioner: "An important reason for the Commission's involvement in the 
management and development of the SES is to ensure that the SES remains free 
from patronage, nepotism and political and other interference." (emphasis added)!5 
When it abolished its Public Service Board, Queensland threw the baby of 
merit-based employment out with the bathwater of excessive centralist control! To 
extend the analogy, it also threw out the monitoring soap needed to keep the 
employment baby clean. Although the 1988 Act provides for a merit-based 
personnel system in Queensland, the purely advisory Office of Public Service 
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Personnel Management cannot be fully effecfive in ensuring protecfion against 
politicisation and cronyism. 
Increased chief executive responsibility 
Many of the recommendations of the Savage Committee were designed to increase 
the responsibility of chief executives with regard to personnel matters. The 1988 
Act devolves most of the Public Service Board's personnel functions to chief 
executives. Although modern management theory calls on regulators to "let the 
managers manage", it is inappropriate in the public service to make them virtually 
unaccountable! Chief executives are obliged by the Queensland Act only to "have 
regard to" guidelines issued by the Office of Public Service Personnel 
Management.!6 Nor are they even required to report to the Office on their 
personnel policies and practices. 
It is particularly in relation to the hiring and firing of senior public servants 
that Queensland has gone too far in delegating powers to chief executives. Chief 
executives are able to appoint someone to a senior position without bothering to 
go through any formal selection process, with no involvement of an independent 
person, and with no obligation to account to anyone for their decision. Further, a 
chief executive can negotiate a starting salary and a performance agreement with 
the appointee, and keep this and other aspects of the appointment confidential. 
Unsuccessful applicants have no right of appeal against the appointment. The 
appointee's performance is assessed using whatever criteria chief executives 
choose, and any performance payment is at their complete discretion. Chief 
executives can terminate the person's appointment with one month's notice and are 
not required to give any explanation. In short, there is nothing to prevent today's 
chief executives from continuing the cronyism of the past! 
Contract employment 
The Fitzgerald Report advocates contract employment for senior public servants, 
arguing that it "does not make political interference or bureaucratic partiality any 
more likely" and that it "may well lead to greater independence for public 
officials".!? Commissioner Fitzgerald does note that the independence of public 
servants will be enhanced if superannuation payouts on termination include 
employer contributions, and this apparenfly has been recently introduced in 
Queensland. 
A clear distinction must be made between public servants who serve the 
government of the day, whatever its political colour, and staff recmited specifically 
to the personal staff of ministers. The Fitzgerald Report acknowledges that the 
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close personal contact and confidence required of ministers' personal staff justify 
such appointments being "properly influenced by purely personal considerafions".i8 
Such ministerial appointments should be on a contract basis. 
As a result of the 1988 public service reforms in Queensland, contract 
rather than tenured employment currently applies to all senior public servants 
above classification level 1-15 (i.e.. Bands 1-3), although, if a Band 3 contract is 
terminated, officers have the option of reverting to their former tenured level. 
But, as Coaldrake points out, "the move toward contracts in Queensland is widely 
interpreted within the public service not so much as a means to develop an 
efficient and flexible system of public management, but as a further and very blunt 
attempt at politicisation".!' 
Experience in other public services shows that the threat of termination 
makes contract public servants very susceptible to political influence. Public 
servants are much more able to resist improper influence if they know they cannot 
be summarily sacked. The majority of public servants see their careers as involving 
only public employment - a recent survey of Commonwealth executives indicated 
that only eleven per cent aspired to a position in the private sector or their own 
business.2o Most public servants come to share a value system and an ethos that 
virtually biruis them to the public service. A threat of being forced to work outside 
the public sector would put great pressure on such people to succumb to political 
influence. Entitlement to a large superannuation payout would in no way 
eliminate the pressure imposed by a possible thwarting of their career aspirations. 
This is not to say that tenure provides absolute protection against political 
pressure. Tenured public servants can be made to toe the party line by denying 
them promotion, by transferring them to the unattached list, or by redeploying 
them to units often referred to euphemistically as "special projects branch". No 
doubt there are some who would find the threat of tenured hibernation much more 
onerous than termination of contract. These are the ones who could well feel 
more independent on a contract as Commissioner Fitzgerald suggests. But they 
would be a very small minority of executives, typically those recraited directly at a 
senior level from outside the public service, who are highly mobile in their careers, 
and who would be quite prepared to leave rather than compromise their 
principles. Nevertheless, for the vast majority of public servants, contract 
employment would increase their susceptibility to political influence. 
The Case for a Queensland SES 
We have seen that the Queensland Public Service has been plagued by 
politicisation, cronyism and lack of accountability. We have also seen that the 
1988 reforms have not provided adequate protection for a merit-based personnel 
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system, despite the general endorsement of Commissioner Fitzgerald. Clearly, 
further reforms are needed. 
Reform of the bureaucracy can be achieved most effectively using a top-
down approach. The values and administrative competencies of senior public 
servants determine whether the effects of a reform process will be thorough and 
long-lasting or superficial and short-lived. Therefore, Queensland needs reform 
from the top. But should this be in the form of a Senior Executive Service? 
We have observed that Queensland's senior bureaucracy already has many 
of the features found in other SES models. You may well ask, "What possible 
advantage could there be in applying an elitist name to a currently operating 
system"? Perhaps the main reason for Queensland to introduce an SES is to 
signify a clear break with politicisation and cronyism. As Halligan points out, "The 
Senior Executive Service has been significant as a symbol and facilitator of 
change."2! 
However, the name is important only if it signifies fundamental changes in 
how the senior bureaucracy operates. A comparison of features indicates that 
Queensland has a 
de facto SES almost identical to the New South Wales model. But it can be shown 
that this is a completely inappropriate model for Queensland. For effective 
reform, Queensland should look more to the Commonwealth and Victorian SES 
models than to those in New South Wales and New Zealand. Many of the features 
in Queensland's current senior bureaucracy serve to prevent reform rather than 
promote an imparfial merit-based public service. Such inappropriate features are 
the lack of a unified group of top managers, the use of contract employment, the 
inordinate amount of discretion by chief executives, and the excessively low level 
of central control. A reformist SES for Queensland should have the following 
features: 
Unified group 
The members of the new SES would need to develop a sense of allegiance 
to the public service, not just to a particular agency. They should be 
encouraged to be mobile within the service. SES members should see 
themselves and also be seen, not as an elite who have special privileges, but 
as a group of very competent high performers who are charged with special 
responsibilities. They should provide an example to non-executive public 
servants of high performance standards, strong commitment to the 
principles of merit and equity, high responsiveness and accountability to 
both their minister and the community they serve, and well-developed 
ethical standards. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
228 Andrew Hede 
Contract versus tenure 
All senior executives should be tenured at a level below that of their current 
appointment for which they should be contracted. Performance against 
agreed goals should be assessed annually and contract renewal should be 
subject to satisfactory performance as well as continued need for the 
position. This combination of tenure and contract ensures that senior 
public servants have the incentive to give high performance, but are less 
vulnerable to improper polifical influence under threat of contract 
termination. In fact, this system could effectively be extended to middle 
management. 
Redundancy 
The vast majority of SES members would be career public servants who are 
redeployed if their job becomes redundant. This does not entail keeping 
people on when there is no work to do, or retaining poor performers 
indefinitely as "the dead wood that has floated to the top". A small 
proportion of executives would be employed on contract for specific 
limited-term projects. Redundant tenured executives who have a 
satisfactory performance record should be given assistance in finding other 
positions. A procedure that has been used successfully in Queensland to 
relocate officers in cases of machinery-of-government changes is to provide 
agencies with extra funds to employ redundant staff. Thus, half the 
executive's salary could be provided to the employing agency in the first 
year, reducing in subsequent years. 
Chief executive discretion 
Chief executives need to be given the responsibility to manage their 
agencies. However, to protect against cronyism and arbitrary action, there 
have to be appropriate restrictions on their discretionary powers. Chief 
executives should be required to develop fair and open selecfion 
procedures, but should have the final say in executive appointments. Other 
personnel policies and procedures should be within established guidelines. 
Any decision to terminate an executive's appointment should be reviewed 
by an independent public service commission. 
Central control 
The operation of the SES should be controlled by a central agency, the 
Public Service Commission which should replace the Office of Public 
Service Personnel Management. The Commission would play a facilitative 
role in ensuring fairness and efficiency in personnel management. The 
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broad personnel policies for the public service should be the responsibility 
of the Commission. The implementation should be delegated to agencies 
but should be monitored by the Commission. Chief executives should be 
required to report to the Commission on their SES appointments and 
performance appraisals. SES members should be able to appeal to an 
office of merit protection for an independent review of a chief executive's 
action affecting them. Victoria has had such an office since 1984 and 
Western Australia introduced one in 1989. 
Executive development 
A high priority should be given to the professional development of SES 
officers. As well as giving them training in management procedures, the 
aim of executive development programmes should be to enhance their 
policy advisory skills and their responsiveness. Those at the top of the non-
executive ranks should also be given training to enable them to make the 
transition smoothly to higher levels of responsibility. 
Conclusion 
The Savage Report specifically rejected the introduction of an SES in Queensland, 
mainly on the dubious grounds that it was elitist. "This and most of the other 
recommendations of the Savage Committee were adopted in the 1988 reform of 
Queensland public administration. Although the Fitzgerald Report generally 
endorses the 1988 legislative changes as being consistent with modern 
management theory, it has been shown here that a number of current practices 
have the effect of increasing rather than decreasing the level of politicisation and 
cronyism in Queensland. 
It is concluded that Queensland's senior bureaucracy should introduce 
further changes designed to promote a merit-based personnel system and to 
increase accountabilify. These are the creation of a unified group of top-level 
performers charged with special responsibility, the introduction of a system of 
combined tenure and contract employment, a better balance between discretion 
and accountability for chief executives, increased central agency control to ensure 
merit without restricting efficiency, and high priority on executive development. 
In addition to having these reformist features, the senior bureaucracy needs 
the reformist name Senior Executive Service to signify a complete break with the 
politicisafion and cronyism that have been the hallmarks of Queensland's Public 
Service in the past. 
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Pecuniary Interest — Is There a Conflict? 
Eric Thome 
An intelligent reading of the Fitzgerald Report will indicate that public 
administration in Queensland left a lot to be desired. Yet it is significant to note 
that the administration of local government was not, in itself, subject to any critical 
examination by Mr Tony Fitzgerald QC. Despite this there are several examples 
given in the Commissioner's Report which do involve local government 
administration. 
So, to what extent are there irregularities within the area of local 
government administration in Queensland? Pecuniary interest is covered in the 
Local Govemment Act by Section 14(4) for members. Officers of local authorities 
are required to declare their pecuniary interests under Section 17(5) of the Local 
Govemment Act. The provisions covering officers are the same as those for 
members. However, it is interesting to note that an officer is specifically prevented 
from exacting or accepting any fee or reward other than his proper remuneration 
simply by virtue of his or her office (Section 17(5) (ii)). 
Members of council have a fiduciary relationship with the council they are 
serving. This means that members are not at arm's length from their councils. 
Because of this, all members owe to the council they are serving the utmost good 
faith. There are two main features of the fiduciary relationship. These are: 
1. each member must use his or her power for proper purposes, and; 
I, each member must avoid situations where individual personal interests 
conflict with individual responsibility and duty to the council each serves. 
What is a proper purpose? After all, local government is a sphere of 
government and therefore political factors are present. Most members have a 
keen desire to be re-elected by the community they serve, which means they wish 
to avoid upsetting constituents. As well, all members are under a legal obligation 
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to use the powers vested in them for the good of the council. This is usually 
translated as looking after the good of the community at large. 
The necessity for the member to make decisions which are for the good of 
the community as the common law requires is given substantial reinforcement in 
statutory law. Before members can embark on the performance of their duties, 
they are required to make a declaration of office. That declaration demands that a 
member "will faithfully and impartially fulfil the duties of his office according to 
the best of that member's judgement and ability".! 
Members cannot enter into any arrangements or place themselves in 
positions where personal interests conflict with the interests of council, such as 
using for their own advantage confidenfial information gained by virtue of office 
on receiving a reward for favours given in the course of awarding contracts. A 
conflict of interest could arise should any company which is a regular tenderer on 
council contracts offer rent free holiday accommodation along with a well stocked 
"free" refrigerator to any member or officer. The giving of gifts which is a regular 
and socially accepted norm in some Asian countries creates a perception of 
conflict in this country. 
The common law in Australia, however, is still undergoing change because: 
1, of the very nature of the numerous functions local government is required 
to perform; 
i, of the number of local government councils in Queensland;2 
Si of the number of elected members serving in local councils in Queensland;3 
4 the very basis of local government is political; 
1 cormption has often been shown to be associated with the political 
machine; and 
4 local councils are merely a micro mirror image of society as a whole. 
Turning now to the statutory provisions of pecuniary interest as they relate 
to local government in Queensland, there is no disqualification of members for 
breach of the pecuniary interests provisions. The only penalty provided for is a 
maximum fine of $500 for each offence." As no sentence of imprisonment is 
imposed, there is no disqualification under Secfion 7(2)(iv) of the Act. The 
disqualification provision in the 7902 Queensland Act was deleted in the Local 
Govemment Act 1936. 
There is no statutory provision in the Local Govemment Act whereby a 
person who believes that a member has breached the pecuniary interest provisions 
of the Act can initiate legal action on his own account against that particular 
member. This is because without some statutory provision similar to Section 9 of 
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the Local Govemment Act, individuals have no legal standing. (Section 9 provides 
legal standing to individuals to initiate action in certain electoral matters.) 
Because of this lack of legal standing, an individual who wanted to press 
legal action would need to make application to the Attorney-General for approval 
for a relator action. Of course, the Attorney-General could initiate action as the 
Chief Law Officer. However, the extent of the Attorney-General's ability to take 
such an action without some executive pressure being applied has to be 
questioned. 
Certainly, Tony Fitzgerald QC, clearly indicated that: 
The Attorney-General has extensive powers and discretions which are 
intended to be exercised in the public interest, including power and 
discretion with respect to the initiation, prosecufion and discontinuance of 
criminal proceedings. The Attorney-General also has primary 
responsibility for legal advice in relation to matters of public administration 
and government. The proper performance of such functions is dependent 
upon independence and impartiality and freedom from party political 
influences, which is threatened if the Attorney-General is subject to 
Cabinet control and Parliament is effectively dominated by the Executives 
Fitzgerald went on to say that in Queensland, the risks of partiality were 
accentuated by the effective amalgamation of the offices of Attorney-General and 
Minister of Justice.6 
Over the years, allegations of breaches of the pecuniary interest provisions 
have been made in the Queensland Parliament. However, no serious investigation 
or inquiry was made by the Minister for Local Government. (Section 4A(3) of the 
Local Govemment Act and certainly no legal action was initiated by the Attorney-
General. 
Up until April 1987, members were not able to vote for their own elevation 
to the position of chair or deputy chair where the occupant of those positions was 
paid a special allowance in excess of that paid to other members. The rationale 
was clear and simple - the member would have a pecuniary interest. As a result of 
a member's breaking this provision, the Queensland Government legislated to 
provide that in such a situation no pecuniary interest was involved.? In fact, the 
minister at the time made the statement that if this was a breach of the pecuniaty 
interest provisions, then those provisions were stupid. In the light of this, it cannot 
be said that the government of the day had any appreciation of what constituted a 
pecuniary interest. Certainly the government failed to lead by precept or example. 
The legislation gives a discretionary power to a council to pass a resolution 
to provide for the exclusion of a member from a meeting whilst the subject matter 
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in which that member has a pecuniary interest is under consideration.8 Some local 
authorities adopt this policy as a matter of course, but there is not data available 
on how many councils have adopted this policy. Certainly some do not. However, 
it has been mmoured that even where a council had adopted such an exclusion 
policy, the excluded member participated in a discussion from outside of the 
Council Chamber! 
Within local government, the greatest potential for malpractice is in the 
area of town planning and land development. However, great care must be 
exercised in identifying the real issues when involved in town planning and land 
development topics. The question needs to be asked whether the real issue is one 
of cormption or whether it is one of conflict of development philosophies. 
In considering this question, many local authorities have themselves to 
blame for clouding the real issue. A systematic approach to separating the 
doughnut from the hole must be adopted: 
1. Does the council have development control plans in association with its 
strategic plan and town planning scheme? 
2. Has the council developed general policy statements covering the main 
issues arising from town planning and land development applications? 
3. How much discretionary power has the council given itself in its town 
planning scheme and subdivision of land by-laws? 
4. How often is this discretionary power used? 
5. Are detailed reasons provided in the council minutes of why that 
discretionary power was used? If not, why not? 
6. Has the council a policy that any member with an interest leaves the council 
meefing whilst the matter is under discussion? 
7. Is that policy of leaving the meeting enforced? 
8. How much personal influence with other council members has the council 
member who may have a conflict of interest? 
9. How much lobbying has been done by the member with the conflict of 
interest outside of the meeting environment? 
10. 'What "deals" have been done with other members which may secure a safe 
passage of applicafion? 
11. Do members appreciate that the council has a statutory responsibility to 
reach conclusions based on genuine planning considerations and not the 
shifting sands of local politics?9 
Town planning and land development applications are fertile areas for 
"deals". No matter how honourable the intention of the parties, irrespective of the 
community benefits which may be obtained, the council has no right in law to enter 
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into deals of any kind. The council, as the planning authority, has a legal 
obligation to consider the application on its merits, and not in terms of additional 
benefits which may be derived for the community. The important principle was 
established very clearly in the case of Read v. Brisbane City Council (1986) 2 Qd R 
22. Once a deal is made, it is extremely difficult for either party, especially the 
council, to defend satisfactorily any allegation of impropriety or cormption that 
may be made. 
A sound strategic plan incorporating development philosophies would 
provide councils with a firm basis for decision making and a defensible stance if 
political or legal obligations occur. 
However, that does not answer the question as to whether land developers, 
real estate agents or their spouses should be allowed to contest local government 
elecfions and, if successful, be members of a local council. There is no doubt that 
members and senior staff are privy to very sensitive and confidential information. 
Town planning approvals, be they consent approvals or rezoning, have a major 
impact on land values. As town planning approvals are attached to the land and 
not to the applicant, there is no doubt that scope for cormption does exist. Yet, if 
the electors know that persons contesfing an elecfion are land developers or real 
estate agents, why should such persons not be members of council, should that be 
the will of the electorate? After all, the principle of the presumption of innocence 
must surely prevail. The public could presume that these members will comply 
with both statutory requirement and common law. 
I mentioned earlier that members of council have a statutory responsibility 
to reach conclusions based on genuine planning considerations. This is an 
essential element, one that cannot be disregarded because of mateship, past 
services rendered or for possible future polifical favours. A council cannot consign 
this responsibility to another body for any reason whatsoever. These points were 
clearly enunciated in Wyatt v. Albert Shire Council.io 
Until recent times, the matter of public duty versus personal interest has 
been dealt with simply by depending on the sense of honour and integrity of the 
individual elected to public office. As a result of events over the last few years, it is 
clear that public figures no longer have the tmst and respect of the public at large. 
It would seem that the public has not decided to draw any distinction 
between the three spheres of government in this respect. As a result of this public 
mistmst, various countries including Australia have sought to find an answer to this 
vexed problem. Numerous inquiries have been conducted.!! Numerous 
recommendations have been made. Some of these recommendations have been 
enshrined in legislation. Despite these measures, there is no evidence that 
corruption has been eradicated. As both Dr Dick Klugman and Sir James Killen 
have said, "... politicians as a whole are [not] any worse than the rest of the 
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community [and are no better]".i2 In any event, will a legal enactment make a 
dishonest person honest? Yet the public needs to have a mechanism whereby 
sanctions can be imposed on dishonest members. 
The next question that needs to be posed is - is it possible for any legislation 
dealing with conflict of interest to be drafted in such a manner that is 
encompassing, clear yet definitive, and still provides the widest possible potential 
for citizen participation which is so essential in any democracy.i3 It was Alexis de 
Tocqueville who implied that institutions constitute the strength of free nations. A 
nation may establish a system of free goverrmient but without municipal 
institutions, it cannot have the spirit of liberty.i4 It is not possible to legislate in 
this situation. This is simply because the sheer variety of transactions to which the 
conflict mle applies makes it impossible to given anything like a comprehensive 
definition of "interest" for its purposes.is 
From the local government viewpoint it is essential to realise that, for the 
substantial majority of members, their participation in local government is part-
time. Consequently, there is a need for these members to earn an income. 
Because of the legislative provisions of the Local Govemment Act, all members are 
required to reside in the local authority area which they represent. It can be seen 
therefore, that to return to the 7902 Local Authorities Act provisions whereby any 
person who was concerned with, or participated in, the profit of any contract with 
the local authority was not capable of being or continuing as a member, is far too 
restrictive. 
Should society adopt the stand of Ulysses S. Grant when he said that "No 
personal considerations should stand in the way of performing public duty?" It 
cannot be realistically stated that a member of council should forfeit his right to 
conduct his own business. Spouses of members, irrespective of gender, must be 
entitled to go about their legitimate business with both dignity and privacy. 
In addition to the above, there is an urgent need to ensure that members 
and council employees are not the subject of false innuendo and accusations. This 
must be balanced against total accountability of councils. We do not live in a 
perfect society. 
From what has been said earlier, ft is clear that the existing provisions of 
the Local Govemment Act are inadequate. In the interest of promoting public 
debate on this topic, the following suggestions are put forward:i6 
1. A Code of Conduct be prepared for both elected members and employees 
of local government and that such Codes be enshrined in the Local 
Govemment Act by way of Regulation. 
2. The Declaration of Office currently detailed in Section 7(2A) be amended 
by inserting not only references to the Code but also a declaration that each 
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member has read and understood the Code and will faithfully implement 
the terms of the Code. 
3. All employees be required to make a declaration similar to that made by 
elected members. 
4. A Register of Members' Interests be established, such register to include 
details ofii? 
(a) real property in which the member has an interest together with the 
nature of that interest, including information on all Tmst 
Documents, Partnerships and Private Companies; 
(b) sources of income, including all forms of remuneration, gifts, stocks 
and shares, tmst settiements, interest payments; 
(c) interests and positions in corporations, statutory authorities etc; 
(d) positions in trade unions, professional or business associations; 
(e) loan indebtedness; 
(f) discretionary disclosures. 
5. A Register of Senior Officers' Interests be established along similar lines is 
a Members' Register. Employees who are to be defined as senior officers 
for the purposes of the Register include: 
Clerks and their deputies; 
Accountants and their deputies; 
Chief clerks; 
City, town and shire engineers and their deputies; 
Town planners and town planning assistants at all levels; 
Building surveyors; 
Consultant engineers and planners. 
i . The Code of Conduct and the Register be overlaid with a set of objectives 
which demonstrate the reasons for their existence.!8 
7, All Registers to be kept by the Clerk and to be available for inspection only 
by elected members of the council. 
1, All Registers to be kept up to date, with penalties for late and non-
disclosure. 
4. The Local Govemment Act to be amended to enable individuals within the 
community to have legal standing in any action based on the breach of 
pecuniary interest provisions. 
10. The Local Govemment Act to be amended to enable individuals within the 
community to have legal standing in any acfion based on the breach of 
pecuniary interest provisions, 
lis The legislation be amended to provide that it be permissible for any 
member of the public to make an allegation of a conflict of interest to the 
Criminal Justice Commission or if the Commission is not established and 
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working, to the Auditor-General for investigation and institution of legal 
action. 
12. The invesfigation body to have the powers necessary to subpoena and to 
administer oaths. 
13. Legislation be enacted requiring any public official, either elected or 
appointed, to report any suspected conflict of interest to the investigating 
body for attention, with that public official being given appropriate 
protection against any form of reprisal. 
14. Where a prima facie case of conflict has been established, the matter to be 
referred to a Court of competent jurisdiction for determination. 
15. Condifional legal assistance to be made available from Consolidated 
Revenue to persons charged with a breach of the conflict of interest 
provisions. 
16. Penalties for proven offences should be substantial, eg a heavy fine and/or 
sentence of imprisonment together with a substantial period of debarment 
from holding public office.19 
17. The principal points of common law covering the two main features of the 
fiduciary relationship as they apply to local government be enshrined in the 
Local Govemment Act. 
18. A public education campaign to be undertaken by the Local Government 
Association of Queensland, preferably in conjunction with the Department 
of Local Government, with a view to highlighting the importance of local 
government, the demands placed upon elected members and staff, the need 
for decisions to be made at the local level, and the vital role local 
government plays in the economic life and well-being of the area in 
parficular, and the state in general. 
19. All persons who offer themselves as candidates at a local government 
elecfion declare the source of their income on their nomination form with 
the statutory provision that such data be published in newspaper circulating 
in the area. 
20. That elected representatives be paid adequate allowances for performing 
their duties as elected members. 
21. All elected members to undergo a training process by way of attendance at 
seminars where adequate instmcfion and informafion can be disseminated 
on all facets of local government activity2o with special emphasis being given 
t« 
the fiduciary relationship of members and employees, 
meeting procedures, 
the role, duties and functions of elected members and council 
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employees/consultants, 
public policy. 
22. All invitations to tender to contain a warning against cormption.21 
23. All tenders for public works in excess of $100 000 to be accompanied by a 
statutory declaration by the agent or contractor that no payments, gifts, or 
other inducements have been or will be offered by them or their agents to 
members or employees of councils where such offers could be reasonably 
constmed as being for the purpose of obtaining any favour in connection 
with the contract.22 
24. The practice of contract splitting be prohibited. 
25. Public participation be encouraged in local government administration. 
26. No member of a council be allowed to serve a period in excess of nine years 
(three terms) without having a minimum of one term off council. 
27. The subject of ethics and philosophy be included in the curriculum of senior 
high school student, and in all undergraduate degree courses as specialist 
units. 
The problem that we as a community have to face is growing concern about 
the integrity of public life. Local government is said to be the government closest 
to the people - the grass roots of democracy. It provides basic services; it can be an 
advocate for its residents; it can act as a barrier between its citizens and other 
spheres of government. As Michael Jones said "Whilst local governments should 
try to be efficient, their main aim is to provide sensitive, participative and 
responsive government."23 This can be achieved provided that the elected 
members of councils make decisions which are in the best interests of the public at 
large and serve their communities with the utmost good faith. 
Notes 
1. Section 7(2A) of the Local Govemment Act 1936 as amended. 
2. 134 - Local Government Department - Members and Employees of Local 
Authorities July, 1988. 
3. Ibid. 1323 
4. Section 14(4)(iv) of the Local Govemment Act 1936 as amended. 
5. G.E. Fitzgerald QC, chairman. Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal 
Activities and Associated Police Misconduct, Report (Brisbane: Queensland 
Government Printer, 1989), p. 138. 
6. Ibid. 
1. Section 14(4)(ia) of the Local Govemment Act 1936 as amended. 
8. Section 14(4)(vii) of the Local Govemment Act 1936 as amended. 
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S, Nagy V. Cairns City Council (1981), QPLR 148; Ingham v. Maroochy Shire 
Council (1983), QPLR 139. 
10. (1986) QPLR 409. 
11. The Riordan Committee of 1975; The Bowen Committee of 1979; The 
Salmon Committee (UK) 1976; Redcliffe-Maude proposed local 
government mles of conduct (1974); The New Zealand Ministers' Private 
Interests Committee (1956); to name but a few. 
12. "Killen - Along the Road", Courier-Mail, 17 October 1983. 
13. Sir James Killen in his keynote address to the 93rd Annual Conference of the 
Local Govemment Association of Queensland, Townsville, 1989. 
14. A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. G Lawrence (New York: 
Harper and Rowe, 1966), p.61. 
15. R. Finn, Fiduciary Obligations (Sydney: Law Book Company, 1977), para. 
472. 
16. Some of these recommendations have been canvassed in Local Govemment 
Act Review, A Discussion Paper (Brisbane: Queensland Government Printer, 
1989). 
17. Submission by Cr T.N. Quinn on behalf of the Woongarra Shire Council 
"Public Duty and Private Interests", vol. 1, March 1984. 
18. Ibid. 
19. Examples of penalties detailed in Section 229 of the Australian Companies 
Legislation provide a general indication of the seriousness of conflicts 
within the corporate sector. Penalties range from $5,000 to $20,000 or 
imprisonment for five years, or both. 
20. Other topics which should be included are an overview of various funcfiOns 
of council, e.g. town planning, subdivision of land, building and health, 
environmental matters, budget, inter-governmental relations, industrial 
matters, contract law, project management. 
21. Royal Commission on Standards of Conduct in Public Life (UK), 1976. 
22. Ibid. 
23. M. Jones, Local Govemment and the People Challenges for the 80s 
(Melbourne: Hargreen Publishing Company, 1981). 
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Problems and Prospects for Electoral 
Reform After Fitzgerald 
Paul Reynolds 
The electoral system in Queensland has long been the subject of contentious 
debate in Queensland politics. A version of the present zone system was 
introduced by the Labor Premier, Hanlon, in 1949 when the Australian Labor 
Party (ALP) was under electoral threat with the nationwide swings to the coalition 
parties in the late 1940s. Labor had held office in Queensland continuously since 
1915 with a short break between 1929 and 1931 without any need, prior to then, for 
a zonal system. The irony was, however, that when Labor faced its severest 
electoral threat, following the ALP split in 1957, its zonal system not only failed to 
save it, but facilitated the coming to power of the coalition, being responsible for 
the then Country Party being the larger of the two coalition parties. The Country 
(later Nafional) Party then, in 1958, proceeded to re-craft the zonal system with 
two cardinal objectives; to entrench the coalition parties in power and to ensure 
the Nationals' dominance over the Liberals. 
The most recent redistribution, in 1985, two years after the collapse of the 
coalition, continued this trend. This redistribution, on which the 1986 and 1989 
elections were fought, created safe seats for all parties, partly by increasing the size 
of the Legislative Assembly from eighty-two to eighty-nine seats, and partly by a 
re-crafting of the boundaries. The 1986 results attested to the nature of the re-
distribution, with only three seats changing hands, two from Labor to the Liberals 
(Mt Isa and Ashgrove) and one from the Nationals to the Liberals (Toowong). 
There are, at the time of writing, four zones with differential quotas stmck 
for each zone.i TTie South East Zone ranged in seat size from Manly (22,982) to 
Mt Coot-tha (18,209), with an average enrolment of 20,056: The Provincial Cities 
Zone, from Port Curtis (14,675) to Thuringowa (21,569), with an average 
enrolment of 18,462: The Western and Far Northern Zone from Mt Isa (11,830) 
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to Roma (7,909), with an average enrolment of 9,270: The Country Zone from 
Gympie (14,908) to Carnarvon (11,996), with an average enrolment of 13,312. 
Comparing the smallest seat (Roma) with the largest one (Manfy) produces 
a differential of 2.9, while a comparison of the average seat size in the Western 
and Far Northern Zone with the average for the South East Zone, yields a 
differential of 2.2. Hence a vote cast in a Western and Far Northern Zone 
electorate is worth between two and three times that of one cast in an electorate in 
the South East Zone. 
The Country Zone intersects the Provincial City Zone, dividing the 
provincial cities from their hinteriands, containing these city voters within the 
confines of their urban areas. The differenfial in the average seat sizes of these 
two zones is 1.4, thus the votes of those living a few kilometres beyond a provincial 
city are worth one and a half times that of adjacent city voters. 
By contrast, the differential between average emolments in South East and 
Provincial City Zone seats is minimal at 1.1. Hence the weightage of urban voters, 
whether in the south east or provincial cities (and mral voters in the South East 
Zone), is similar. It is, therefore, beyond argument that, both in effect and in 
deliberate intention, the zonal system is designed to weight raral votes relative to 
urban votes at rates between 1.5 and 3.0, depending on the zonal comparisons and 
those for individual seats. 
This, it must be emphasised, does not happen by chance, nor does it occur 
randomly. Rather, is it the deliberate outcome of the long standing government 
policy, exacerbated by the provisions of the Elections Act 1983-85 which require the 
electoral commissioners to conduct their deliberations in private, not to reveal 
their submissions and to report solely to the Premier, not to the Parliament. 
The political results of the zonal system are equally apparent. 
Table 1: Seats won by the political parties at the 1986 State election by zone 
Party 
National 
Labor 
Liberal 
South East 
2^3 
19 
9 
51 
Zones 
Provincial 
City 
,5 
8 
-
13 
Western 
6 
1 
1 
8 
Country 
Far Northern 
15 
2 
-
17 
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Thus, by 1986, after twelve years of contesting urban and Brisbane seats, 
forty-three per cent of National seats were from the two raral zones and, while 
forty-seven per cent of their seats were from the South East Zone, over half of 
these were raral seats in that zone. By contrast, sixty per cent of ALP seats were 
from the South East Zone and a further twenty-seven per cent from the Provincial 
Cities Zone. Ninety per cent of Liberal seats were from the South East Zone. 
Thus, by weighfing seats in the raral, western and northern parts of the State, the 
Nationals' rhetoric was that it wjis advantaging mral voters by ensuring them 
maximum representation. In reahty, it was advantaging itself since, of the twenty-
five seats contained in both zones, the Nationals, in 1986, held twenty-one of these 
(eighty-four per cent). 
It is at this point that the recommendations of Tony Fitzgerald QC, become 
important. His findings and recommendations concerning the electoral system are 
quoted in full, as his text is important of itself, and because it has impacted heavily 
upon the parties, especially during the 1989 election campaign:2 
A fundamental tenet of the established system of parliamentary democracy 
is that public opinion is given effect by regular, free and fair elections 
following open debate... 
The fairness of the electoral process in Queensland is widely 
questioned. The concerns which are most often stated focus broadly upon 
the electoral boundaries, which are seen as distorted in favour of the 
present Government, so as to allow it to retain power with minority support 
There is a vital need for the existing electoral boundaries to be 
examined by an open, independent inquiry as the first step in the 
rehabilitafion of social cohesion, public accountability and respect for 
authority ... It should be allowed to do its task untifled by pre-determined 
restrictions. 
The inquiry must be permitted to reconsider basic assumptions 
which shape the present boundaries, such as whether there is genuine 
justification for a zonal system. If it finds that there is a justification for the 
present system, it should assess the appropriate zones and what, if any, 
special considerations ought to apply in different zones.3 
A properly authorised and satisfactorily resourced Electoral and 
Administrative Review Commission which reports directly to a 
Parliamentary Select Committee on Electoral and Administrative Review, 
as well as to the Premier is needed ... Matters of priority already mentioned 
include:... 
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(c) A review of the electoral system, especially the fairness of electoral 
boundaries, the basis of representation, the processes of registration and 
counting and the distribution of electoral material at polling booths.'' 
At the first media interview he gave after becoming Premier, Mike Ahern 
was asked whether his "vision of excellence" included a reform of the zonal system. 
He replied that the subject was not on his agenda. After the Fitzgerald Inquiry 
had completed taking evidence, but prior to the Report being handed down, Mr 
Ahern repeatedly committed the Government to implementation, "lock, stock and 
barrel". Neither the Government, nor the National Party organisation anticipated 
that an inquiry into the zonal system would be a part of the Fitzgerald Report, let 
alone that it would be one of the cardinal recommendations. TTie Government 
was then handed a dilemma which was that it had locked itself into implementing 
Fitzgerald's recommendations, but at the cost of threatening its own electoral base. 
The upshot was that the new Premier, Russell Cooper, had legislation enacted to 
set up the Electoral and Administrative Reform Commission (EARC) and the 
Criminal Justice Commission (CJC), but did not appoint the chairperson or part-
time members of EARC, this being held over until after the 2 December 1989 
elections. Meanwhile, Sir Robert Sparkes signalled the National Party 
organisation's intention to make submissions to a subsequent EARC inquiry 
vigorously defending the zonal system and arguing its necessity for Queensland 
electoral politics. 
The Fitzgerald Report had a similar impact on the other parties. By calling 
for an EARC inquiry, the Commissioner had effectively pre-empted Labor and 
Liberal policies to enact "one vote, one value" should the former win, or the latter 
be senior coalition party, as a result of the 1989 election. At the time of writing, 
therefore, the prospects for electoral reform look better than they have ever been, 
but the nature, extent and scope of the reform will clearly depend on the proposed 
EARC inquiry and on its recommendafions. All three parfies during the 
campaign, committed themselves to implementing the findings of such an inquiry, 
even if such findings were at variance with their stated politics. E.G. Whitiam may 
yet be proved correct when he asserted at an ALP function in Brisbane on 2 
September 1989, that "whatever the outcome of the 1989 election, it will be the last 
state election in Queensland fought on crook boundaries". 
In his victory speech on 2 December 1989, the incoming premier, Wayne 
Goss, affirmed that the EARC inquiry into the electoral system would be a "top 
priority" for the new ALP Government while, on 3 December 1989, Chris Griffiths 
for Citizens for Democracy reiterated that his organisation remained committed to 
"one vote, one value" for Queensland. Much then will depend on the 
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recommendations of the EARC inquiry, not least on its personnel, terms of 
reference and the nature of the submissions it receives. 
Notes 
1, The figures used are from the official "Details of Polling at General 
Election Held on 1 November 1986", Cmmd. 1987. Seat sizes according to 
"Number on roll qualified to vote". 
2, G.E. Fitzgerald QC, chairman, Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal 
Activities and Associated Police Misconduct, Report (Brisbane: Queensland 
Government Press, 1989). 
3. Ibid., p. 127. 
4. Ibid., p. 144. 
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How Unfair Is Queensland's Electoral 
System? 
Malcolm Mackerras 
Some forty years ago my schoolteacher explained to the class that there was a 
difference between the words "character" and "reputation". A man's character, he 
explained to the all-boy class, described what he was really like. For example, a 
man's character may be that he is hardworking but he may also have the reputation 
for being lazy. 
These remarks are very relevant to the long-mnning debate about 
Queensland's electoral system. The character of that method is that it is a system 
of single member electorates with preferential voting, like that for the 
Commonwealth House of Representatives, like the systems used to elect the lower 
houses of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia and the 
Northern Territory. 
Queensland's electoral system is, of course, not universal, even for lower 
houses. It differs from the ways in which the Tasmanian House of Assembly and 
the ACT Legislative Assembly are elected. They employ systems of proportional 
representation. 
Is Queensland's electoral system fair? Clearly not. Why not? Because it is 
a system of single member electorates and that system is notoriously unfair. 
In my opinion, the above paragraphs constitute a reasonable description of 
the character of Queensland's electoral system. What about its reputation? 
Queensland's reputation is that it employs a gerrymander which is unique in 
Australia. 
It is very easy for propagandists to prove that Queensland has a 
gerrymander. All they need do is quote a few statistics and hope the audience 
wants to believe in the existence of that gerrymander. However, propagandists 
find a problem if I am in the audience. I am altogether too sceptical and I do not 
believe in the existence of the so-called Queensland gerrymander. 
For years we have been told by the media that Queensland must have a 
gerrymander because it is a proven fact that, under certain circumstances, it is 
possible for the National Party to win an election with onfy thirty five per cent of 
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the vote. Okay, I admit the fact. Under certain circumstances, it is possible for the 
Queensland Nationals to win with only thirty five per cent. That fact proves that 
Queensland employs a system of single member electorates with preferential 
voting. 
When I hear the propaganda against the Queensland system, my reaction is 
to say that I do not believe that the Commonwealth boundaries are 
genymandered. Yet I am aware that Labor has 57.4 per cent of the seats in the 
present House of Representafives, but only won 45.8 per cent of the first 
preference vote at the 1987 election. The argument does not satisfy people. There 
seems to exist this ingrained assumption that it is democratic for a party to win if 
its vote is in the forties but undemocratic if its vote is in the thirties. 
The assumpfion is silly. The trath is that the system of single member 
electorates is notorious for the way in which it over-represents the largest single 
party. 
It is not easy to argue that the alleged Queensland gerrymander does not 
exist merely because there is no Commonwealth gerrymander. So I try another 
tack. Sir Henry Bolte was premier of Victoria from 7 June 1955 until his 
retirement on 23 August 1972, a period of just over seventeen years. Did he owe 
his place to a gerrymander? Not many would say so and nor would I. Yet his 
Liberal Party never won forty per cent of the vote, even though it always contested 
evety seat, or nearly every seat. The Bolte record is set out in "table 1" and "table 
2". Why did not a series of such outrageous results bring forth allegations of a 
gerrymander? The answer is that, throughout the period, the electoral eiu-olments 
were kept as nearly equal as was practicable. In the words of the slogan there was, 
more or less, "one vote one value". There was and is no gerrymander in Victoria. 
But there was and is a system of single member electorates with preferential 
voting. 
Now let us come to the Queensland election which took place on 1 
November 1986. Details are set out in "table 3". The result was very similar to all 
those Victorian elections except that the National Party was the beneficiary, not 
the Liberal Party. 
If that 1986 Queensland election had been preceded by a redistribution 
based upon the objective of making electoral enrolments as nearly as equal as 
practicable, then the result would have been the same, or at least very nearly the 
same. It is highly implausible to suppose that the National Party would not have 
won the election outright under "one vote one value". It would not have won the 
election outright under proportional representation but that is a different matter 
altogether. Nor would Bolte have won his elections. 
You do not need to suppose the existence of a gerrymander to explain the 
fact that the Nationals won a majority of seats with 39.6 per cent of the first 
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preference vote. It is really quite simple. After minor party preferences were 
distributed, the National Party won a majority of votes in a majority of seats. 
Furthermore, and this is the important point, that majority of seats contained a 
majority of the electors of Queensland. 
"This point is important to grasp lest we make the mistake of supposing that 
National Party mle in Queensland depended on the so-called gerrymander. The 
result of the 1986 Queensland election was that the Nafionals won forty-nine seats 
containing 51.8 per cent of the electors (see "table 4"). When fresh enrolment 
figures were issued for 30 April 1989, it was discovered that National members 
represented 52.8 per cent of the electors. The reason was that the National seats 
were growing so much more rapidly than the others. However, the Brisbane seat 
of Merthyr switched to Liberal at a by-election on 13 May 1989. Consequently the 
situation now is that the forty-eight National members represent 51.4 per cent of 
the electors of Queensland. 
You will notice that I do not pretend that the Nafional Party won 51.4 per 
cent of the vote last time. I merely assert that Nafional members represent 51.4 
per cent of the electors. But I can easily show that the National Party did win a 
smidgin over fifty per cent of the three way vote in 1986. 
Following those Victorian elections set out in "table 1" and "table 2", 
analysts said, in effect, that the Democratic Labor Party was a minor party with the 
vast majority of its preferences going to Liberal. Therefore, the Liberal Party 
really did win a majority of the votes. Therefore, Bolte was the rightful premier so 
no gerrymander need be presumed. 
Quite so, and that is what analysts should have said about Bjelke-Petersen, 
foflowing the 1986 Queensland election. The occasional analyst did say that, but 
such analysis was drowned by the clamour of those searching for the gerrymander. 
The Liberal Party vote in Queensland in 1986 was really three quite 
separate votes. Nominally the Liberal Party won 230,310 first preference votes (or 
16.5 per cent of the formal vote) but most of those votes were wasted as far as the 
Liberal Party was concerned. The three elements of that Liberal vote were: First, 
in Sherwood, the National Party candidate misunderstood the hour of close of 
nominations and so did not nominate. That left some 5,000 Nationals with the 
option of voting Liberal or Labor - and voted Liberal. Second, on my calculafions, 
there were 57,225 Liberals who voted for the ten successful Liberal candidates. 
Third, the rest of the Liberal vote was a minor party vote, no different in status 
from the votes for the Democrats, the Socialists or the Independents. It went to 
the big party of the voter's higher preference. The great majority of that went to 
the National Party. Therefore, my calculation of the 1986 three way vote is 
697,936 for National, 640,414 for Labor and 57,225 for Liberal. 
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Given that the system of single member electorates is notorious for over-
representing the largest single party, it is not surprising that the Nationals won the 
election outright. That is why it is quite implausible to suppose that the National 
win suggests the existence of a gerrymander. 
The most common form of propaganda against the Queensland boundaries 
is to draw attention to the fact that at the last State election, there were 7,909 
voters in the National Party seat of Roma and 22,982 in the Labor seat of Manly. 
That sort of argument would be all very well if the two cases were typical. They 
are not. 'Table 5" and "table 6" set out certain enrolments as at 30 April 1989. I 
think the tables are self-explanatory. The only point worth adding is that the area 
of Gregory is 443,250 square kilometres (considerably more than Victoria) while 
the area of Logan is 133 square kilometres. What the reader will notice is that the 
National Party dominates at both extremities of enrolment size. 
The correct way to analyse this is to strike averages. If we take the 
enrolments as at 30 April 1989, but call Merthyr a Liberal seat (since it switched to 
Liberal on 13 May), then we find that the average enrolment in Labor seats is 
20,558, in Liberal seats it is 20,010, and in National seats it is 18,459. (The average 
enrolment for all the seats is 19,350.) That is not a significant difference between 
the three parties. 
It is tme that Labor needs 51.5 per cent of the two-party preferred vote to 
win the elecfion on 2 December 1989. The bias against Labor is 1.5 per cent which 
is the difference. My own view is that the best way to explain National Party 
success is to study "table 8". "When these matters are properly understood it 
becomes clear that National Party power in Queensland is explained by the fact 
that a substantial number of Queenslanders voted for Joh. Under a system of 
proportional representafion, Joh might well have been brought down ten years 
earlier. However, Queensland, like Victoria, has a system of single member 
electorates with preferential voting. That system sustained Bolte for nearly twenty 
years in Victoria and Bjelke-Petersen for nearly twenty years in Queensland. The 
malapportionment or gerrymander has virtually nothing to do with either case. 
If Evan Whitton is a journalist, Peter Coaldrake is an academic. 
Coaldrake's book is much to be preferred to Whitton's.i Yet even Coaldrake 
cannot resist engaging in propaganda. Take, for example, his assertion that the 
Nationals in 1986 won the election "by collecting forty-nine seats with 39.6 per cent 
of the primary vote".2 The assertion is correct. The context is not. It is preceded 
by lengthy descriptions of the gerrymander at work. It is all designed to give the 
impression that it was the gerrymander which gave the Nationals victory with 39.6 
per cent of the primary vote. 
Among his several examples, we have his description of the fact that the 
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Aboriginal reserve of Wujal Wujal is located in Cook rather than Barron River.3 
This is one of several attempts to prove that Queensland has both a gerrymander 
and a malapportionment. It may well be that the exclusion of Wujal Wujal from 
the marginal seat of Barron River was motivated by a desire to help the National 
Party retain Barron River. The cmcial question, however, is this: How much 
difference does it make? 
Cook is admittedly, an ultra-safe Labor seat. At the 1986 election. Labor's 
Bob Scott received 5,629 votes (66.7 per cent) while the National Party candidate 
received 2,816 (33.3 per cent) in a straight contest. In Barron River the National 
Party member, Martin Tenni, received 7,990 votes (54 per cent) while the Labor 
candidate received 6,795 votes (46 per cent), also in a straight contest. 
And how did Wujal Wujal vote? Altogether, eighty-four valid votes were 
cast there, forty-three for Labor and forty-one for National. So the gerrymander of 
the boundaries between Cook and Barron River made not the slightest difference. 
I think I find the case put by Peter Coaldrake as unconvincing as the case put by 
Evan Whitton. 
I will be quite happy if the Goss Government carries out a redistribution in 
which the number of electors in each electoral district shall be as neariy equal as is 
practicable. However, that will not mark the dawn of democracy in Queensland, 
because the State will still have the same electoral system as before. 
Historians should describe the period from 1957 to 1989 accurately and 
should not be misled by propaganda. 
Table 1: Victorian Legislative Assembly elections 1955-70 - percentages of first 
preference votes 
8 May 31 May 15 Jul 27 Jun 29 Apr 3 0 May 
Party 1955 1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 
Liberal 
Labor 
CP 
DLP 
Other 
37.8 
32.6 
9.5 
12,6 
7.5 
37.2 
37.7 
a.3 
14.4 
1.4 
36.4 
38.6 
7.1 
17.0 
0.9 
39.6 
36.2 
8.8 
15.0 
0.4 
37.5 
37.9 
8.6 
14.3 
1.7 
36. 
41. 
6, 
13. 
2, 
.7 
,1 
.4 
,3 
.2 
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Table 2: Victorian Legislative Assembly elecfions 1955-70 - seats won 
28 May 31 May 15 Jul 27 Jun 29 Apr 30 May 
Party 1955 1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 
L i b e r a l 
Labor 
CP 
BliP 
I n d 
T o t a l 
L i b e r a l 
m a j o r i t y 
34 
2 0 
10 
1 
1 
66 
2 
38 
18 
10 
-
-
66 
10 
39 
17 
9 
_ 
1 
66 
12 
38 
18 
10 
-
-
66 
10 
44 
16 
12 
-
1 
7 3 
1 5 
42 
22 
8 
--
1 
7 3 
1 1 
Table 3: Queensland Legislative Assembly election, 1 November 1986 results 
Party Votes % Seats Contested Seats Won 
88 49 
89 30 
63 10 
38 
Table 4: Electors in seats won in Queensland, 1 November 1986 
N a t i o n a l 
Labor 
L i b e r a l 
Other 
3 9 . 
4 1 , 
1 6 . 
2 . 
.6 
,3 
. 5 
, 6 
Party Winning Seat E l e c t o r s 
8 0 9 , 8 5 6 
5 6 7 , 2 3 9 
1 8 6 , 1 9 9 
1 , 5 6 3 , 2 9 4 
% of T o t a l 
5 1 . 8 
3 6 . 3 
1 1 . 9 
1 0 0 . 0 
National 
Labor 
Liberal 
Total 
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Table 5: Electorates with fewest voters (enrolments as at 30 April 1989) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
NP 
ALP 
Gregory 
Roma 
Balonne 
Warrego 
Peak Downs 
Flinders 
Bowen 
Cook 
Mt Isa 
Carnarvon 
Warwick 
Liberal 
(NP) 
(NP) 
(NP) 
(NP) 
(NP) 
(NP) 
(ALP) 
(ALP) 
(Lib) 
(NP) 
(NP) 
8 
2; 
1 
8,204 
8,210 
8,672 
8,859 
9,118 
10,871 
12,204 
12,284 
12,553 
12,598 
13,050 
Table 6: Electorates with most voters (enrolments as at 30 April 1989) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
Logan 
Landsborough 
Thuringowa 
Manly 
Cooroora 
Nicklin 
South Coast 
Albert 
Glass House 
Nerang 
Fassifern 
NP 
ALP 
(ALP) 
(NP) 
(ALP) 
(ALP) 
(NP) 
(NP) 
(NP) 
(NP) 
(NP) 
(NP) 
(NP) 
8 
3 
27,224 
27,028 
26,584 
26,156 
25,936 
25,873 
25,849 
25,433 
25,357 
25,170 
25,061 
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Table 7: Bias for lower houses with single member electorates 
Parliament % Bias in Labor's Favour 
South Australia 
New South Wales 
Western Australia 
Commonwea1th 
•Victoria 
Queensland 
3-7 
3.. 5 
3.»4 
1.7 
1.4 
- 1 . 5 
Ave rage 2 . 0 
Table 8: How the National Party vote has doubled 
Party Votes % Seats Contested Seats Won 
27 May 1972 
Country 
Liberal 
Labor 
Other 
7 December 1974 
National 
Liberal 
Labor 
Other 
12 November 1977 
National 
Liberal 
Labor 
Other 
20.0 
22.2 
46.8 
11.0 
27.9 
31.1 
36.0 
5,0 
27.1 
25.2 
42.8 
4.9 
44 
53 
82 
77 
48 
53 
82 
46 
54 
51 
82 
46 
2B 
m 
2. 
39 
30 
II 
2 
24, 
ai. 
Cont'd. 
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Party Votes % Seats Contested Seats Won 
35 
22 
25 
2 9 November 1980 
National 
Liberal 
Labor 
Other 
2 2 October 
National 
Liberal 
Labor 
Other 
1 November 
National 
Liberal 
Labor 
Other 
1983 
1986 
27.9 
26.9 
41.5 
3.7 
38.9 
14.9 
44.0 
2.2 
39.6 
16.5 
41.3 
2.6 
56 
64 
82 
43 
n 
S3 
82 
30 
Si 
6,i 
sa 
aa 
41 
8 
32 
1 
49 
10 
30 
Notes 
1. P. Coaldrake, Working the System (Brisbane: University of Queensland 
Press, 1989). 
2. Ibid., p. 52. 
3. Ibid., p. 50. 
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The Weighting Game: Do the Nationals 
Have a Case? 
Rae Wear 
Under the system of electoral weightage which operates in Queensland, the 
principle of "one vote, one value" has been rejected. Instead, the State is divided 
into four zones; the South Eastern, Provincial Cities, Western and Far Northern 
and Country Zones. Votes cast in the mral zones are worth up to three times the 
votes cast in the populous South East. This over-representation of rural areas 
operates to the considerable advantage of the mling National Party and to the 
detriment of both the Labor and Liberal Parties. In the mral zones are the seats in 
which, as former Minister Russ Hinze indicated to the Fitzgerald Inquiry, "... all 
you have to do is get the National Party tag and you can win forever and a day."i 
The Nafionals argue that by maintaining electoral weightage, they are doing no 
more than carrying on a tradition begun by the Labor Party. For example, after a 
Labor re-distribution prior to the 1935 State election. Sir Arthur Fadden claimed, 
in a fashion reminiscent of Russ Hinze at his best, that a seat like Kennedy became 
so safely Labor "that even Winston Churchill standing as a non-Labor candidate 
could not have won it".2 
As well as using historical argument, the National Party justifies electoral 
weighting in three major ways; that weightage is necessary to overcome the 
difficulties in representation posed by a small population thinly distributed over a 
large area; that mral electorates produce a large proportion of Australia's wealth 
and export income and therefore deserve "reasonable representation in 
Parliament" and that representation based on "one vote, one value" would deprive 
mral people of the chance of reasonable representation.3 Without electoral 
weightage, the Nationals suggest country voices would be drowned by the clamour 
of city voters whose interests and values are different from mral people. For these 
reasons, they claim that mral voters are deserving of special consideration from 
the electoral system. 
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The Nationals' arguments are premised on an under-standing of democracy 
as a system in which "... all sectors of a community are entitled to an adequate voice 
and vote to protect their interests".* Their contention is that the electoral system 
should provide a mechanism for the representation of minority sectors or interests, 
rather than for the equal representation of individuals, which is the view of the 
Liberal and Labor parfies. The Nafional Party's position is not necessarily anti-
democratic in certain contexts and in certain conditions (a federal system is an 
obvious example), but it needs to be recognised that the Nationals are arguing for 
a deviation from the Westminster model of democracy which they avowedly 
support.5 As James Kelly wrote on the subject of vote weightage and quota 
gerrymanders in Queensland nearly twenty years ago: 
The issue of pro-mral voting involves a conflict between two opposed 
interpretations of democratic representation. Electoral systems in Australia 
are ostensibly designed to ^ive effect to the basic democratic principle of 
popular control of Governments by requiring them to seek majority support 
at periodic elections. The theory involves a view of electors as individuals, 
with equal political rights, and not as members of interest groups, 
communities or any other collectivity. That the system is fundamentally 
based on the equal political rights of individuals is recognised in the simple, 
but effective phrase, 'one man, one vote, one value'. * 
In pressing for the retention of electoral weightage, the Nationals are 
asking that a mechanism usually associated with consensus models of democracy 
be imposed upon the essentially majoritarian Westminster system. Much of the 
debate on the issue of representation in Queensland occurs without acknowledging 
that two different models of democracy are being used. 
This chapter will examine the Nationals' case in relation to relevant aspects 
of the Westminster model of democracy. It will then proceed to an examination of 
an alternative consensus model of democracy which has sectional representation as 
a characteristic.' Finally, the chapter will venture an assessment as to whether the 
Nationals have a case for electoral weightage. 
The Nationals and the Westminster Model 
It may be argued that to enter into debate over whether the National Party of 
Queensland has a case for electoral weightage requires a suspension of disbelief. 
It assumes the acceptance of the Nationals' arguments at face value and the 
banishing of the suspicion that the reasons which they give for electoral weightage 
are simply a cynical rationale for the maintenance of power at any cost. There is 
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certainly evidence for this position and it is one which a number of commentators 
take.8 In a celebrated statement, former National Party Minister, Russ Hinze, 
made it clear that the distortion of electoral boundaries for partisan advantage 
was considered sensible in some quarters of the National Party: "I told the 
Premier, 'If you want the boundaries rigged, let me do it, and we'll stay in power 
for ever. If you don't do it, people will say you are stupid.' In South Australia, 
Steele Hall redistributed himself out of office. I don't think you'll be able to blame 
Joh or me for doing anything like that.-' 
Bjelke-Petersen's own conversion from vigorous opposition to the zonal 
system under Labor, on the grounds that it meant the majority would be mled by 
the minority, to ardent supporter of the system under the Nationals, lends weight 
to the belief that pragmatic rather than ideological considerations are often at 
work.io 
However, to dismiss the Nationals' arguments as nothing more than ex-post-
facto justifications for holding on to power, is to underestimate the ideological 
nature of National Party support. Many mral voters believe that they will be 
disenfranchised if the weighting system goes. Further, they are of the opinion that 
this will be detrimental, not only to themselves, but to the wider society. Farmers 
in Queensland, like their compatriots in the rest of Australia, have long held the 
conviction that their economic contribution and moral worth make them 
indispensable to the rest of society. They also tend to believe that as a group, they 
have substantially different interests and values from urban dwellers. For these 
reasons, they argue that a tmly democratic system should provide a mechanism to 
give them a voice and protect their interests. 
As has been suggested, this is not necessarily anti-democratic, but it is 
different from the version of democracy accepted in Westminster systems. Despite 
the hybrid origins of our system of government which have led to some well-
documented departures from Westminster, our democratic conventions are 
derived from British tradition.n The essence of that tradition is majority mle.12 
Westminster is a "wiimer takes all" system in which there is no formal mechanism 
to provide for minority participation in government. 
This is considered to be unnecessary because, in theory, all interests in 
society have their ideas represented through either the government or the 
opposition. Despite the plethora of opinions in any society, the Westminster 
system assumes that all views can be gathered into two opposing political camps 
which take turns in government. 'Whilst there may be more than two political 
parties, "Considerations of government always tend to bring matters back to only 
two sides - the side of the Ins and the side of the Outs."i3 As Duverger has 
suggested, "A duality of parties does not always exist, but almost always there is a 
duality of tendencies." i" This duality can be seen in Queensland in the division of 
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the three major political parties into Labor and non-Labor parties. Even though 
the Nationals and Liberals in Queensland represent different interests and have 
fought bitterly to determine ascendancy, they have much in common, especially a 
united opposition to Labor. 
The Westminster system adopts the position that all interests are 
represented and protected by the two major political alignments. There is, in this 
view, no need to electorally "weight" sectors to ensure that their interests are 
protected. The principle of alternation in office, in conjunction with a tolerant 
society, ensures this. This principle of alternation, is, as Graham Maddox points 
out, fundamental to the Westminster model: 
According to the traditional way of looking at things, under the 
'Westminster' model representative government cannot be said to 
be in a healthy condition unless there is a reasonable 'pendulum 
swing' between the two major alignments, so that one party, then the 
other, holds office for a time. In this way, a reasonable opportunity 
is offered to both sides to have policy implemented, and so in turn 
all groups within society can see the chance of having their points of 
view represented politically. Under the two-Party system the major 
alignments are aggregative institutions which bring together, on one 
side or other, the interests and concerns of all groups and individuals 
in society, is 
Clearly, the system of electoral weightage which operates in Queensland 
acts to hinder this pendulum swing between the Labor and non-Labor alignments, 
although it has not been solely responsible for keeping Labor out of office.i6 
However, it does build into the electoral system a deliberate and consistent bias in 
favour of the interests represented by the National Party. By its partisan nature, it 
is a distortion of a different order from those found in many electoral systems. It is 
not uncommon for electoral systems to produce disproportional results in which 
there is a failure to translate a majority of votes into a majority of seats.!' Nor are 
considerable variations in the size of electorates uncommon, as the National 
Party's policy document on electoral weightage makes clear. It makes much of the 
fact that in other Westminster democracies there is wide variation in the size of 
electorates. The document cites the example of Great Britain, where, in the 
redistribution for the House of Commons elecfion in 1983, the majority of 
electorates varied in numbers of voters from 50,000 to 70,000, with the largest 
electorate having a voting population of 94,236 and the smallest, 22,822. Eight 
electorates had more than 80,00 voters and three had less than 40,000.18 Such 
distortions appear for a variety of reasons, such as the maintenance of a 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
The Weighting Game 263 
geographical community, but they are not deliberately arranged to reflect a 
philosophy of sector or interest representation. 
Special arrangements for minorities are considered to be unnecessary in the 
Westminster model, not only because of the formal recognition of govertunent and 
opposition, but also because, "British democracy, although majoritarian, is tolerant 
and civir'.is The Westminster model operates most effectively in stable and 
homogeneous societies in which the expression of different points of view fails to 
destroy the fundamental harmony of society. The conflict which occurs between 
the two major polifical alignments "concerns only secondary aims and means, 
whilst a general polifical philosophy and the fundamental bases of the system are 
accepted by both sides..."20 Majoritarianism is not effective where the schisms in a 
society are so pronounced and the differences between groups so marked that 
majority mle becomes tyrannical and oppressive, a situation which arguably has 
occurred in Northern Ireland. In situafions of severe, or potentially severe conflict, 
a case has been made for the weightage of minority interests. 
The Consensus Model of Democracy 
The arguments in favour of minority over-representation have rested largely on the 
contention that majority mle divides society into two great opposed interests, with 
the strong oppressing the weak. To counter this tendency, alternative "consensus" 
models which discard the majoritarian principle have been put forward. One of 
the most impeissioned pleas for a consensus model of democracy came from John 
Calhoun, Vice-President of the United States from 1817 to 1825. Calhoun was a 
Southerner, and thus a representative of a sectional minority. He argued in favour 
of a system of concurrent, rather than numerical majorities. The concurrent 
majority gave equal representation to key sections in society, whatever their 
numerical size, rather than to individuals. His argument was that: "... governments 
of the concurrent majority have greatly the advantage. I allude to the difference in 
their respective tendency in reference to dividing or uniting the community. That 
of the concurrent ... is to unite the community, let its interests be ever so 
diversified or opposed, while that of the numerical is to divide it into two 
conflicfing portions, let its interests be naturally ever so united and identified.-2i 
Calhoun's credibility has always suffered from the suspicion that his 
elaborate model of government by concurrent majority was simply a device to 
defend the power of the South and protect its "peculiar institution" of slavery. He 
does, however, in the words above, raise one of the key arguments in favour of 
consensus models of democracy; that they unite, rather than divide different 
sectors or community interests. 
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The view has already been put that the majoritarian Westminster system 
does not divide society because it rests on an underlying consensus. If, however, 
there is no underlying consensus on the polifical philosophy or fundamental bases 
of society, a majoritarian system could be profoundty divisive. In such cases, a 
model of democracy which puts the case for minority representafion has some 
validity. Such a model is the consensus or consociational model devised by Arend 
Lijphart. This is based on a study of the successftil operation of democracy in a 
number of plural, or divided societies, which have multi-party systems. In these 
societies, the majoritarian model has been rejected on account of its potential to 
divide society by denying significant minorities access to power. It has been 
replaced by a consensus model. Instead of government by a majority, there is 
government by "a grand coalition of the political leaders of all significant segments 
of the plural society".22 The reason for this is that majoritarianism in a society 
marked by pronounced religious and ethnic cleavages usually leads to the 
oppression and exploitation of minorities by a dominant majority. Worse, the 
disaffected minority often resorts to civil strife or attempts to break away, leading 
to instability and violence. In order to achieve harmony in divided societies, 
various devices are used. One of these is electoral weightage or the deliberate 
overrepresentation of certain sectors in society. An example of this occurs in 
Belgium where the cabinet must consist of equal numbers of Dutch and French 
speaking members, despite the fact that French speakers form a minority in 
Belgium.23 
Although electoral weightage is a characteristic of consensus models of 
democracy, it is, as Queensland shows, not unknown in majoritarian systems. 
When over- representation is introduced into Westminster systems it is usually in 
order to favour a group which is seen as disadvantaged. New Zealand, for 
example, characterised by Lijphart as "a virtually perfect example of the 
Westminster model of democracy" uses a system of electoral weightage in favour 
of Maori voters.24 Maori can register in either their own electorates, or in one of 
four special Maori electorates. Since 1943, the votes from these electorates have 
consistently favoured the Labour Party which supports the retention of separate 
Maori representation in Parliament. The maintenance of Maori seats has been 
defended on the "consensus" grounds that Maori have distinctive cultural values 
and interests, which need protection through the electoral system. It was feared 
that the operation of the majoritarian principle would significantly disadvantage 
them. For these reasons, a vote weighting mechanism was grafted on to the 
Westminster system. It is interesting to note that the 1986 Report Of The Royal 
Commission On The Electoral System in New Zealand, rejected vote weightage on 
the grounds that: "If a minority group needs or is entitled to other protections for 
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its rights, these must be found outside an electoral system based on equality of the 
vote."25 
In other words, the Royal Commission rejected the representation of 
interests (in this case an ethnic group) in favour of the representation of 
individuals. It found that vote weightage was inconsistent with the principles of a 
majoritarian, Westminster system. The commissioners found that even for so 
distinctive a group as Maori, electoral over-representation was inappropriate. 
The Nationals' Case 
This raises the question of whether electoral weightage of mral areas is 
appropriate in a state ostensibly governed on Westminster lines. The Nationals 
built their Ccise by arguing that mral people are a distinctive group who contribute 
significantly to Queensland's wealth, and who have special needs because of the 
"tyranny of distance". They argue that electoral weightage is the most appropriate 
way to protect the values and interests of mral people. 
There is little doubt that mral people are different in many ways from 
urban Australians. The fact that there is a mral-urban cleavage in Australia has 
been acknowledged.26 Rural areas have been seen to have both a distinctive 
economic base and a distinctive polifical culture.27 This culture involves a set of 
beliefs which have been variously labelled as "rural fundamentalism" or 
"counttymindedness". These beliefs combine a faith in the virtues of mral living, 
the conviction that the mral sector is uniquely productive and mistmst of the cities 
with social and religious conservatism. David Kemp, in a study comparing the 
attitudes of managers and executives, farm owners and managers, farm labourers 
and other manual labourers found that farm workers and their bosses shared 
conservative opinions on a range of social issues. For example, the two groups 
were the ones most in favour of the retention of capital punishment and of "God 
Save the Queen" as Australia's national anthem.28 Farm labourers' views on these 
issues were closer to those of mral property owners than to those of urban 
workers. It must be noted, however, that the differences in opinion were not 
pronounced. 
Whilst the evidence suggests that there are differences between country and 
city dwellers, those differences do not appear to be profound. It is difficult to find 
data which suggests that the mral-urban cleavage is so pronounced that mral 
people do not share in the general polifical philosophy of their fellow 
Queenslanders. The fact that federally, electoral weightage has been removed 
without causing conflict, lends weight to this view. On these grounds, electoral 
weightage appears to be unwarranted. 
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On the point of the mral sector's economic contribufion, the Nationals' case 
can be dismissed. It is no part of any twentieth century model of democracy to 
assign votes according to productivity. 
The Nationals also strongly emphasise the difficulty in representing a sparse 
population spread over a wide area. Undoubtedly, the wide empty spaces of 
Western and far Northern Queensland do provide challenges for the electoral 
system. However, it should be possible to meet that challenge other than through 
electoral weightage, with additional staff and support for mral members. 
On consideration, the Nationals' case for electoral weightage fails. Whilst 
electoral weightage can be justified in some plural societies, it is extremely difficult 
to accept in the Queensland context. If electoral weightage were to be removed, it 
is hard to believe that mral Queenslanders would face tyrarmy and oppression at 
the hands of their city cousins or a non-National Party Government. Labor leader 
Wayne Goss has already acknowledged the importance of the mral and mining 
sectors and has in turn been reassured by mral leaders that primary producers 
would be able "to live with a Goss Labor Government".29 
The consensus model of democracy suggests that the representation of 
interests is, in some cases appropriate. But in a community in which all political 
parfies support the Westminster model, its use appears deviant. The Westminster 
model values open debate and political conflict built upon foundations of 
consensus. It is a system in which the alternation in office of the major political 
parties assures the representation of diverse views. Most importantly, it is a system 
tolerant of minority opinion. 
These factors mean that the Nationals have no case for electoral weighting. 
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Fitzgerald Commission of Inquiry 
Public Advertisement Inviting Submissions 
COMMISSION 
OF INQUIRY 
liev^,;^HECO^Ii\IISSIONS OF INQUIRY ACTS 1950TO I 9 5 # ff& 
A Commission of Inquiry has been appomted by His Excellency the GoyGrnor 
with the advice of the Executive Council in relation to possible activities 
involving: 
(i) prostitution. 
(ii) unlawful gambling, 
(iii) the sale of illegal drugs 
(iv) associated misconduct by members of the Queensland Police Force; and 
(v) payments by named persons to one or more political parties in 
Queensland and the purpose of any such payment. 
The Order-in-Council by which the Commission of Inquiry was constituted was 
published in an Extraordinary Queensland Government Gazette on Tuesday. 
26 May 1987 and copies may be obtained free of charge from the 
Commission. 
Investigations are being earned out on behalf of the Commission into the 
matters in respect of which it is required to report and make 
recommendations. 
Any person or organization with information or documentation which relates 
to any such matter, or which may otherwise assist the Commission, for 
example by indicating a possible line of investigation, is requested to 
communicate with the Commission as soon as possible. 
Ail communications should be directed initially to the Secretary of the 
Commission either by writing to the address stated below or by telephoning 
the number indicated 
Procedures will be implemented within the Commission to ensure that 
confidentiality is maintained with respect to the identity of persons who assist 
the Commission and the information and documents which they provide in so 
tar as that is appropriate and consistent with the discharge of the 
Commission's functions 
Further, any person who feels particular concern may upon request have his 
or her communication referred directly to Counsel Assisting the Commission. 
The Commission's preliminary hearing was held at 10.15 a.m. on Friday. 12 
June 1987 and it is presently anticipated that the full Commission hearings 
will commence on 13 July 1987. 
The Commission's hearing will ordinarily be held in Court 29 on the 4th 
F.oor m the District Courts Section of the Law Courts Building. George Street 
Brisbane 
For addUional mformQUon contact the Secretary of the Commission. Mr John 
Sosso 
The address of the Commission is 
Level 2. Watts House. 95 North Quay, Brisbane 
The postal address ol the Commission is 
•P:0. Box 157, North Quay. 4002 
The Telephone number of the Commission is: 221 2261 
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CORRUPTION AND REFORM 
Leading commentators here present their views on what the recom-
mendations of the controversial Fitzgerald Inquiry mean for Australia 
and for the Sunshine State. Journalists, public servants, lawyers, po-
lice administrators and political scientists canvass the broad range of 
issues that Tony Fitzgerald exposed in his Report. . . from police cor-
ruption to freedom of information legislation, the media and the public 
service. It includes along the way a tour of the history of corruption 
since Botany Bay. 
The reporters who sparked off the inquiry, Chris Masters and Phil 
Dickie, are among those discussing the vital role of the media. Histo-
rian Ross Fitzgerald compares the Fitzgerald Inquiry of 1987-89 with 
the notorious National Hotel Inquiry of 1963-64. Evan Whitton pro-
poses three simple ideas for parliamentary democracy. Malcolm 
Mackerras explains why the gerrymander is just propaganda. Brian 
Toohey voices his strong misgivings atxjut the Report; and Nigel Pow-
ell, the policeman who blew the whistle on the Queensland Licensing 
Branch, makes his own special plea. 
Uncompromising in their examination of the roots of corruption and 
the possibilities for reform, these arguments and opinions will stimulate 
and inform discussion on this most important of national issues. 
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